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Foreword
There has been a lot of attention on the current transition of power taking place in Brussels.
For the first time in European Union history, the new President of the European Commission
will  take up his post after being nominated as 'Spitzenkandidat' of the party group which
gained the highest share of votes in the EP elections. The new President of the European
Council and new High Representative have been selected; the (controversial) structure of the
new Commission has been announced, together with the list of Commissioner-designates;
and the new Members of the European Parliament, elected in May, have started working,
now scrutinising the potential new Commissioners in their hearings. 
There is no better moment to take stock of the 'state of the Union' and to look ahead into the
next European political cycle (2014-2019), focusing not on personalities but on content:
what challenges do we face and what should the EU focus on in the coming years?
Europe's experience of recent years has been one of multiple and inter-related crises,
triggered by the global financial crisis, including financial/banking, public debt, euro,
economic, social, and political crises. In addition, we now face uncertainty over the
continued membership of the United Kingdom and an external crisis, with potentially large
impact on the EU, especially in those countries with high energy dependency.
These crises, and the difficulties in addressing them, have heightened the legitimacy deficit
that has been affecting the European Union for the last decades and has given new life to
Eurosceptic and populist movements. The fundamentals of the European project, such as the
free movement of EU citizens, are starting to be challenged even by mainstream European
parties, while the debate on repatriation of powers and the balance between Member States'
and EU competences is growing.
Thus, it is clear that in the next five years this new political leadership will be faced with a
multitude of challenges. The list of immediate priorities is long: fostering growth, creating
jobs, overcoming internal fragmentation, establishing an Energy Union, dealing with
problematic neighbours, finding a way forward on the UK issue and completing the missing
elements of EMU governance. Europe also needs to find ways to overcome its legitimacy
deficit and come up with a shared vision for Europe's future. 
This issue of Challenge Europe aims to contribute to this debate about the future of European
integration in view of the next political cycle, the challenges it faces and the possible
solutions, considering also their implication for the way the institutions organise their work.
This is done through a series of articles authored by distinguished contributors, almost all of
whom are or have been involved in high-level EU policymaking and policy analysis, either
at the European or the Member State level. 
The first article of this volume addresses the state of the Union at the start of the new political
mandate, followed by an analysis of the three meta-challenges faced by the EU: stagnation,
fragmentation and legitimacy. The following articles deal with these challenges across a large
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breadth of policy areas, from EU and euro governance to differentiated integration, growth,
solidarity, climate change, EU foreign policy, migration and the freedom of movement of
persons, leadership, and populism. 
I would like to thank the authors for accepting our invitation and putting their ideas on paper
and the EPC staff, for helping prepare this publication, in particular Paul Ivan as coordinator
of the process. I believe that this volume is an important contribution to the current policy
debate, providing analysis combined with concrete recommendations. We hope this
publication will not only be useful, relevant and timely, but that it will be a starting point for
further debate.
Fabian Zuleeg is Chief Executive of the European Policy Centre.
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State of the Union and key challenges for Europe's future1
Janis A. Emmanouilidis and Paul Ivan
In the last five years deep cracks have appeared in the European project. The 'euro-area crisis'
triggered by a severe global financial and economic crisis has put European integration to a
major test, more profound than ever before. The experience of recent years has revealed and
exacerbated significant deficiencies in the European Union's (EU) economic and political
construction. At time it has cast doubt on fundamentals of the European project and raised
questions about whether Europe will be able to deal effectively not only with the immediate
crisis, but also with the many other serious socio-economic, politico-institutional, societal
and global challenges that Europe is and will be confronted with. At the start of a new
institutional-political cycle (2014-2019) and while the crisis situation has for a number of
reasons improved significantly since the summer of 2012, at least in systemic terms, the
Union's new leadership and Member States will now have to take strategic decisions about
the future of European integration.
'State of the Union' – improvements in systemic terms but no room for complacency
In 2010, at the beginning of the EU's last political cycle and two years after the collapse of
Lehman Brothers, Europe became the centre of the biggest financial and economic crisis
since the Great Depression. What began as a government debt crisis in one of the smallest
economies on its periphery, representing only 2% of the EU's combined economic output,
soon exposed the fundamental deficits of a monetary union without an equally strong
economic and political dimension. As the Greek crisis escalated, many European leaders
wanted to believe its problems were unique, but the markets followed their own logic and
the crisis quickly spread to other EU countries. As the dominos began to fall, it became
obvious that the E(M)U lacked the necessary institutional structures, procedures, rules, and
instruments to prevent such a crisis from beginning, spreading and worsening. And then the
unthinkable became a very thinkable reality: one or more countries could leave the euro; the
euro zone could implode; or even that the EU could disintegrate.
To make matters worse, Europe faced not just one but a number of highly complex crises,
which together produced a crisis of confidence, undermining the trust of markets, citizens
and global partners in the future of the euro and the EU itself: Europe faced a banking crisis
in a highly interwoven European financial system which included illiquid or even insolvent
financial institutions burdened by high levels of public and private debt; a public debt crisis
prohibiting or endangering the access of over-indebted countries to capital markets; a private
debt crisis putting additional strains on the banking sector in many Member States; a
competitiveness crisis illustrated by current account deficits in Europe's periphery at the
outset of the crisis and by a limited ability to adapt individual European economies to the
challenges of a more competitive global environment; a growth and investment crisis
involving structurally low levels of GDP growth and a lack of public and private investment
and the negative effects of a persistent credit crunch; an institutional crisis characterised by
the rising significance of national governments in EU policy-making, while responsibilities
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have been shifted to the Union without a parallel delegation of actual powers and resources
to Brussels; a social crisis caused by deep, long-lasting recessions and very high levels of
structural long-term unemployment in a number of Member States and by more fundamental
and unresolved demographic challenges, with ageing societies and shrinking populations
across the EU; and last but not least, a political crisis characterised by high levels of volatility
and instability and the rise of populist, anti-establishment, anti-EU/euro, and anti-
immigration parties and movements.
In this unprecedented situation, there was no textbook that European and national decision-
makers could turn to for advice and guidance on how to react to these complex and
interwoven crises. Responses have been often slow, insufficient and sometimes ill-advised,
and the results sometimes meagre and disappointing. 
At the same time, many things that seemed impossible some years earlier have happened since
the outbreak of the crisis, including huge bailout programmes, two multi-hundred billion euro
rescue mechanisms (EFSF; ESM), unprecedented fiscal consolidation efforts in deficit countries,
a strengthening of EMU governance, the signing of an intergovernmental fiscal treaty,
unprecedented action by the European Central Bank (ECB) to support sovereign debt markets
and provide liquidity lifelines to banking systems; and the creation of a (limited) banking union
with a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and a Single Resolution Mechanism. 
But despite all these efforts, the EU and its members struggled for a long time to get ahead
of the curve and persuade the markets and citizens that they were capable of meeting the
multifaceted challenges posed by the crisis. At times, it seemed that the 'crisis snowball'
might spiral out of control and trigger an avalanche with the potential to bury the euro or
even the European project underneath it.
Today, the situation still remains volatile, but fears of the worst-case scenario becoming reality
have receded for two main reasons: the ECB's promise to do 'whatever it takes' to guarantee
the euro's stability and the significantly lower risk of country leaving the common currency.
This has boosted confidence and significantly reduced the danger of a euro meltdown. 
Although the situation has improved in systemic terms, this is not reflected in the day-to-day
reality in many Member States. The crisis is by no means over and there is no room for
complacency neither at European nor at national level, given the continuing fragility of the
economic, fiscal, social, and political situation: economic growth remains elusive and
(youth) unemployment (exceptionally) high; the European banking system and financial
markets are still highly fragmented; in a number of countries government debt levels remain
exceptionally high; the social and political situation in many Member States is tense and the
rise of populist forces on both the left and right of the political spectrum has raised concerns
about the state of democracy in Europe.
All this is happening while the world and the neighbourhood around us is in the midst of
major transformations, and the EU and its members are under pressure to respond to
fundamental changes 'out there'. History is very much in the making as proven by
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developments such as the continuous rise of China but also more tragically, by the turmoil
in the Middle East or the war in Ukraine and the stand-off with Russia.
It is impossible to predict what the future global order will look like. Despite different
patterns of relative rise or decline, all major international players expose a considerable
degree of domestic fragility. On balance we are witnessing a shift towards a less 'Western
world'. The ability of the 'West' to influence international affairs is being put to test as its
societies grow older and its share of world population and economic might is expected to
further shrink. Under these conditions, Europeans have to face the challenges related to
increasing global economic competition by individually and collectively preparing
themselves for the transition of Europe's economy. 
In the new global landscape, Europe is no longer a centre of gravity in international political
and economic affairs, as global developments are increasingly shaped in other parts of the
world while the 'old continent' is mainly preoccupied with itself. As a consequence, there are
severe doubts as to whether the EU and its members will be able to manage the process of
growing global interdependencies and connectivity. Globalisation is and will continue to be
the most significant factor shaping international politics and Europeans find themselves once
again at a crossroads while things could move in two very opposite directions: Europe could
either face creeping decline, gradual marginalisation and in the worst case even global
irrelevance or co-determine the future rules of global governance. While the distribution of
power detracts from Europe's clout on the global stage, the EU remains a pivotal international
actor whose combined economic, financial and political resources can make a positive
difference to international cooperation, if mobilised for the pursuit of clearly defined goals.
Whether Europe will be willing and able to act strategically to advance its values and interests
in a changing world remains unclear and will very much depend on developments at home.
Three key challenges – fragmentation, stagnation, legitimacy
Given the current state of the Union and the changing external environment, it is still not
clear whether the 'iron law' of European integration history will prove itself again; i.e.
whether the EU will, once again, emerge stronger and more mature form the crisis, as it has
in the past. But one thing seems rather certain: if Europeans want to exploit their combined
potential, they have to collectively and individually address three interlinked key challenges:
stagnation, fragmentation and legitimacy.
1. Stagnation 
The first key challenge the EU and its members will face in the years to come is economic
and institutional-political stagnation. Europe's feeble recovery seems to have ground to a halt
and the EU is close to entering its third recession since the 'great crisis' started in 2008.
Continuous economic stagnation would lead inevitably to growing pressures on the middle
classes and to widespread perceptions of increasing social injustice both within and between
Member States. After years of low growth or even recession, the main challenge facing
European leaders in the coming five years will be to return the troubled European economies
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to sustainable growth and to increase employment rates, productivity, competitiveness, and
the overall level of prosperity in Europe.
However, the Union is not 'only' facing economic stagnation but also the danger of
institutional-political stagnation. Collective efforts to overcome the Union's remaining
structural shortfalls have lost momentum since late 2012, with the decreasing threat of a euro
meltdown limiting governments' readiness to take bold(er) decisions. To be clear, the EU is
still advancing, as shown by the recent agreement on the next leg of the banking union, the
Single Resolution Mechanism. But there is a loss of ambition and growing complacency as
reform fatigue has spread. 'Consolidation' has become the order of the day as immediate
crisis threats and markets pressures have receded; 'doing less, but doing it better' at European
level has become the predominant mantra in Brussels and in most national capitals. The
question is whether this will suffice in the years to come. 
2. Fragmentation
The second key challenge the EU and its members will face is that of fragmentation – in its
different shapes: fragmentation between the EU and its citizens due to an increased
uncertainty about the future added value of European integration and a growing feeling
among citizens that they are directly affected by decisions taken in 'Brussels' which they
cannot effectively influence; economic fragmentation between Member States due to a lack
of competitiveness of certain EU economies and the lack of mechanisms between weaker
and stronger countries to cushion economic and social shocks that hit some harder than
others; political fragmentation characterised by a higher level of distrust between Member
States and even national societies due a (re-)surfacing of national stereotypes, nationalism,
chauvinism and resentments, and an ever-louder, over-simplistic and harmful blame game
between Member States because of differing interpretations of the root causes, nature and
complexity of the crisis, disagreements over the 'crisis recipe' as well as conflicting visions
regarding the overall future of European integration; and, last but not least, social
fragmentation within individual EU countries due to an increasing divide between the 'haves'
and 'have-less' leading to widespread perceptions of social injustice resulting in indignation,
despair, and anger.
The different sources and dimensions of fragmentation threaten to undermine the ability 
of the Union to develop, adopt and implement adequate policy solutions, which no country
– irrespective of its size – can cope with alone. As a consequence, the EU and its members
run the risk of struggling to meet citizen's expectations in terms of delivery, which in return
undermines the Union's legitimacy. 
3. Legitimacy 
Finally, the EU is challenged by a loss of legitimacy of the European project in the eyes of
citizens for a number of reasons. In more fundamental terms, the EU and its members are
struggling with an increased loss of trust in traditional political elites and their ability to master
the complex challenges of today's world. Although the resulting challenge to traditional
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models of political representation is a wider phenomenon, it has particularly drastic
consequences for the EU, which is still perceived as an elitist project and thus is brought into
question more quickly and fundamentally than traditional political entities. This effect is
fostered by the circumstance that national politicians often blame 'Brussels' for some of their
own failings ('scapegoating') and are reluctant to give the Union credit for its successes.
The loss of trust in traditional parties also leads to a more dispersed political scene, with new
movements and parties entering the political sphere, which has the potential to undermine the
ability of the EU and its members to deliver adequate policy results ('output legitimacy'). The
success of 'anti-forces' – anti-EU, anti-euro, anti-migration, anti-establishment – demonstrated
most visibly in the 2014 European Parliament elections, is putting mainstream parties under
severe pressure, which risks further complicating the search for compromises between
Member States. At the same time, the success of 'anti-forces' on both the left and right side of
the political spectrum increases the pressure on 'pro-EU forces' in the Member States and in
the European Parliament to form coalitions and find adequate policy responses.
Finally, there is a widespread notion that the Union has in recent years become more inter-
governmental and dominated by the views and interests of particular Member States, which
undermines the legitimacy of EU decision-making. The Union's governance structures are
not being perceived as being able to balance national interests so that all EU countries feel
they profit from decisions taken in Brussels/Strasbourg. Since the Lisbon Treaty entered into
force and over the course of the crisis, the powers and political weight of the heads of state
and government have increased at the expense of the European Commission and European
Parliament. This has boosted inter-governmentalism in the EU, at times undermining or even
circumventing the traditional 'community method' through the introduction of a number of
inter-governmental treaties/agreements outside the EU treaty framework. Today's Union is
also characterised by what might be called 'unbalanced inter-governmentalism': a new
balance of power between Member States, with Germany playing a much more dominant
role than in the past.
Addressing internal and external challenges – a summary of contributions
So, what can and should the EU and its members do to effectively address the challenges of
stagnation, fragmentation and legitimacy? What are the possible solutions that should be
pursued to put the continent in the best possible position not only to confront the many risks
and uncertainties it faces, but also to exploit and make the best use of all of Europe's
potential? In the present volume a number of distinguished authors address key issues and
challenges and identify recommendations on how to address them in the years to come.
In the first article of this volume, Herman Van Rompuy argues that in a time of sweeping
worldwide changes, Europe risks losing the competition race. He argues that the EU needs
to focus on innovation, to turn ideas into real business and to develop digital technologies
by addressing the problems regarding intellectual property, copyrights, market
fragmentation, consumer protection, investment in infrastructure, venture capital for start-
ups, and digital skills. Europe also needs to focus not only on reducing production costs,
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though that should be done for example regarding energy costs, but also on focusing on
quality in all its shapes and guises: novelty, reliability, image, design, experience, durability.
Writing about the growth challenge for Europe and the EMU, George Pagoulatos contends that
in the short term what is needed is a policy mix that first assists fiscal consolidation, economic
adjustment and productivity-enhancing structural reforms in the economically weaker
countries and that second, provides for an urgent countercyclical stimulus funded for example
by the European Investment Bank (EIB) and assisted by the EU budget and the ECB. This would
help to close the investment gap in the euro zone and to restore growth prospects. Pagoulatos
argues that it would also be essential to install a fully-fledged banking union to enhance credit
conditions. In the long term, he calls for the enactment of the recommendations outlined in the
four Presidents report "Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union" and the
Commission's "Blueprint for a Deep and Genuine Economic and Monetary Union". He also
calls for more steps being done toward a better growth strategy including the completion of the
single market in services, the enhancement of energy efficiency and autonomy (via an energy
union), the strengthening of EU industrial policy, and better public finances.
Writing about euro governance, Daniela Schwarzer affirms that the main challenge for the
EU will be to return the troubled European economies to sustainable private sector-led
growth and to fight unemployment. She also addresses the multiple lines of fragmentation
the EU is faced with, between the euro area and non-euro area Member States, the one
inside the monetary union between the North and the South, the fragmentation within
societies, and also the fragmentation of financial markets. A final challenge identified
concerns the reduced input and output legitimacy, with countries facing narrower policy
options in times of crisis, which in turn has given rise to eurosceptics. Schwarzer argues that
a robust economic recovery is necessary to help Europe tackle all these challenges and to
help reduce the sovereign debt burden. Any promising path to economic recovery will have
to combine measures that ensure accessible and cheap credit, structural reforms that release
growth potential both in deficit and surplus countries, investment in education and mobility,
and finally a better macroeconomic policy mix. In the long run, the author argues, it is
unlikely that economic prosperity can be achieved without improving the decision-making
mechanisms of the euro area.
László Andor maintains that restoring the capacity to achieve balanced growth and socio-
economic convergence in Europe is a key condition for the EU to overcome the crisis and to
regain output legitimacy. To achieve this, a predictable and rules-based mechanism of
countercyclical fiscal transfers would be needed in the context of which EMU countries
would share part of the costs of a short-term unemployment insurance (either via a basic
European unemployment insurance scheme or through the reinsurance of national
unemployment insurance schemes). Through such a scheme, it should be possible to create
a European safety net for the welfare safety nets of individual Member States and to prevent
short-term crises from unleashing longer-lasting divergence within the monetary union.
Pawel Swieboda argues that the post-crisis solidarity and cohesion agenda in the EU must
focus on restarting the convergence process. The basic objective will be to restore the level-
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playing field in the Union by completing the EMU with a robust fiscal pillar and elements of
a "transfer union". On the one side, increasing investment to raise aggregate demand is the
most pressing task. The other side of the bargain has to do with improving macroeconomic
performance, increasing competitiveness and completing structural reforms in the vulnerable
countries, for example through labour market reforms, improvements of the institutional and
financial infrastructure or the sophistication of business models, altogether combining the
objectives of fiscal consolidation with those of growth and equity.
In his article about the Single Market and Competitiveness, Malcolm Harbour calls on the
new European Commission to pursue even more effective implementation and "better
regulation" rather than new initiatives. He argues that President Juncker's team should tackle
the continued problem of ineffective application and weak enforcement of key single market
measures by Member States, introducing a "fast track" method for compliance monitoring. He
also calls for improvements regarding the digital single market, the Services Directive, full
implementation of the Consumer Rights Directive, a mutual evaluation and full appraisal of
the Mutual Recognition Directive, and a consistent implementation of the Public Procurement
rules agreed in 2014.
Jo Leinen argues in his article on the climate challenge that the EU needs to change the way
it manages the energy resources it imports and reduce energy consumption. He calls for a
rethink of business models and a move towards a circular economy where resources are
reused and recycled. He proposes measures which could include a "product passport" which
lists product materials and their origins, a mix of 'push and pull' measures to introduce
legislative benchmark standards and to provide investment perspectives for the business
sector, recyclable product designs, investment in technology and innovation, and better
consumer information. He also argues that to mitigate climate change, renewable energies
need to be expanded, energy efficiency and security needs to be ensured, and grid and
storage capacities need to be enhanced. 
Rosa Balfour, while mentioning that the European Union falls short of expectations to become
a fully-fledged global actor, presents two options for EU foreign policy: a 'do less but better'
option and a more ambitious one, of international engagement as a means for EU renewal. She
holds that the next EU leadership will have to address energetically and with foresight relations
with the EU's neighbours (including Russia and Turkey). This will require consolidating the EU's
crisis management structures, dealing with energy matters (internally and externally), and will
impose some long overdue thinking on European defence, both in terms of its industry and its
existential purpose. Rosa Balfour argues that EU Member States cannot afford not to cooperate
more closely on foreign policy, notwithstanding their lack of an appetite to do so. The choice
is between levels of ambition. Feeding into that ambition a compelling narrative about a new
form of international multilevel engagement, while also resting on the roots of peace-building,
could become a source of renewal for Europe as a whole.
Cecilia Malmström calls for addressing migration with appropriate care, a key element of
this being the respect for the rights of workers. While flexible labour migration policies which
allow European economies to address real shortages are essential, they should not be used
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to instigate unfair wage competition. A sustainable EU migration policy should also enable
integration and labour market participation of all migrants. She argues that the EU needs to
face the fact that people will not stop seeking refuge in Europe and should be adequately
prepared. Measures include search and rescue at sea, enhanced cooperation with third
countries, fight against migrant smuggling networks, and emergency support for the countries
facing greater pressures. The EU should also consider the possible use of humanitarian visas
and continue to engage with countries of origin and transit. 
In his article on the freedom of movement of persons, Radoslaw Sikorski tackles some of the
myths regarding the free movement of workers inside the EU, arguing that is has a limited
scope (only 3% of EU citizens) and is an integral part of the single market that spurs economic
growth and brings huge benefits to the EU economy. He argues that the possibility of finding
employment is the main reason for why people move, not the misuse of social benefits.
Sikorski calls for the elimination to abuses of the social welfare system but not by excluding
migrants. The article defends the idea that the economic challenges which Europe faces can
only be addressed by collective responses on the basis of the freedom of movement, which
should actually be strengthened, not weakened. The freedom of movement is essential for the
EU to be able to retain (or even strengthen) its global competitiveness.
Maria João Rodrigues deals with the issue of leadership at the EU level and argues that Europe
is in need of new leadership to recreate a stronger European unity. She emphasises the gains
in democratic legitimacy brought by the new procedure to elect the President of the European
Commission and also stresses that candidates for the Commission should be evaluated in the
national context in terms of their ability to address challenges at the EU level and their
adaptive qualities regarding top Commission priorities. The process should also transcend the
national level and involve more European selection input, including the Presidents of the
Commission, the European Council and the Parliament. Member States should carefully
consider their Commission candidates and assess their merits on the basis of proven
competences and political outcomes.
Writing about populism in the EU, Heather Grabbe asserts that populist parties are thriving,
partially due to deep concerns such as economic pain, disillusionment with politics, scepticism
toward the representative value of European democracy and insecurities regarding national
identities and the durability of European social contracts. She stresses that the increased political
power of these parties could change the balance of power between EU institutions, lead to
negative spill-over effects into national politics and endanger the EU infrastructure of rights and
rule of law. Grabbe calls on European leaders to limit racism in the public debate; connect
national and European politics to increase tolerance; and bring more voices into the debates and
increase transparency at EU level. Furthermore, instead of forming a grand coalition to protect the
status quo, mainstream parties should become more active and reform the EU by making progress
on issues such as fundamental rights and services liberalisation, while fuelling public debates
about the future of Europe and communicating better through social media. 
In his article on differentiated Europe, Alexander Stubb stresses that differentiation is a tool
for effectively enlarging and deepening the Union. He analyses the topic in terms of the three
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meta-challenges identified. Stagnation is seen as a catalyst for differentiation as differentiated
Europe can be a solution to political and economic stagnation. The author argues that the
difference between differentiation and a second meta-challenge, fragmentation, is a thin line
that is best guarded by strong common institutions. In terms of input legitimacy, Stubb sees
the strengthened role of the Commission as providing a fair degree of accountability, whereas
working outside the EU Treaties poses a challenge to legitimacy. In terms of output
legitimacy, differentiated Europe tends to perform well because it typically is a solution to
policy problems where joint progress is not an option. The fact that treaty change is not an
option for the time being will mean that differentiated Europe can be a useful instrument in
deepening integration. However, he argues, we also need to recognise that there are no-go
areas for differentiation, namely those areas where the essence of European value added lies
and where effects are much stronger when the whole Union participates.
Fabian Zuleeg maintains that in what concerns EU decision-making four key challenges need
to be addressed: crisis management (which requires more flexibility and speedy but
accountable decisions); cohesive and comprehensive responses to systemic challenges
(rather than a 'silo approach'); as well as increasing politicisation and fragmentation of
decision-making. Referring to the structure of the Commission, the author notes that the lack
of a clear cluster structure in the new Juncker Commission will require a clear definition of
responsibilities. Regarding the governance challenge posed by the politicisation of the
Commission, the author proposes outsourcing some of the functions by establishing
independent bodies. He also argues that the EU level needs to gain more executive powers,
accompanied by accountability mechanisms. Referring to the challenge coming from the
limitations of the EU rules-based system, he calls for instruments that can be employed
quickly and to ensure Member State compliance. Another challenge is that of the impeded
possibility of further pooling sovereignty, which could be tackled by giving more executive
powers at EU level and increasing the politicisation of the system.
In a final article, Janis A. Emmanouilidis argues that the Union and its members are still
facing the aftershocks and collateral damage of the 'euro crisis' and identifies one structural
challenge the EU and its members will have to confront in the new political cycle: the danger
of fragmentation – between the EU and its citizens, between Member States, between states
and national societies, which takes various forms (economic, social, political, geopolitical
etc.). These fragmentations have exposed severe cracks in the 'old bargain' between 
Member States and between the EU and its citizens, which makes it difficult to convey a
convincing future-oriented 'narrative' about the future of Europe. Simply consolidating 
past achievements will not suffice. If EU institutions and Member States want to turn the tide,
they will have to go beyond a lowest common denominator approach. Emmanouilidis
stresses that a new 'win-win' situation needs to be created or, in other words, there 
is need for a 'New Pact for Europe' between Member States and between the EU and its
citizens. Such a New Pact could be based on three main pillars: an 'Enabling Union' which
should foster sustainable growth and job creation by stimulating investment and enhancing
Europe's competitiveness; a 'Supportive Union' which should enhance the EU's 
'caring dimension'; and a 'Participatory Union' which should strengthen the ties between the
EU and its citizens. Furthermore, he proposes a new 'grand project' around an Energy Union,
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to provide new momentum for European integration and calls for a reflection process
regarding the concrete measures to be taken, with the aim of reforming the EU Treaties in the
next decade.
Janis A. Emmanouilidis is Director of Studies and Paul Ivan is Policy Analyst at the
European Policy Centre.
Endnote
1 This chapter draws from the first report of the New Pact for Europe project: Strategic Options for Europe's Future, Brussels, 2013,
Available at www.newpactforeurope.eu/documents/1st_report_new_pact_for_europe.pdf
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Europe’s economic challenges and the importance of
ideas and innovation
Herman Van Rompuy
How will we Europeans earn our living in 20 or 30 years' time? And how can it be 
done, while remaining true to our values of fairness, freedom and solidarity? These
fundamental questions predate the financial crisis and will still be with us once we have 
fully overcome it.
The world is becoming a hugely competitive place by the day. We see hundreds of millions
of men and women from Asia, Latin America and Africa escaping poverty and entering the
global market for jobs, ideas and resources; not just with energy and enthusiasm, but also
with good diplomas. It is a movement that is unique in human history and obviously a reason
to rejoice. But not only are new competitors catching up, older competitors are racing ahead
too. For instance, the United States is now running on much cheaper energy than Europe,
thanks to their shale-gas revolution. These sweeping worldwide changes matter much more
than how we arrange banking oversight or coordinate economic policies within the Union.
Globalisation, new technologies, the ageing of our populations, the race for resources: for all
our countries, these are the real challenges.
In a job like mine, you get to meet a lot of business people. I also regularly meet trade unions,
very often at my own request. Twice a year we hold a Tripartite Social Summit, bringing
together the unions and business with EU institutions. In such exchanges, it can sometimes
seem that we have two different understandings of economic realities, two separate narratives.
And during my years in office, I have seen this gap widen. Of all the groups in society,
business leaders are probably most keenly aware of the challenge posed by globalisation. They
have their finger on the pulse of global economic activity and keep alerting me that Europe is
losing out. The trade unions, generally more focused on the economy's demand side, regularly
call for more (public) investment. Their leadership remains highly committed to Europe but
they can sense a rise of Euro-scepticism among their members.
We must, and can bring these two narratives together. Yes, global change is relentless and
our societies must adapt, but we can also preserve what makes Europe such a special place:
a unique combination of relative prosperity, solidarity, individual freedoms, and security. This
challenge was always on my mind.
The power of ideas
As Antoine de Saint-Exupéry once said: "A pile of rocks ceases to be a rock pile 
when somebody contemplates it with the idea of a cathedral in mind." Such individual
strokes of genius are indispensable for any nation to grow and prosper. But nobody builds a
cathedral alone; you build them as a society. Here also, it is a matter of improving conditions
and opportunities.
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Throughout my mandate, I have worked to impress upon European leaders the importance
of ideas and innovation. By putting the topic high on the agenda of our European Council
meetings – for instance, in February 2011, October 2013 and March 2014 – but also with
concrete breakthroughs. I was pleased that on my watch we have finally been able to broker
a deal on the remaining issue for the European patent (the seat of its court). This set the seal
on the work of the Belgian Presidency in the second half of 2010, which had solved all but
this point through 'enhanced cooperation'. It was the end of an odyssey that started forty
years ago. I can still hear former Prime Minister Leo Tindemans speaking at a party meeting
on the European Patent. It was in 1978… The point of patents is that by protecting an idea
across national borders, they provide an incentive to be inventive. The new unified patent
and its patent court mean that inventors and businesses at last have a real 'one stop-shop' for
requests, delivery and after-sales, in no fewer than 26 EU countries. If you realise that the
existing European patent office in Munich receives some 260,000 patent applications each
year, it is clear that there is a real need. It will mean less time, less money, less worry and
larger markets for businesses, so that innovation can spread further and faster, and progress
can more easily benefit all Europeans.
Some argue that, as a society, we are no longer as innovation-minded as we used to be. In
his book Mass Flourishing, economics Nobel Prize winner Edmund Phelps looks back at the
exciting century leading up to the 1960s, during which Europe and the United States
experienced a tremendously creative surge. He describes a grass-root, innovation-minded
society, where people – not just geniuses, but ordinary people as well – would get excited
about finding new ways to do things, and do them better. There is a wider lesson in this story.
Innovation is not something that happens only in science labs. It can and should be
happening in every workshop, in every office, behind every computer, in every meeting
room. It means being open to trying out new things. Testing ideas until they work. Asking
ourselves: how do we turn brainwaves into breakthroughs, and breakthroughs into real
business?
When it comes to our competitiveness as a continent, turning ideas into real business is at
the heart of the matter. Recent figures make the problem strikingly clear. The EU-US
productivity gap, which had started to narrow in the years before the crisis, is widening
again. It means that compared to the United States our collective competitiveness is eroding.
The two factors that stand out are research commercialisation and ICT technologies.
Europeans may be leaders in scientific excellence (as Nobel Prize winners regularly show),
but compared to our competitors in the US, Japan or South Korea we find it more difficult to
bring this research to the market. And if we do not, others will do it for us, with our ideas.
As they did for instance with the World Wide Web, which was invented at the CERN, the
European Organization for Nuclear Research in Geneva. 
We do have the power of ideas. I am certain that behind the scientific breakthroughs of the
future, there will be some European research. Our research programme 'Horizon 2020' is one
of the biggest in the world. It helps to make research in Europe attractive again. Ahead of the
European Council on the Union's long-term budget, I received four Nobel Prize winners, all
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urging me to protect the programme's share. They told me that after a period when many top
researchers left to work across the Atlantic, we are now witnessing a 'brain-return'!
A second factor holding back our competitiveness is the fact that we are lagging behind in
digital technologies. Over the past five years, the annual sales of typical ICT companies from
the US and Asia went up by almost 50%, while those of European companies stagnated, or
even went down in some cases. This is striking. In the history of communication technologies,
there is a glorious tradition of innovation coming from Europe for the best part of the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries. 'Made in Europe' communication technology has changed the world,
starting with radio and television, right up to CD-ROMs, MP3 music technology and the World
Wide Web. But who turned it into real business? American companies… The cutting-edge
research and innovation today is in fields like social media, big data, cloud computing, or the
'Internet of things': this is where European companies should now focus.
We do not want the miss the boat again, and there is no reason why we should. It is perfectly
clear what Europeans need to do to get back in the game. From intellectual property, to
copyrights, to market fragmentation, to consumer protection, to investment in infrastructure,
to venture capital for start-ups, to digital skills: we know the remedies. It is the body of
knowledge that makes up the EU's 'digital agenda', our joint 'to-do' list, which, once carried
out, would hugely benefit European companies and European citizens. 
The continent of quality
I am deeply convinced that all our countries have what it takes to prosper in the 21st century.
A highly educated workforce, the singular alchemy of our prosperity, freedom and rule of law,
the solidarity embodied in our social models: when combined, these are unrivalled assets.
Faced with today's global competition, there is no reason to throw this all away. Other
continents may offer products or services that are cheaper than the ones made in Europe.
That is a reason to worry, but not a reason to panic. To worry, because cost – the relationship
between trends in labour or energy costs and productivity – is certainly important. One
lesson from the crisis is that a rise in income which is not linked to a related increase in
productivity is not sustainable, and can fuel bubbles.
Labour costs are important but energy costs are also becoming more relevant by the day. In
Europe we will probably not have a shale-gas revolution comparable to the one happening
in other parts of the world, such as America. So we must win the battle on energy efficiency.
There is huge potential in this field; specifically in the construction industry.
Having said this, if salvation for our economies were only to be found in bringing down
costs, Europe could 'close shop' now. Fortunately, this is not the case. Our major strengths
lie precisely in our so-called 'non-price competitiveness'. Our focus must not be exclusively
on costs, but on quality in all its shapes and guises: novelty, reliability, image, design,
experience, durability... It is our ability to produce such quality and to adapt to the needs of
high-growth markets that will get results.
20
Europe will not emerge from the crisis by denying its true self. More now than ever before,
our continent must be a synonym for innovation and quality. Our European brand is that of
a certain way of life, of taste and style, of open social relations, of environmental protection,
of a sense of progress. Individual countries offer fine examples. Take Denmark, which excels
by the clarity of its design; or Germany, with its cars and high-precision machinery, both in
demand in emerging economies; or Italy, with its luxury brands and seducing belle cose. All
our countries can draw strength from remaining true to themselves. It is perhaps a handicap
in some respects, if one sticks too rigidly to a strictly productivist logic that demands ever
greater uniformity and speed. But it remains, above all, an asset. 
This contribution draws upon Herman Van Rompuy's recent book "Europe in the Storm.
Promise and Prejudice" (Davidsfonds, April 2014).
Herman Van Rompuy is President of the European Council.
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The growth challenge for Europe and the EMU
George Pagoulatos
The European economy is slowly and painfully striving to reemerge from the last six years of
crisis. It was a crisis of enormous intensity and contagiousness, given the unprecedented
depth of global financial integration combined with the systemic flaws in the EMU
architecture. And it is not over, as the high levels of unemployment and the growing
divergence between Member States testify. The threat of fragmentation is imminent as ever:
fragmentation between euro-ins and euro-outs; fragmentation between North and South;
fragmentation within societies, with increasing income inequality and a growing number of,
what used to be, the middle class population slipping through the social safety net and below
poverty lines. 
Policies of front-loaded fiscal consolidation have left welfare states in economically weaker
countries severely underfunded. According to OECD data, the number of people living in
households without any income from work has doubled in Greece, Ireland and Spain, and
has risen by 20% or more in Estonia, Italy, Latvia, Portugal, and Slovenia. Fertility rates have
dropped further since the crisis, deepening the demographic and fiscal challenges of ageing.
There are long-term implications from these deteriorating trends, regarding people's 
long-term health, education and upward mobility from low-income families. It is also highly
likely that many of the people unemployed for a long period of time will never again be able
to gain proper access to the job market and build a normal career track. The enduring effects
of the crisis risk creating vicious cycles of low growth, high debt levels, austerity, declining
productivity, and stagnation.
These developments carry heavy implications for the future growth prospects of the European
economies, for future prosperity, and for the sustainability of pension systems and welfare
states. They must be urgently reversed.
What needs to be done (I): Euro zone adjustment on the short-term
The economic crisis in the euro zone must be addressed as a matter of priority, also given its
wider implications for the entire European economy. 
Over the last few years, under painful adjustment therapies, the euro zone took important
measures towards confronting the large deficits and excessive imbalances which contributed
to the sovereign debt crisis. Fiscal discipline and overall macroeconomic stability are
essential preconditions for ensuring the viability of the euro and allowing the euro zone
economies to move to a healthy growth trajectory. 
However, the adjustment policy mix has been too procyclical, ending up amplifying the
recession, fostering debt deflation and prolonging the crisis. The lack of any significant euro
zone-level countercyclical measures, to offset the recessionary impact of adjustment, has been
a significant factor for the prolonged stagnation of the European economy. The inability of the
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broken monetary transmission mechanism to transfer the low interest rates from the core to
the economies of the periphery has further deprived healthy companies, especially SMEs, of
precious capital.
Since the crisis began, the growth rates of the euro zone economy have been deplorably low.
At well below 1%, the current rate of inflation in the euro zone falls short of the ECB's
definition of price stability. Deflation or 'lowflation' makes the rebalancing effort in the euro
zone extremely difficult. The economies of the euro zone South need lower inflation, in order
to restore cost competitiveness vis-à-vis the core; but against an average 0.5% they can only
rebalance in deflation. A nominal GDP growth rate around 1% or below means that the
public and private debt burden in highly indebted euro zone economies will be growing
further, to the point of eventually becoming unserviceable. 
What is needed is a policy mix that would assist fiscal consolidation, economic adjustment and
structural reforms in the economically weaker countries, starting from a higher average inflation
rate (closer to 2%) in the euro zone. At the same time the Euro zone economy needs an urgent
countercyclical stimulus, which should be provided via an EU- or EMU-wide investment
stimulus. A large investment stimulus at the euro zone could be funded by the European
Investment Bank (EIB), assisted perhaps by the EU budget. The EIB should increase its capital
base and could issue bonds, which among others, could be purchased by the ECB. This and
purchases of private sector assets could be part of an extensive asset purchasing programme by
the ECB, which could facilitate financing conditions and help push inflation upwards. Investing
in European public goods such as Trans-European Networks and infrastructures (energy,
telecoms, digital networks reaching remote areas where the private sector is disinclined to
invest) would enhance Europe's growth potential and deepen the single market. 
A true recovery programme is necessary and urgent in euro zone Member States which are
currently suffering intolerably high unemployment. Productivity-enhancing structural
reforms in these countries must be combined with large investment in education and
research, new technologies, networks, health, energy, environmental sustainability and the
business environment, all of which would strengthen longer-term competitiveness. 
With an average unemployment rate around 12%, unemployment remains the most important
concern for Europe. It is painfully acute in the crisis-hit economies, peaking above 25% in
Spain and Greece. Apart from an explosive socio-economic and political problem, long-term
unemployment is a terrible waste of human capital, undercutting the productive capacity and
future growth potential of the economy, eroding welfare state capacities. It is vital to 
maintain the employability of the unemployed, especially the long-term unemployed, by
making sure that active support and training is extended and social safety nets are funded, to
avert marginalisation.
Most of the existing studies reveal a large investment gap in the euro zone, including
Germany as well as the crisis economies, as a result of public investment spending cuts,
private sector deleveraging, and the credit crunch. It would be preferable to cover this
investment gap through large scale EU investment funding as mentioned above. The
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European Commission can also apply flexibility, if justified by the specific circumstances, in
treating national investment expenditure with regard to budget deficit rules, whose
credibility however should be safeguarded. 
An investment boost will help restore the long-term growth potential of the receiving
countries and the EU economy as a whole. It is a necessary complement but not a substitute
for national reforms aimed to raise the underlying productivity of EU economies. euro zone
countries with relatively low public debt levels, that have the fiscal space, should lead the
investment stimulus required for the recovery of the euro zone economy. 
Following the extensive adjustment (fiscal and external) in the periphery, the euro zone 
must move to a more symmetrical distribution of the burden of adjustment. A stronger
demand stimulus in the export-surplus economies would help economic rebalancing across
the euro zone. 
The faster implementation and completion of a fully fledged banking union, and the repair
of bank balance sheets and bank restructuring where necessary, are vital in restoring normal
credit conditions in the bank-based European economy. The access to credit for healthy SMEs
remains constrained, especially in the crisis-hit economies. In the longer run, the
development of alternative sources of finance, such as venture capital, angel investors, and
SME bonds would enhance financing conditions in Europe, especially with regard to new
innovative enterprises. 
What needs to be done (II): Fixing the EMU
Raising competitiveness, especially in economically weaker countries has extensively relied
on wage deflation and lowering labour costs. Though the adjustment of unit labour costs
since the outbreak of the crisis has been necessary, there should be stronger emphasis on
other cost factors too, and on raising overall productivity levels. This mainly remains a
national policy responsibility, but the EU should become more active in supporting
investment and providing technical assistance to the less developed regions. 
Economies which prior to the crisis had relied on credit-driven growth and an overexpansion
of non-tradable sectors, at the expense of tradable sectors, will need to shift to a more 
export-led model. This will require far-reaching structural reforms and intelligently directing
or 'nudging' resources towards higher value added export sectors. In some cases, typically
non-traded economic activities such as real estate, education or health services, can be
redirected towards external demand. Some of the otherwise less competitive economies can
exploit a comparative advantage in high-tech start-ups, where impediments of bureaucracy,
weaker infrastructure and other cost-factors are less crucial. The EU should work closely with
national and regional authorities, private business, research centres and other stakeholders
to encourage and sustain smart growth. 
It is important to promote the speedy implementation of the banking union. Without it, the
euro zone periphery could end up trapped in a permanent situation of high perceived
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country risk, higher capital costs, savings and investment flight, wage deflation, low growth
and persistently high unemployment. This would undermine the economic and socio-
political viability of the euro and European integration. The backstop established by the
banking union needs to be strengthened. The third pillar of the banking union, a single
deposit insurance system, needs to be added. 
The recommendations outlined in the Presidents report "Towards a Genuine EMU" and the
Commission's "Blueprint for a Deep and Genuine EMU" must be enacted upon. Most
important among them is the need for the euro zone to acquire its own fiscal capacity. A euro
zone budget, funded preferably by own resources (VAT, corporate taxation, financial
transaction tax, etc.), should operate as a main instrument of macroeconomic stabilisation in
the face of crises hitting Member States in an asymmetric manner. A euro zone budget,
together with the EIB, should be able to direct investment to crisis regions, assisting their
recovery. A European unemployment insurance scheme could assist national efforts to deal
with excessively high levels of cyclical unemployment, while national reforms confront the
sources of structural unemployment. 
There should be progress towards an investment union, as proposed by the European Policy
Centre (EPC), including a dedicated investment fund aimed at delivering investment for growth
in Member States that are unable to make the necessary investments themselves. This would
encompass and exceed existing initiatives such as frontloading EU budget funds, project bonds
and the Connecting Europe Facility. A "European Investment Guarantee Scheme" would be a
vital additional new instrument that would provide insurance against the higher country risks
involved in private sector investment towards crisis-ridden economies. Such steps towards
moderate mutualisation, combined with greater pooling of national budgetary and economic
policies, would help build a more integrated, cohesive and sustainable euro zone. A Eurobond
scheme could be employed to finance euro zone investment in infrastructure. 
In general, the euro zone has not tapped on the advantages of a monetary union, and
especially the status of the euro as the world's parallel reserve currency next to the dollar.
This implies that euro zone bonds, Eurobonds, would be able to benefit from the advantages
of a deep and liquid global financial market, ensuring low-interest finance for major EMU
projects. Such projects include infrastructure, and they can also include the process of partly
substituting the national issuance of debt through joint issuance in the form of Eurobills and
a Debt Redemption Fund. Thus, through reducing servicing costs, high public debt levels
would de-escalate more rapidly and financial markets would be better integrated and
stabilised. The appropriate conditionality would effectively safeguard against moral hazard.
Effectively dealing with the debt overhang is a crucial prerequisite for allowing the European
economies to grow. 
What needs to be done (III): EU growth strategy
The EU faces a great competitive challenge from the transformation of the global economy.
The challenge is not only to reverse or decelerate the long-term trend of its shrinking share in
the global GDP. The challenge is also to do so by preserving the European model of a social
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market economy, balancing growth and competitiveness with social cohesion, environmental
sustainability, and a European quality of life. The unhappy prospect of a "1% European
economy" needs to be resisted: 1% GDP growth, 1% inflation, 1% of the population
controlling wealth.
Globalisation, technological progress, and the shift of power towards new global economic
poles are leading developments in Europe and the world. European enterprises are
responding to global market transformations by becoming integrated in global value chains.
Tapping on new sources of growth and competitiveness requires open and interconnected
product and services markets, higher investment in research and innovation, a favourable
environment for entrepreneurship, and an appropriately skilled labour force.
The Europe 2020 strategy places emphasis on the appropriate areas and priorities that will
allow the EU to enhance its medium- to longer-term growth potential. Following the euro
zone crisis, the EU is now even further behind on the Europe 2020 targets than it was back
in 2010.  Prolonged unemployment and exit from the labour market in crisis countries has
led to further divergence on the now overambitious 75% employment target (persons aged
20 to 64 in employment). The EU must seek to raise the employment rate especially in
Member States at the lowest tier (Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Portugal,
Romania, Slovakia, and Spain). The employment rate should also be enhanced by better
policies of skill-building and life-long learning, and social policies to support full
participation of women in the labour market. In addition, Europe should counteract ageing
and the shrinking of the labour force by adopting a dynamic immigration policy, integrating
larger number of immigrants into the labour market and attracting talented young workers
from around the world.
Other Europe 2020 headline objectives are also drifting further away. The percentage of
people at risk of poverty has actually increased to 25% in the EU. The crisis has made it
difficult to reduce the number of early school leavers, and raise the proportion of young
people with tertiary education to 40%. Education, training and lifelong learning should
remain a policy priority shielded by expenditure cuts, preferably favoured with higher
investment than it currently receives. A quarter of the EU's adult population still lacks the
skills to make effective use of ICT. Investment in R&D should be supported to reach closer to
the ambitious 3% GDP target, and so should the shift to renewable energy, where the
momentum has been lost. 
These are targets that are vital for attaining the objectives of smart, sustainable and inclusive
growth in Europe. They should be promoted with new rigor and commitment at EU and
national level, employing EU budget and regulatory instruments to support national efforts.
Among others, the European Union could use its available instruments in order to promote
productivity-enhancing reforms on the ground, for example by attaching the disbursement of
EU budget funds to administrative reform. 
Completing the single market in services, energy, the digital sector, and research should
feature at high priority. These are areas where single market integration can drive economic
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growth through spill over effects across sectors. In particular, completing the digital single
market would enhance ICT, strengthen the productivity and competitiveness of European
enterprises, improve the functioning of the labour market and the public services, assist
Europe's transition to a low carbon economy, and promote education and skill-building in a
knowledge-based society. 
Linked to this is the objective of enhancing energy efficiency and autonomy. Europe is facing
higher energy costs compared to major competitors such as the US. This warrants revisiting
the energy policy mix, without compromising the main environmental and sustainability
policy targets. The energy union must be promoted as a grand project (seeking among others
greater energy security and lower energy prices) with important positive effects in a number
of policy areas. 
The functioning of the internal market for industrial products must be further improved and
EU industrial policy should be strengthened, with a particular focus on SMEs which provide
the majority of jobs in Europe. In particular, the more flexible reallocation of skills and
resources across firms and sectors and towards emerging high-growth sectors and markets
must be facilitated by financial systems and labour, capital market and bankruptcy
regulations.
Finally, it is important for the EU and Member States to strengthen public finances by
avoiding further tax increases on working people and productive enterprises, or deeper cuts
on social and investment spending. In countries in need of fiscal consolidation, the tax
burden should be shifted to tax bases linked to consumption, property, and pollution. Better
EU-level and global coordination is necessary for broadening the tax base against tax fraud,
tax evasion and tax havens. 
In conclusion
Economic growth is vital not only for overcoming the enduring effects of the crisis but also
for reintegrating millions into the labour market, for promoting prosperity, and defending
Europe's position in the world. This would shore up public finances, reduce the debt
overhang and deliver a functioning welfare state to the next generations of Europeans.
Attaining this desired level of economic growth is also crucial for the European integration
project to regain the trust of citizens, by delivering a European Union that actually works and
delivers on their behalf. 
George Pagoulatos is Professor of European Politics and Economy, Athens University 
of Economics & Business; Member of the Board of Directors, ELIAMEP; Academic Fellow
at the European Policy Centre.
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Strengthening the euro area
Daniela Schwarzer
The euro area
Since 2007, a series of acute crises have threatened the very existence of the euro area. The
financial crisis which spilled into the currency union in 2007 was followed by an
unexpectedly strong downturn of the real economy. As of 2010, the euro area was confronted
with a severe sovereign debt and banking crisis.
Despite these troublesome developments, the euro area has proven to have a considerable
degree of resilience. In each phase, governance weaknesses were revealed – and national
governments together with the EU institutions have designed an impressive series of policy
responses in crisis management and institutional innovation. The euro area today is completed
by a banking union with a Single Supervisory and a Single Resolution Mechanism. National
budgetary and economic policies are more closely overseen and coordinated. With the
European Stability Mechanism, the euro area now has a permanent tool in place to manage
sovereign liquidity crises and instabilities in the banking sector. Most importantly, the euro
area's only true federal institution, the European Central Bank (ECB), has become its most
effective crisis manager: with the announcement of its Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT)
programme, the ECB finally managed to calm the self-fulfilling crisis in 2012. Meanwhile, the
announcement of credit easing and quasi-quantitative easing in September 2014 is a move
towards reducing financial fragmentation and countering deflation. 
The euro area in 2014 is hence a lot different from the one in 2007. And yet, further
challenges need to be overcome. Prevailing stagnation, fragmentation and problems of
legitimacy require a rethink of policies and further governance reform.
Stagnation
Although sovereign debt markets have calmed down since summer 2012 and the euro area
on average has finally emerged from recession, the economic situation in the euro area
remains fragile. Economic growth rates, which for several years have varied significantly
across Member States, now tend to converge, but at a low level. 
The main challenge facing European and national leaders in the coming five years will 
be to return the troubled European economies to sustainable private sector-led growth 
and to fight unemployment, which has particularly affected the young generation in a number
of crisis countries. Today, the social and political repercussions of years of crisis can 
be felt especially in those countries which underwent severe adjustment processes.
Unemployment in the euro area is currently at around 12% – yet youth unemployment is close
to 25% across the euro zone, and well over 50% in both Spain and Greece. Over five million
young people under 25 were unemployed in the EU-28 area in July 2014. While current labour
market adjustments like skills discrepancy and cyclical vacancies represent immediate
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challenges for policymakers, demographic developments in the EU and skills shortage pose
long-term challenges.
Strengthening growth and reducing unemployment are particularly challenging tasks in the
euro area, where the tools for necessary adaptation processes are limited, as Member States
no longer command national monetary and exchange rate policies. Meanwhile, the use of
fiscal instruments is constrained by both the dire budgetary situations in a number of
Member States, and the European surveillance and coordination mechanisms which, while
enabling some flexibility to take into account national economic situations, still impose
upper limits on deficits so as to enable a reduction of public debt levels over the medium
term. European instruments designed to alleviate the social repercussions of the crisis have
been created, but are currently underused. 
Following a Finnish policy model, the European Commission is advocating all Member States
to introduce youth guarantees to drastically improve school-to-work transitions and financial
and administrative measures to immediately support job opportunities for young people. The
European Social Fund (ESF) will provide more than 10 billion each year in the 2014-2020
period, as there is no or little money for such measures at the national level in the countries
affected most by the crisis. A wide array of persisting barriers, such as delay in presenting the
required operational programs by governments, a lack of awareness and still insufficient
funds have so far delivered disappointing results, with only France and Italy participating one
year after the programme's adoption.  
While labour mobility has traditionally been significantly lower in the EU than in the United
States, many EU Member States have demonstrated a greater responsiveness and stronger
migration reaction to the current unemployment shock. More policy action in addition 
to the EURES mobility platform will be required to further remove obstacles to intra-EU
labour mobility. 
Fragmentation
Closely linked to the ongoing stagnation in the euro area is an increasing fragmentation of
the monetary union. There are several dimensions to this which will be discussed
subsequently: firstly, the North-South-divide which is most frequently attributed to varying
levels of competitiveness, but is actually underpinned by deep running variations in political,
administrative and civic cultures; secondly, increasing social inequality and the questioning
of the social contract both within Member States and on the EU level; and, thirdly, financial
fragmentation within the currency union. Moreover, fragmentation may occur between the
euro area and the non-members, some of which are actually on the verge of disintegrating.
Since 2010, the euro area has rhetorically been divided into a "core" of countries which were
not struck by liquidity problems and a "periphery" of crisis countries, a phenomenon that is
also often referred to as a new "North-South divide" within the euro area. The two groups are
visibly distinct because of substantial divergence in growth and underlying competitiveness,
sustainability of public finances and employment. For instance, the gap between the
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countries with the highest and lowest jobless rates for young people is extremely high, with
about 45 percentage points between Germany (the lowest at 7.8% in July 2014) and Spain
(the highest, at 53.8% in July 2014). 
The North-South divide has been explained by structural economic factors. Recently,
variations in political and administrative culture, governance approaches, and civic 
self-understanding and trust have been emphasised as relevant to explain the slow-down of
the catch-up process. One conclusion from the insight in the institutional and socio-political
underpinnings of the North-South-divide is that the path to convergence will be longer and
both financially and politically more costly than initially may have been assumed. The
adaptation processes that societies, political and bureaucratic systems and elites will have to
undergo on top of the structural reforms of economies and labour markets encounter more
obstacles than initially expected, in particular as those who would lose in the necessary
reform and adaptation processes can hardly be paid off.  
For policymaking in the euro area, the continuing divergence between crisis and non-crisis
countries has further estranged the positions of Germany and a small group of Nordic countries
from those of Southern European countries – both on short-term measures to foster growth and
with regard to the differing visions of the future euro area held. Yet there is room for compromise.
In terms of debt and deficit reduction, as well as structural reforms, some Southern countries
have become slightly more similar to the Nordic ones. At the same time, there have been some
moves by Northern countries that, to a small degree, contribute to a more symmetric rebalancing
of the euro area. One example is Germany's recent introduction of a minimum wage. 
It will take some time, and possibly another crisis, to make governments and citizens in those
Member States that currently fair best in terms of economic and financial stability realise an
important point: the euro area with one currency, one economy, and one financial market has
made national states vulnerable, but instruments and mechanisms on the European level can
ensure macroeconomic stability and help to alleviate asymmetric shocks. This approach, over
time, would be to the benefit of all Member States. As the costs and benefits in the short term
(for instance, from now to five years into the future) will be very unevenly distributed, a long-
term vision is therefore necessary if the euro is to stay together. What is needed to move forward
is a set of instruments that encourage growth and crisis resilience of the euro area and
establishing a larger degree of mutual insurance. Part of this is achieved with banking union,
other parts could take the form of a European unemployment scheme and European bond
issuance. Participation in the mutual insurance mechanisms should be conditional on far-
reaching domestic reforms. If this happens and structures between Member States actually
converge, then more solidarity, insurance, and joint liability may be acceptable to the 'strong'
Member States. 
Fragmentation also occurs within societies – a phenomenon mostly felt in the crises countries.
Inequality in Europe has risen substantially since the mid-1980s. While the enlargement
process has added to this, large income gains among top earners have been a main driver that
also increased inequality in the euro area. 4% of all the EU population (over 120 million
people) live in or in risk of poverty. 
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In a number of nation states, the intergenerational contract no longer holds: the younger
generations can no longer assume to be as well or better off than their parents – given the
costs of longevity, record levels of youth unemployment and the failure to adapt education
systems to tomorrow's needs. Moreover, governments can no longer maintain previously
unchallenged levels of welfare provision. With a shrinking redistributive capacity and rising
costs, for instance in health systems and unemployment schemes, the social contract across
social classes or groups is challenged and has already put the intra-societal notion of
solidarity to a serious test. In particular citizens in Member States which are going through
severe adaptation processes have little reason to believe in mutual insurance mechanisms
which in the past were at the heart of social systems and enabled and maintained social
peace and political stability in post-War Western Europe. This is an important background to
the fact that national opinion leaders have more and more difficulty to argue for intra-
European solidarity mechanisms.
Reducing the social cost of the crisis therefore remains a key immediate challenge for policy
makers. Improving social inclusion in Europe and reducing regional disparities through
stimulating private sector-led growth in areas where incomes are relatively low remains a key
policy challenge for the EU and its Member States.
The fragmentation of financial markets complicates this task further. Despite ECB actions to
alleviate the situation in crisis countries such as Greece, Portugal, Ireland, and Spain,
corporate borrowing rates still vary decisively, pointing to inefficiencies in the European
financial market. While the OMT-programme announcement by the ECB could effectively
stabilise interest on sovereign and large corporate bonds again, spreads for SMEs are still
divergent. To a certain extent, structural differences and internal adjustment processes
explain the reluctance of banks to increase lending within economies where capital
allocation proved to be inefficient, fueling asset price bubbles and unsustainable
investments. Nonetheless, a key factor for restrictive lending to small firms in Southern
European countries is a bottleneck in the financial sector. Due to the ongoing deleveraging
in the financial sector of Southern European countries like Italy and Spain, many banks
reduce risky assets like loans as long as their profitability is impaired by rising ratio of
defaulting loans. 
Another important reason is the upcoming conclusion of the Asset-Quality Review (AQR) by
the ECB in October 2014 that will present banks' capabilities to fulfill the new equity capital
standards of BASEL III introduced in January 2014. As falling back on alternative sources of
finance is not an option for many SMEs, the bottleneck in the financial sector has caused a
significant private investment gap, contributing to sluggish growth and prolonging
unemployment. The SME sector plays a vital role for employment and growth, especially in
the compartmentalised structures of Southern European economies where they account for
four in every five jobs on average. 
The challenge for the European Union is to reduce these growth inhibitors in the financial
sector faster and more effectively than through the slow process of structural reforms, before
the operational completion of the banking union. Due to the deflationary pressure which
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crisis countries increasingly experience, short-term measures have become necessary, as
they create instant relief for banks and increase lending to the real economy. In the past, the
vagueness of purpose of monetary tools has triggered moral hazard behaviour, for instance
causing the sovereign bank nexus. Against this background, European policymakers should
appreciate the plans of the ECB to expand its balance sheet with targeted purchases of
securitised corporate and consumer loans from banks. While these measures would
represent an improvement of banks' balance sheets, the expected increase in corporate
lending and SME investments could provide a much needed cyclical stimulus to stagnating
euro zone economies.
Another line of fragmentation may in the future deepen between the euro area and the non-
euro area Member States. In the years 2010 to 2013, the euro area has become more
integrated, both institutionally and procedurally. Closer budgetary and economic policy
coordination, the creation of the financial insurance mechanism ESM, a more active and
stronger role for the ECB entailing a higher degree of risk sharing, and close political
cooperation in crisis management through the regularly meeting of euro area summits have
given rise to the concern that a decoupling of the euro area core from the non-members may
eventually take place. The political challenge is hence also to bridge this divide effectively
as the return of private sector driven growth to the euro area will be made even more difficult
if political divisions among the 28 EU members increase and prevent necessary steps to
complete the single market, in particular in the field of the digital economy and services.
Reduced legitimacy
The dire economic situation, the high unemployment rates and the inability or unwillingness
of the established political parties to effectively manage the debate on European integration
by providing a strong and contemporary pro-European narrative, have given rise to
eurosceptics. Anti-EU and anti-establishment movements scored high in the May 2014
European elections in a number of EU Member States. An unparalleled number of seats in
the European Parliament are occupied by representatives of anti-establishment movements
since, but it is not in the EU institutions that this electoral result will most be felt. The new
strength of 'EU-critical' movements will impact most strongly on the national level, even if
they are not part of government coalitions. 
If anti-establishment movements and EU critics gain additional ground in domestic debates,
then structural reforms and budgetary consolidation measures, along with further-reaching
reforms of the institutions of the European Union and/or the euro zone, will become even
harder to implement. Accordingly, this will have a negative impact on national governments'
willingness and ability to take a proactive stance on EU affairs and projects like the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) which are of a strategic importance to
Europe. Many national debates, including in the UK, today are characterised by an EU
criticism with strong anti-globalisation undercurrents.
Political leaders who believe in the merits of European integration need to trigger a
substantial debate on EU reform and to improve the domestic conditions for sounder
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economic development throughout the EU. Meanwhile, the long-term consequences for
those societies and economies in which half of the young labour force will not find a job in
the foreseeable future need to be publicly discussed, as action that would fully measure the
effects of daunting social and economic challenge has not yet been taken.
Moreover, decision-making structures in the euro area need to be scrutinised. Given the
potentially destabilising effects of financial and economic openness, the euro area poses a
particular challenge to its Member States. Governments' ability to control economic
developments in their home countries is limited as they have given up monetary policy and
exchange rates as the powerful instruments of macroeconomic policy making. As there is no
euro area fiscal capacity, or European economic and labour policies, macroeconomic policy
developments are no longer a matter of democratic political choice, but a more or less
random result accumulating national policy choices which do not usually take into account
their contribution to overall macroeconomic stability and potential negative spill-overs.
Moreover, capital mobility in the monetary union has increased the pressure on governments
to improve price competitiveness. Monetary union and financial integration have created a
bias towards supply-sided policies in order to attract investments and corporations. These
new constraints were hidden until 2010 as less competitive and less fiscally sound countries
benefitted from low interest rates. Today, all governments of euro area Member States face
narrower policy options, in particular when it comes to impacting growth and employment
in their home country. 
In addition to these constraints on potential "output legitimacy", the European economic
governance structures are flawed on the input side. It can hardly be argued that citizens' vote
today impact macroeconomic policy choices. This problem is amplified by the rule-based,
rather technocratic coordination of national budgetary and economic policy, which, in
particular when it leads to the enshrining of certain policy goals into law or even
constitutions, weakens the ability of democracies to self-correct.
Outlook
Europe's foremost and urgent challenge is to overcome the stalling of economic growth. A
robust economic recovery is necessary to help Europe tackle the social and political
challenges societies are facing and the reduction of the sovereign debt burden. Any
promising path to economic recovery led by private-sector growth will have to combine
measures that ensure accessible and cheap credit, in particular for small and medium sized
companies in regions struck by the crisis, structural reforms that release growth potential
both in deficit and surplus countries, investment in education and mobility, and finally a
better macroeconomic policy mix. In the long run, it is unlikely that economic prosperity can
be achieved without improving the decision-making mechanisms of the euro area.
Daniela Schwarzer is Director of the Europe Program at the German Marshall Fund of the
United States (GMF).
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Social Europe. Can the EU again improve people’s life prospects?
László Andor
Introduction: Unprecedented socio-economic divergence and eroded social mobility 
in Europe
The European Union has survived the long economic and social crisis, but is weakened by
many social fractures that diminish its very ability to act on the challenges it faces.
After years or even decades of socio-economic convergence between Member States, Europe
has recently experienced major disparities in economic, employment and social outcomes.
In 2010 it agreed a wise socio-economic strategy: "Europe 2020", including clear targets to
increase employment and reduce poverty substantially. This Strategy was based on the
ambition of sustained convergence between Member States and within societies. 
Four years later, it is clear that the EU has not managed to do enough to realise this ambition.
The employment rate among 20-64 year olds has dropped from 70.3% in 2008, and 68.5%
in 2010, to 68.3% in 2013 instead of rising towards 75%. An initial objective was to lift at
least 20 million people out of poverty or social exclusion by 2020, but we have seen that 
the number of people in or at risk of poverty or social exclusion has risen from 118 million
in 2010 to 124 million in 2012. Perhaps most worryingly is that we are far from a situation
where every individual has decent opportunities and can rely on the society's support to
improve his or her lot.
Citizens' trust in Europe as a force supporting upward social mobility has considerably
diminished as the protracted crisis has left millions of people unemployed or trapped in
precarious work. This too, can be seen at the national level: the crisis has weakened the
ability of many governments to deliver the demands of their citizens: primarily to counteract
the economic crisis, provide good-quality public services and ensure good socio-economic
opportunities for everyone.
National welfare systems have been substantially weakened as a consequence of the
sovereign debt crisis, especially in countries and regions considered as euro zone periphery.
Therefore, for the first time since the Second World War, doubt has been cast on the
assumption that children are (mostly) going to be better off than their parents. 
Socio-economic disparities have grown particularly within the euro zone, chiefly as a
consequence of the incomplete design of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Today's
set-up of the EMU, on the one hand, severely constrains individual Member States' monetary
and fiscal policies, while, on the other hand, lacking sufficient common instruments to
mitigate asymmetric economic shocks. The lack of a proper lender of last resort and of a
common budget at the EMU level have been the most obvious deficiencies. Europe's
monetary union with strict rules for national fiscal policies is today often seen by citizens as
a constraint rather than a solution.
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Experience since 2008 abundantly confirms that the systemic flaws of the Maastricht design of
the EMU have significant real-life consequences during an economic downturn. Adjustment
occurs predominantly through 'internal devaluation', resulting in high unemployment, rising
poverty and weakening of essential public services like healthcare and education. 
While countries deemed insolvent by the financial markets have stayed afloat thanks to 
drip-fed emergency support from other European countries, the European Central Bank (ECB)
and International Monetary Fund (IMF), they had to accept tough fiscal and structural
reforms. The latter may have been designed with the best intentions but in many cases had
a socially regressive impact, i.e. lower-income groups had to sacrifice the most while upper
classes remained relatively protected.
The rise of anti-establishment and often chauvinistic parties in the 2014 elections to the European
Parliament reflects the dissatisfaction of many voters with the mainstream parties of the centre-
right and to a lesser extent of the centre-left. In most European countries the main explanation for
this development is the experience of frontloaded fiscal consolidation combined with 'structural
reforms' geared mainly towards internal devaluation, i.e. cost-cutting. These policies have been,
in most cases, supported by mainstream parties on both sides of the centre and have been
coordinated in Brussels through the EU's reinforced economic governance mechanisms. 
On the other hand, in countries which were not forced to implement pro-cyclical
macroeconomic policies and did relatively well during the crisis, the rise of anti-establishment
or anti-European parties is mostly explained by a fear of 'having to pay for somebody else's
problems', e.g. through cross-country fiscal transfers or by accepting inflows of poorer people
from other countries. The interdependence of our countries is not always sufficiently
recognised, notably as regards the implications of a one-size-fits-all monetary policy and the
economic spill-over effects of prolonged social hardship.
The EU has responded to the employment and social crisis by considerably strengthening the
toolbox of employment and social policies. The social dimension of the EMU and the
problem of socio-economic divergence have also been explicitly recognised. However, an
obvious lesson from the recent crisis is that ambitious employment and social targets and
policies can at best partially compensated, but not offset, deficiencies in macroeconomic
policy responses and in the architecture of the EMU.
In the following, I will briefly review the main EU policies developed over the past five years
in the field of employment and social affairs. I will put these in the context of the
macroeconomic policy response during the same period and conclude by reflecting on
systemic reforms which Europe needs to strengthen its economic recovery and to at last make
progress towards the employment and social inclusion targets of the Europe 2020 Strategy.
Strengthening EU employment and social policies during the long crisis
The Barroso II Commission has made a number of proposals to improve the effectiveness of
employment and social policies. In 2010, working in the hope of a steady recovery from the
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economic crisis, we put forward three flagship initiatives aiming to support progress towards
the employment and social targets of Europe 2020: The Agenda for New Skills and Jobs, Youth
on the Move and the European Platform against Poverty and Social Exclusion. They contained
a number of ideas for structural improvement in the functioning of Europe's labour market and
in the social policy field, for instance the idea of a single open-ended employment contract,
the concept of a youth guarantee, various measures to boost labour mobility and support for
social innovation as the framework for constructive interaction between governments and
NGOs in pursuing the objectives of social inclusion and poverty reduction.
However, as the sovereign debt crisis spread across the euro zone periphery and a second
recession set in, it became obvious that the intensity of the measures foreseen under the
Europe 2020 flagship initiative was insufficient to respond to a worsening employment and
social crisis. We therefore had to shift gear and reflect not only on ways to translate an
expected economic recovery into improved employment and social situation, but on ways
to bring about a job-rich economic recovery in the first place and to improve the efficiency
and effectiveness of social policies given the double challenge of fiscal consolidation and a
deepening social crisis.
In December 2011 we launched a Youth Opportunities Initiative, which sought to mobilise
existing resources, including national allocations from EU Structural Funds that were not yet
committed to concrete calls or projects. Many operational programmes were consequently
revised in order to enable faster and better drawdown of these resources, targeting in
particular support for youth employment and job creation in SMEs.
In April 2012 the Commission put forward an 'Employment Package' which broadened the
European Employment Strategy in several ways. It moved beyond the traditional focus on the
quantity (participation) and quality (skills) of the labour supply and emphasised the need to
boost demand for labour as a prerequisite for higher employment and consequently
economic growth. In particular, it advocated lowering the tax wedge on low-paid labour, use
of targeted hiring subsidies and arrangements such as short-time work as ways to maintain
or increase employment.
These new measures have been recognised as crucial in order to rescue and valorise the
productive potential of people otherwise abandoned by the economy due to the double-dip
recession. This proactive employment policy agenda, seeking to use labour market levers to
stabilise aggregate demand, also included action plans to achieve the job-creation potential
of particular sectors such as the green economy, healthcare and information technologies as
well as personal and household services. It has been followed up by sectorial initiatives such
as the Grand Coalition for Digital Jobs and the 2014 Green Employment Initiative.
In December 2012, the Commission launched a Youth Employment Package whose key
element was the proposal for a Council Recommendation on establishing a Youth Guarantee
in each country, i.e. a comprehensive scheme ensuring that everyone under 25 receives a
good-quality offer of a job, apprenticeship, traineeship or continued education within four
months of leaving school or becoming unemployed. The quality of labour market
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opportunities for young people has been further emphasised throughout a Quality
Framework for Traineeships, agreed by Member States in March 2014.
The Youth Guarantee has been conceived as both relief and a structural reform, with some
measures helping to immediately alleviate the youth unemployment crisis while others being
focused on more structural improvements in school-to-work transitions, e.g. through the
development of apprenticeship systems. In 2013 the European Council decided to ring-fence
an initial 6 billion within the EU budget to support the Youth Guarantee's implementation
in regions with particularly high youth unemployment rates under the new Youth
Employment Initiative.
On the social policy side, we have put forward a Social Investment Package in February 2013
which set out ways of further modernising welfare states and improving the efficiency and
effectiveness of social policies against the background of growing crisis and shrinking public
budgets. We laid emphasis on social services enabling people to actively participate in the
economy and society (e.g. childcare or lifelong learning) and on prevention of poverty and
exclusion (e.g. through training and employment support) as compared to passive social
expenditure that compensates for poor socio-economic outcomes ex post.
In emphasising support for people's active socio-economic participation, the Social
Investment Package shared the philosophy of the 2012 White Paper on Pensions, which
emphasised the need for active ageing and reduced gender employment gaps as pre-
requisites for adequate (effective) and sustainable (efficient) pension systems. The White
Paper also promoted longer working lives, notably through alignment of the statutory
retirement age to changes in life expectancy, reduction in early retirement options and
investment in the employability of older workers.
As part of the Commission's agenda for a job-rich recovery, we have also completed a
number of steps towards a genuine European labour market, where people can easily seek
and take up work in other Member States while having their employment and social rights
protected. As part of the effort to facilitate intra-EU labour mobility, the Commission
proposed a reform of the European Network of Employment Services (EURES) in order to turn
it into a pan-European placement and recruitment service, drawing on improved
classifications of skills, qualifications and occupations and using new technological
possibilities of automated matching between jobseekers' skills and requirements advertised
by employers.
The Barroso II Commission also succeeded in removing obstacles to the free movement of
workers in several ways. The 'portability' of occupational pensions has been improved
through the adoption – after nine years since the original proposal – of a directive improving
the acquisition and preservation of supplementary pension rights. This legislation establishes
rules on so-called vesting and waiting periods and will make it easier for people to move to
a different Member State for work without losing the possibility to accumulate and
subsequently enjoy entitlements in occupational pension schemes. Agreement was found
also on an enforcement directive on the exercise of the freedom of movement of workers,
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which requires Member States to establish contact points where mobile EU workers can get
information about their rights and redress in case their rights are breached.
In the context of labour mobility, a very important achievement was the adoption in April
2014 of an enforcement directive on the posting of workers in the context of free movement
of services. This enforcement directive represents a difficult, if not miraculous compromise
between the European Parliament and Council, reconciling a number of very different starting
positions. By clarifying how the rules of the 1996 directive on the posting of workers are to be
applied and enforced, the enforcement directive will make it easier to ensure that posted
workers' rights are protected, that companies have greater legal certainty and that relevant
national enforcement bodies work together more efficiently. The enforcement directive will
also make it easier to combat the use of 'letterbox companies' and abuses of subcontracting
arrangements, particularly in the construction sector, where provisions on joint and several
liability for compliance with posting rules were introduced. The enforcement directive can
therefore go a long way towards resolving the long-standing political controversy on the
conditions of the posting of workers, and should enable policy-makers to move on to other
challenges in Europe's single market for services and labour. 
Together with strengthening the toolbox of employment and social policies through better
analysis, guidance and coordination, and legislative work on a genuine European labour
market with good working conditions, we have also ensured that a robust set of financial
instruments is available in the EU's Multiannual Financial Framework for 2014-20 to support
progress towards the 2020 employment and poverty targets.
The role of the European Social Fund (ESF) has been strengthened through an agreement on
its minimum financial share within EU Cohesion Policy (amounting to over 80 billion in
current prices for 2014-20) and through close alignment of the ESF's priorities to the Europe
2020 Strategy and country-specific recommendations issued during the European Semester.
The European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF) has been maintained and it can now
support re-employment of workers affected by mass layoffs not only occurring as a
consequence of changing global trade patterns but also those resulting from the on-going
economic crisis. A new Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived (FEAD) has replaced the
EU's earlier food aid programme with the explicit objective of strengthening social cohesion
through material assistance to severely deprived people and through targeted social
inclusion projects. Finally, an EU-level Programme for Employment and Social Innovation
(EaSI) will support employment and social analysis, policy-making and mutual learning
across Europe, finance the functioning of the EURES job search network, and help to improve
the access of micro-entrepreneurs and social entrepreneurs to finance.
Conclusion: Improving the EU's legitimacy through a stronger social dimension of the EMU
and its economic policies
Given the complexity of Europe's financial and economic crisis, stronger employment and
social policies have been a necessary response but they have clearly not been sufficient to
offset the worsening employment and social situation. At the macroeconomic policy level,
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much of our crisis response has been incremental, largely resulting from the very incomplete
design of the EMU. Without any lender of last resort, any euro zone budget or any sort of
economic government to begin with, Europe had to respond to the crisis through
strengthening the coordination of national fiscal and structural policies and developing
emergency macroeconomic stabilisation tools. 
Preparations for a more systemic reform of the EMU were started only as a second step in
2012 when the underlying causes of the euro zone crisis became more widely recognised.
The key question during the EU's institutional transition in 2014 is whether EMU reform will
continue with a sufficient level of ambition or whether complacency will prevail now that
GDP growth has turned slightly positive and financial markets are temporarily calm.
Throughout the crisis years, the Barroso II Commission has always paid attention to
employment and social developments, although they were not always treated with the same
urgency as the financial sector crisis. The Commission has benefitted from very strong
analysis in its annual reviews of Employment and Social Developments in Europe (ESDE) and
from close cooperation with the OECD, ILO and many distinguished experts. Since the
European Semester of economic policy coordination was established, the Directorate-
General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion has been involved in the preparation
of country-specific recommendations as part of the so-called 'core group' alongside the
Secretariat General and the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs and later
also the Directorate-General for Taxation.
In October 2013, the Commission also presented proposals to strengthen the social
dimension of the EMU, in response to the conclusions of the European Council which
identified this in December 2012 as one of the key aspects of EMU reform. A key element of
initiative on the social dimension of the EMU has been the creation of a Scoreboard of key
employment and social indicators to be used in the European Semester process. This
Scoreboard became a tool helping to identify earlier and better major employment and
social trends that may affect the good functioning of the EMU. 
The Scoreboard, which was approved by the Council as part of the 2014 Joint Employment
Report, consists of five key indicators capturing employment and social trends that can severely
undermine employment, social cohesion and human capital, and have negative effects on the
growth and competitiveness of a Member State and potentially on those of the EMU as a whole:
n the unemployment rate (15-74 age group);
n the NEET rate in conjunction with the youth unemployment rate (15-24 age group);
n real gross household disposable income (GHDI);
n the at-risk-of-poverty rate (18-64 age group); and
n income inequalities (S80/S20 ratio, i.e. the ratio between the incomes of the top and 
bottom quintiles of the income distribution). 
The Scoreboard has been developed with the understanding that given the limited mechanisms
of macroeconomic adjustment in the EMU, unemployment and social crises risk developing to
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a greater extent and last longer within the currency union than outside (or than was the case
during earlier instances of monetary cooperation in Europe). Therefore they have to be
anticipated and addressed by the currency union on a collective basis. The Scoreboard has
been used in preparation of the country-specific recommendations during the 2014 European
Semester and could represent a very useful tool also in the coming years when it comes to
further strengthening the coordination of economic, employment and social policies.
A good understanding of employment and social dynamics in Europe is very important,
because the European integration project can hardly continue to evolve in the right direction
unless we find an answer to the question how our Economic and Monetary Union can be
made to sustainably work for socio-economic convergence and renewed prosperity across
the highly heterogeneous group of countries of which it consists. 
In the wake of an economic crisis which was longer and more severe in Europe than in other
advanced economies, and which led to socio-economic divergences and inequalities unseen
in Europe for decades, we should be grateful that European voters have maintained a
majority in the Parliament which wants to further strengthen the European project. However,
unless Europe achieves a job-rich and inclusive growth in the second half of this decade and
makes visible progress towards the targets originally set for 2020, we can be certain that
much fewer voters will give the EU the benefit of the doubt in 2019, if we are still a Union
of 28 democratic countries at all by then.
Restoring the capacity to achieve balanced growth and socio-economic convergence in
Europe is a key condition for the EU to regain 'output legitimacy'. However, no promising
results can yet be shown in this respect, which also means that continuing EMU reform
should be seen not only as a key component of the European recovery strategy, but also as
a pre-condition of progress towards the Europe 2020 goals.
Our crisis experience shows that achieving durable recovery and restoring convergence will
be extremely difficult as long as the EMU remains without a fiscal capacity and continues to
rely on austerity and internal devaluation as the main mechanisms of adjustment to economic
crises. A more resilient and growth-friendly EMU would require a well-designed mechanism
of fiscal transfers between Member States using the euro. Through such a scheme, it should
be possible to create a European safety net for the welfare safety nets of individual Member
States, strengthening the ability of national governments to support an economic recovery.
The best options for a predictable and rules-based mechanism of countercyclical fiscal
transfers appear to be schemes where EMU Member States would share part of the costs of
short-term unemployment insurance. One such option is a basic European unemployment
insurance scheme, enabling partial pooling of fiscal risks through a common core of national
unemployment insurance schemes. Another option is reinsurance of national unemployment
insurance schemes that would be activated in cases of severe downturns.
Both such schemes would provide a limited and predictable short-term fiscal stimulus to
economies undergoing a downturn in the economic cycle, thus strengthening market
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confidence in the EMU and helping to mitigate economic contraction. By alleviating the
need for abrupt fiscal consolidation in a downturn, such automatic fiscal stabilisers at the
EMU level would also create a more favourable environment for structural reforms that bear
fruit in the longer term.
Crucially, a countercyclical fiscal capacity at the EMU level would help prevent short-term
crises from unleashing longer-lasting divergence within the monetary union. It would
provide a good answer to the citizens' question: "How does Europe help us when we need
it most?" – an answer which over the past years we have unfortunately struggled to find.
László Andor is European Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion.
 
Solidarity and cohesion 
Pawel Swieboda
In the past five years, the concept of solidarity has quietly lost much of its traction in the public
discourse in Europe. Widely used at the time of the creation of the single market, the
emergence of the common currency and during the EU's big bang enlargement of 2004-2007,
it has recently become a more confused organising principle. The European system has been
affected by growing levels of distrust, which has much to do with the way in which the euro
zone crisis was tackled. In spite of massive resources having been mobilised to support
countries in need, mutual accusations and discord have become ever more present in the EU's
policy-making process. 
As a result, many observers and analysts have given up on the promise of restoring convergence
in the European Union. Ashoka Mody for one, has argued in favour of accepting a "de facto
decentralisation in Europe" making it more robust, rather than seeking a federal arrangement at
any cost.1 His basic assumption is that overcoming structural differences between the Member
States and the differences in governance cultures will be impossible. Europe should accept this
situation and manage its diversity, rather than continue to seek uniformity. 
However, questioning the rationale for economic convergence in Europe can pose a major
risk to the sustainability of the European project. It can blow a hole in the meticulous effort
to restore legitimacy of the European Union in the face of massive pressures of fragmentation.
What is more, it can also weaken growth prospects in the EU at large. As the continent
struggles through the aftermath of the deepest recession since the 1930s, it is becoming
broadly accepted that weakness in one quarter of the European Union affects the
performance elsewhere. Even in Northern Europe, "the recovery has been much slower and
less powerful than after previous downturns", leading analysts dwell on the likelihood of the
"new normal" of lower growth.2
Cohesion was, from the beginning, part of a larger bargain by means of which some Member
States received compensation for benefiting less from some European policies. One of the first
instruments of cohesion policy, the European Regional Development Fund, which was
introduced in mid-1970s, compensated the UK for not being in the position to draw benefits
from the Common Agricultural Policy. At the time of the formation of the single market, the
reason for compensation changed and a more redistributive logic was accepted: the
deepening of European integration was to be accompanied by measures supporting those
members with lower ability to withstand competitive pressures. The objective of reducing
disparities between regions with different levels of development has been for long enshrined
in the Treaties. The introduction of the euro also carried cohesion policy implications, granting
weaker countries the benefit of lower interest rates and better access to capital. As we have
seen later, what seemed to be a bargain at the time, in this case, turned out to be a curse. 
Subsequent reforms of cohesion policy, starting in the late 1980s have focused on the
efficiency of spending and success of investment projects as the major criterion. Although
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much criticism has been voiced with respect to the resistance of the EU budget to change,
cohesion policy itself has been undergoing significant modernisation towards broader
acceptance of its role in incentivising economic activity, rather than providing a blank
cheque for investments. In the context of the economic and financial crisis, the case for
elements of redistribution at the EU level has only been strengthened by the unquestionable
benefits, which the stronger countries have drawn from the single currency. 
However, as the World Bank stated in its flagship "Golden Growth" report3, the convergence
machine in Europe had been broken from the early 2000s onwards when the inflow of
investment in Southern Europe was diverted to unproductive use. The scale of the damage
done by the lack of vigilance on the part of the recipient countries has been enormous, not
only in the social texture but also in economic prospects. In Spain, new loans for small and
medium sized businesses (non-financial) have decreased nearly 70% between the end of
2007 and the first quarter of 2013.4 This contrasts with an increase of nearly 30% between
the beginning of 2003 and the end of 2007. The prerogative of solidarity requires recognising
that there are always two sides to each investment decision – just as some sectors of the
Southern European economy had a sponge-like ability to attract funds, creating financial
bubbles, investment decisions were backed up at the other side of the equation by Northern
European banks. 
In the meantime, Central Europe has largely continued improving its economic performance
and catching up with the European median. Most countries of the region have exceeded the
aggregate EU-27 level of growth, although performance has differed sharply among them.
Poland and Slovakia have done best with their 2013 growth 49% above the 2004 level. They
were followed by Lithuania (38%), Romania (37%) and Bulgaria (34%). Some have done less
well with Slovenia's economy growing only by 14% and Hungary's by 9%.5
The 2004-2008 boom years in Central Europe can be justifiably attributed to the EU
dividend. Lower business risk, higher attractiveness for investors and financial credibility,
reducing barriers in the flow of capital all contributed to the catch-up dynamic. Investments
and exports have interchangeably been the main contributors to growth in the region.
Foreign direct investments have been particularly important, given Central Europe's low
saving rate. They have led to rise in productivity and technology transfers. In some of the
younger Member States, EU funds constituted over 90% of public investment in the course
of the crisis, underlining the importance of transfers in maintaining growth dynamic. 
Productivity improvements have been significant, although not allowing yet for bridging the
gap to the EU average levels. When it comes to labour productivity, Poland is at 72% of the
EU average (up from 60% in 2003) while Slovakia is the regional leader with 81% (up from
64% in 2003). Trade has been a big growth engine in Central Europe with Poland's exports
rising 220% in the years 2004-2013 and imports by 160%. Slovakia has become the most
open economy with exports amounting to 97% of GDP in 2013.6 EU membership has led
the region to anchor its enterprises in the global supply chains. As the IMF observed, the 
spill-over of German domestic demand to Central Europe remains relatively small while
much of the bilateral trade between Germany and the region is in intermediate goods.7
43
All this is a success story. However, more recently, Central Europe's advances have stalled
and its rates of growth have converged downwards towards the median for EU-27. There are
two paradigms to explain the region's slowing growth. One draws on the approach presented
in the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) "Stuck in transition"
report8, which puts the blame on the slowing momentum of reform. Another builds on the
approach of the World Economic Forum, which speaks about the need for transition from the
efficiency-driven to the innovation-driven model of growth. Given that most countries in the
region have not yet made that transition, one of the EU's objectives in the next institutional
cycle ought to be to incentivise and assist in the process. 
Looking at both Southern and Central Europe, it is clear that the post-crisis solidarity and
cohesion agenda must focus on restarting the convergence process. No other priority is more
important for winning back citizens trust and ensuring renewed legitimacy for the European
project. Importantly, reinstating the pivotal role of convergence is not only an issue with
relevance for the more vulnerable Member States but is profoundly in the interest of the
stronger countries as well. It is both the question of restoring aggregate demand as well as
avoiding the transmission of individual countries' instabilities. The EU cannot afford to be a
patchwork of growth areas intermittent with countries and regions on the trajectory of failure.
There will have to be several components of this 'growth for convergence' agenda. The basic
one will have to do with overcoming the legacy of the past and restoring the level-playing field
in the European Union. Much of the effort at the reconstruction of the euro zone belongs to
this category. A genuine commitment to the convergence agenda would require completing
the Economic and Monetary Union with a robust fiscal pillar, including the joint issuance of
debt and elements of a "transfer union". However, reduction in the cost of debt, which this
would entail, or a mechanism for orderly restructuring of debt, which still does not exist in the
euro zone, would not be effective without restoring growth. 
Beyond issues of re-footing the EMU, the new convergence bargain will need to span across
both demand and supply sides of the equation. On the demand side, stronger economies will
need to play a more pronounced role, given their surplus savings, while on the supply side,
more will be expected of the vulnerable countries. There will also need to be a powerful EU
dimension to enable the scaling up of opportunities through advancement of the single market. 
In the former basket, increasing investment in order to raise aggregate demand is the most
pressing task. It is the collapse of public investment in the weaker countries that has
contributed to the depth of the recession. There are three possible ways to proceed. One
would be to create a dedicated investment fund, aiming to serve the interests of the strategy
for growth by pulling the available resources through a loan-based vehicle.9 Another
possibility is the one to which the new President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude
Juncker, has committed himself. This means greater efforts at leveraging private investment
through the more flexible use of the EU budget and European Investment Bank (EIB) lending.
In Jean-Claude Juncker's view, this can mobilise up to 300 billion euro additional public and
private investment in the real economy over the next three years.10 A further increase in the
EIB's capital "should be considered" for this end. 
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The third method would be to encourage more domestic investment by incorporating a range
of EU-level incentives. This may include exclusion of national co-funding of EU-financed
investments from the fiscal indicators of the Stability and Growth Pact as well as the
extension of the EU fiscal framework with an asymmetric "golden rule" to protect public
investment in times of difficulty, while limiting adverse incentives in good times.11 In parallel,
improving the range of financial instruments, which are available to the Member States and
enterprises, is vital. This means increased use of the new private-public partnership
instruments, including project bonds, and greater use of loans or guarantees. 
A workable and flexible financial infrastructure to allow firms to gain finance and investment
must be an essential component of the new convergence agenda. The most vulnerable
countries have appealed for a long time to the European Central Bank (ECB) to engage in
non-standard reflationary policy and restart credit to small and medium sized enterprises
(SMEs). They would benefit enormously from increasing the flow of non-bank finance,
including by more equity funding, venture capital and corporate bond issuance. Peer-to-peer
lending could significantly improve the funding environment for start-ups. As Hugo Dixon
points out, an initiative to create a "capital markets union" could "kill two birds with one
stone: it would help the euro zone finance jobs and growth, while giving the UK another
strong reason to stay in the EU".12
Investment needs to increase not only in the periphery but also at the centre. In Germany,
low investment has meant low productivity growth and a vicious cycle of continued
dependence on low wages and outsourcing of the production to Central and Eastern
Europe.13 Therefore Germany should change its approach to investment not only to help
overcome the wider EU imbalances but also for the sake of its own growth model. 
The prerequisite for increasing the flow of investment lies in improving the supply side
environment and competitiveness in the vulnerable countries. Progress needs to be achieved
across the whole range of component areas of competitiveness, including not only labour
market reforms but also efficiency of the institutions, quality and extent of infrastructure, good
macroeconomic environment, maturity of financial markets or sophistication of the business
models. Better investment environment also involves improving absorption capacity, including
earlier involvement of the European Commission and the EIB in the preparation of projects. 
The other side of the bargain has to do with improving macroeconomic performance and
completing structural reforms in vulnerable countries. Efforts need to be undertaken to work
out an optimal policy matrix, which combines the objectives of fiscal consolidation with
those of growth and equity. As the OECD suggests, "well-designed consolidation packages
can avoid severe adverse side effects on growth, equity and current-account imbalances".14
In spite of major efforts, which have been undertaken in the past few years, there is still an
enormous scope for improvement. Spain, for example, is ranked 136th in the World Bank's
"Doing Business" report when it comes to starting a new business. Being an entrepreneur in
Spain "continues to be more expensive than in other European countries" with the different
levels of administration requiring different authorisations for starting a business and licensing
goods and services.15
45
Prior to the crisis, much of the EU's economic policy, including the use of cohesion funds,
was geared increasingly towards addressing the EU's strategic challenges of globalisation,
demography and technological change. Although the "Europe 2020 Strategy" will need to be
significantly revised to take into account the fallout from the crisis, the focus on long-term
readiness to meet societal and global challenges will need to be retained.
This means that the EU's agenda for solidarity and cohesion will become more complex and
more nuanced. It will need to be better anchored in the societies' understanding of the
commonality of their interests. In the future, solidarity in the EU will need to be more 
tailor-made and better adapted to the specific requirements of countries at different stage of
economic development. It will also need to be more of a two-way street with clear mutual
advantages. Its ratio of success will be measured by how decisively and how effectively it 
re-launches the convergence process in the EU. 
Pawel Swieboda is President of demosEUROPA – Centre for European Strategy.
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The single market and competitiveness – the challenges
for the Juncker team
Malcolm Harbour
The announcement of the new European Commission is encouraging for single market
supporters, especially in terms of how internal co-ordination and cross functional working
will be organised. It is particularly significant that the responsibility for the single market in
both goods and services is to be combined under one Commissioner portfolio. There is much
to be gained from a combined focus, especially on enforcing the existing rules. A unified
Consumer focus is also much welcomed. The European Parliament's Internal Market and
Consumer Protection Committee (IMCO), which I had the privilege to Chair over the last five
years, was extremely critical of the fragmented approach to consumer policy and legislation
adopted by the outgoing Commission. A strong consumer focus underpins a dynamic and
well-functioning market place and encourages more competition. 
It is notable that the Competition Commissioner portfolio is the only one in the new Juncker
line up that remains unchanged. Moreover, none of the Vice Presidents are given a policy 
co-ordination role over Competition. Hopefully this is because President Juncker wishes the
Competition team to be given an independent role and to take impartial action in enforcing
rules or approving mergers. It will be important for the single market that consumer detriment
due to absence of competition or abuse of dominant positions is swiftly dealt with.
The role of the new team in the single market arena must focus on effective application and
enforcement of existing rules rather than major new initiatives. In this respect, the new 
Vice-President (VP) for Better Regulation will play a key role. President Juncker has said that
his senior VP will ensure that "every" Commission proposal respects the "principles of
subsidiarity and proportionality". For the single market, this is too narrow a remit. Efficiency
and effectiveness of measures must also be optimised. Top of VP Timmermans' in-tray should
be a major reform of the Commission Impact Assessment rules, to give far more emphasis to
"post implementation assessments" – actually understanding what is working on the ground
in Member States to make the single market work. Combining the Better Regulation role with
Inter Institutional relations will give him a greater chance to tackle the biggest weakness in
the structure – the Council of Ministers.
The Council is a key player in agreeing, implementing and enforcing single market rules. Yet
the Council is only making tentative and timid steps forward for a "better regulation". There is
very weak input from Member States on the enforcement cost and effectiveness of the existing
acquis. Ministers – and especially their Parliaments – are not systematically engaged in
strategic reviews which would pave the way for reforms, improvements, simplification or even
repeals of existing rules. The European Parliament is way ahead of the Council in collecting
data and guiding legislative Committees to carry out extended strategic reviews. The new
Commission can work with the Parliament to put pressure on all Governments to modernise
the Council and open opportunities for national Parliaments to become engaged.
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The Vice-Presidential team also needs to tackle the continued problem of ineffective
application and weak enforcement of key single market measures by Member States. A "fast
track" method of dealing with Member State non-compliance without recourse to expensive,
cumbersome and time consuming infringement procedures is clearly needed. VP Timmermans
could also exploit his 'inter-institutional' role by securing agreement for better co-ordinated
transposition of new and amended rules across all Member States, combined with exchanges
of best practice and better use of the mutual evaluation tool pioneered in the Services
Directive. The Council should be encouraged to review its Ministerial 'formations' and ensure
that issues of clear under performance or market protectionism are running items on all
Ministerial meetings.
Given the new team, applying "better regulation" and improved co-ordination, the priorities
for action to apply these new policy tools need to be systematically identified. The Digital
Single Market has been given a welcome boost by a Vice Presidential role. But it is important
that digital tools are seen as a mechanism to deliver existing single market benefits more
efficiently and to encourage cross border competition. It is sometimes too easy to become
mesmerised by the latest online shopping application, while forgetting that speedy, reliable
low cost delivery of items ordered online is a key factor in enhancing online sales. Full
implementation of the Consumer Rights Directive, with online redress, will also raise
confidence and encourage more consumers to go 'online'. Vice-President Ansip will need to
take a down to earth, pragmatic, approach and tackle the less glamorous issues vigorously.
On the core single market legislation, it is time for a major review of the goods market and a
full appraisal of the provisions of the Mutual Recognition Directive. Far too many goods are
still subject to entirely unnecessary local testing regimes or blocked from being placed on the
market by unjustified restrictions. The 2005 Mutual Recognition provisions were supposed to
give producers or importers of goods, new rights to challenge arbitrary restrictions, and to
require public authorities to justify import bans on clear public interest grounds. It is clear that
many companies are unaware of their rights to challenge restrictions, or frustrated by a lack
of response to their questions, despite the fact that clear deadlines are written into the rules.
The new Commissioner should press for an intensive screening of the biggest problem sectors,
with a mutual evaluation programme by national authorities, allowing them to challenge
restrictions imposed by their peers. This process can be modelled on the lines of the Services
Directive, deploying the shared expertise of combined goods and service sector teams.
The Services Directive will be subject to a mandatory review and possible revision during
this Commission cycle. Member States must be closely involved from the outset, and should
be collecting data on potential opportunities, and amassing evidence on unjustified barriers.
The existing output from the "mutual evaluation" process must be published more widely,
and Member States maintaining unjustified restrictions on business highlighted. The
Commission needs to ensure that any changes will really make an improvement, and not
used by Member States as a 'smoke screen' to disguise their underperformance.
Public Procurement is another of the 'flagship' measures that underpin an effective single
market. Moreover, it is increasingly realised that the strategic use of public procurement will
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help deliver other key policy goals. A major reform of the Procurement Directives, and new
measures on Concessions, were agreed by Parliament in 2013 and formally enacted in March
2014. At the heart of the changes are simplified and more flexible measures to encourage
SMEs to supply to the public sector; provisions to encourage innovative suppliers to develop
tailored solutions, responding to customer demands; and the possibility for suppliers to take
parameters such as life time costs into account. The new Commission must take a strong role
in working with Member State authorities to introduce these rules in a consistent way and
ensure that the potential for more competitive market based solutions are realised.
The deployment of some of the new provisions, such as "Innovative Partnership Procurements"
needs to be encouraged by the development of training programmes and best practice
exchanges. Otherwise, risk averse purchasing teams may be reluctant to work with innovative
companies to develop leading edge solutions. The use of public contracts to drive innovation
must be a policy imperative for all the Commissioners in the Jobs, Growth and Investment
Portfolio, and commends itself to Vice-President Katainen as a lead project. It would be
especially appropriate in view of Finlands' leadership in exploiting public procurement of
innovation, and linking university research teams and innovative companies with smart
customers. In this respect, VP Katainen should demand a co-ordinating role for Research,
Science and Innovation, which in the published Juncker plan is reserved only for the VP
Energy Union.
In the last Commission cycle, there was a welcome boost in the political profile of the single
market. The adoption of two Single Market Acts (SMA) set out clear political programmes
across the Commission to boost its functioning. These Acts were also widely welcomed by
all stakeholders. The SMA was an initiative of the European Parliament, and it should be
energetically followed through by the new Commission, as it is fully in line with the goal of
more co-ordinated policy making. The SMA was modelled on an earlier Commission
initiative, the Small Business Act, and the drive to make the European Union more SME
friendly needs to be stepped up. A further imperative is to encourage more innovation by
enterprise and public authorities. The new Commission needs to ensure that Member State
performance in meeting these critical competiveness goals are included in the European
Semester, as demanded by Parliament in its last mandate. VP Dombrovskis is a known single
market enthusiast and should be ideally placed to take on this task.
At first sight, this new Commission seems well placed to put the single market at the forefront
of policy making, and to focus on better implementation alongside "better regulation". The
European Parliament hearings should concentrate on this aspect of the new Commissioners
competences, and judge them on their potential to deliver good results for the European
economy. The European Council and especially, the Council of Ministers, need to look at
their own internal procedures, and engage their National Parliaments much more deeply in
the competitiveness journey. Let's hope for real progress.
Malcolm Harbour was Chairman of the Internal Market and Consumer Protection
Committee in the European Parliament between 2009-2014.
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A European response to the resource and climate challenge
Jo Leinen
The 20th Century was characterised by growth: the world population grew by four times and
its economic output grew by 40 times. At the same time, the resource use and greenhouse
gas emissions increased drastically. Only within the last two decades, the worldwide
extraction of resources increased by over 50%.
With the expectation that the demand of resources will triple by 2050 and the demand for
food, feed and fibre is projected to increase by 70%, there is no doubt that we will exceed
our planet's boundaries, the safe thresholds within which humanity can continue to develop
and thrive for generations to come. Crossing these boundaries could generate abrubt or
irreversible environmental changes. Respecting them reduces the risk that human society
and ecosystems will face irreversible damages.
The model on planetary boundaries has been developed by the Stockholm Resilience 
Centre1 and its most prominent boundary is "human induced climate change" which is an
ever increasing threat to humanity. The impacts of global warming have been 
researched and analysed in depth not at least by the International Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) and range from the increased risk of storms, droughts and 
floods until the rising sea level with unpredictable effects for society, environment and 
global economy. 
In order to meet these challenges, the European Union (EU) aims to move towards a
sustainable, resource efficient and low carbon economy. This ambitious transition demands
the commitment of all stakeholders. The overarching objective of its resource efficiency and
climate policies is to decouple resource use and greenhouse gas emissions from 
economic growth. Of course that requires more than a legislative approach; it requires
changes in our behaviour as producers and consumers, and that in turn requires 
incentives across many policy areas. The EU must make this paradigm shift happen 
swiftly and successfully. Every gram of resource that is not extracted, transported 
and used will reduce the ecological footprint. Every measure to reduce the emission of
greenhouse gases will limit climate change and bring the EU on a path towards 
sustainable development.
Accordingly, a vision for "living well, within the limits of our planet" has been formulated
and agreed on in the identically named 7th Environmental Action Programme:
In 2050, we live well, within the planet's ecological limits. Our prosperity and 
healthy environment stem from an innovative, circular economy where nothing is
wasted and where natural resources are managed sustainably, and biodiversity is 
protected, valued and restored in ways that enhance our society's resilience. Our
low-carbon growth has long been decoupled from resource use, setting the pace 
for a global safe and sustainable society.2
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A closer look at the size of the challenge of resource constraints and climate change
Knowledge and science on climate change, its impacts and the need for action have been
well developed over the last years and ultimately led to the international goal to limit the
increase in average global temperature below two degrees. This goal has been accepted by
the international community under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) and is the highest affordable rise in order to have a 50% chance to avoid
the worst effects of climate change. Scientifically translated it means the concentration of
carbon dioxide equivalent in the atmosphere should not exceed 450 parts per million with
a current concentration of around 400 parts per million.
From a European perspective, the challenge is clear: the EU – together with other developed
countries – has a historical responsibility for the large amount of emissions caused since the
industrial revolution; the bills for energy imports are constantly rising and the dependency
on few exporting countries increases accordingly which has been evident not at least in the
context of the Ukraine crisis; altogether with the fact that the co-effects from burning fossil
fuels (bad air quality and health impacts) have been increasing. 
Already in the early 1970's, the European Union recognised the need for urgent action and
subsequently committed itself to emission reductions under the Kyoto Protocol to fulfil its
responsibility. With the adoption of the climate and energy package for 2020, the EU showed
international leadership in being the first to adopt binding climate change mitigation targets
as follows:
n the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 20% from 1990 levels;
n to reach 20% of renewable energy in the total energy consumption in the EU;
n to increase energy efficiency to save 20% of EU energy consumption and;
n to reach 10% of biofuels in the total consumption of vehicles by 2020.
It was agreed that the implementation shall take the triad of sustainability, competitiveness
and security of supply equally into account. Furthermore the following measures were
determined: completing of the internal energy market, ensuring security of supply and
solidarity in times of shortages, making the energy mix more sustainable, setting up an
emission trading scheme and, a coherent external energy policy. 
Member States have made substantial progress towards reaching the aims and targets, yet the
way towards an absolute decoupling from economic growth and greenhouse gases and
reaching the goal of an 80-95% emission reduction is still long. The upcoming two years will
be crucial as the 2030 climate and energy framework will be discussed and the UN Climate
Summit 2015 in Paris has to be prepared – where an international climate change agreement
shall be reached. 
In the run-up to the Climate Summit in Copenhagen in 2009, the EU has shown leadership
in the negotiations, especially after the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, providing material
resources, showing commitment and readiness to compromise. Its role as an agenda-setter
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and as a continuous booster of ambitious climate policy goals had a significant impact on
the negotiations. Its recognition as an important international actor in the climate regime was
further strengthened through communication and integration of emerging and developing
countries, as well as by providing them financial and technological support. In the upcoming
months, all eyes will be on the EU, the level of ambition in the 2030 package and how the
facilitation of reaching consensus on a global climate treaty progresses.
While the size of the climate challenge has been clearly defined by scientists and the
political agenda is well elaborated, the resource agenda is still rather vague. The challenge
is vast, and rather difficult to break down on a single indicator such as the concentration of
carbon dioxide equivalent. 
Already today, resource extraction and consumption exceeds the Earth's capacity to
regenerate those resources. However, the very same planet with limited resource capacity
shall feed 9 billion people by 2050, all with similar expectations for a high standard of life.
Already by 2030, there will be an additional 3 billion middle class consumers which will
thrive on providing for their demands. This is of course good news but worrying at the same
time: If we continue with a 'business as usual' scenario it will put immense strain on many
resources and could potentially limit the ability to grow and provide higher living standards. 
Over the past years, some improvements in the efficient use of resources have occurred, but
economic growth worldwide has outstripped these gains. Resource extraction and use
continue to rise dramatically on a global level and lead to a high volatility in resource prices.
The EU is poor in mineral resources and therefore the biggest importer of raw materials. We
get 48% of our copper ore from abroad, 64% of zinc and bauxite as well as 78% of nickel.
We import all of our cobalt, platinum, titanium and vanadium. The challenge for the EU is
thus to reduce the need of virgin raw materials, use resources more efficiently and become
thus independent from other countries. In order to avoid the waste of valuable resources, the
old concept of 'extract-use-throw away' has to be transformed into a more sustainable
production and consumption mode. Especially as we have to expect an end of perpetually
cheaper resources in the next decades. We need to leave this path and become a more
resource efficient and resilient economy.
From a highly import dependent continent you would expect that resources are managed
efficiently out of a logical, ecological and economical reasoning. Yet, it seems Europe is still
locked into resource inefficient infrastructures, resource inefficient consumption and
production patterns, resource inefficient economic systems and resource inefficient behaviour.  
As mentioned above, it is difficult to say how big the transition shall be, but with regard to the
fact that people in rich countries consume up to 10 times more natural resources than those in
the poorest countries, it shall be indicative that the EU needs to reduce its resource use,
drastically. This implies changing the business models and moving towards a society where the
extraction of virgin raw materials, the absolute level of resource use and the waste of valuable
resources is reduced. This can be achieved by moving to a "circular economy" (with a circular
concept of extract-take-make-use-remake) where resources are reused and recycled.  
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The next passage will focus on how to meet the challenges of mitigating climate change and
reduce the overall resource use.
Policy options for a sustainable, resource efficient and low carbon economy
To continue with the need for action in the field of resource efficiency, measures and
recommendations shall be given hereafter as well as ways to tackle climate change,
described afterwards.
According to a Commission study3, every percentage point reduction in resource use is worth
around 23 billion to business and could create up to 100,000 to 200,000 new jobs in the
related sectors. It has been estimated that a reduction of the total material requirements of
the European economy by 17% is feasible and this could boost GDP by up to 3.3% and
create between 1.4 and 2.8 million jobs. 
This should be an incentive to rethink the system with its related business models and move
towards a circular economy by changing our production and consumption patterns. The
basket of policy measures ranges from targets and indicators to awareness-raising campaigns,
yet discussions on the right way forward are still at an early stage at the European level.
Often, innovative ideas or instruments are difficult to implement or lose effectiveness. The
idea of a 'product passport' which lists which materials a product contains; where they come
from and how they could be re-used or recycled after the end of life of the product; and its
environmental impact on water, carbon and land. This range of information could facilitate
consumer choices and provide the necessary information for a potential label on how
resource efficient the product is. However, if a product consists of hundreds of small pieces
it is questionable if all the information could be collected and properly evaluated. 
The European Parliament called for a legal framework on resource efficiency which includes
targets, indicators, and benchmarks for standards and market-based instruments to create
long-term investment perspectives for the private sector. A well-chosen mix of 'push' and
'pull' measures, including support for research and development, is needed to approach this
challenge. Especially since recent OECD findings confirm that voluntary action brings us
only half-way: "environmental effectiveness of voluntary approaches is often questionable,
and their economic efficiency is generally low".'4
As the study of the Commission shows, it is a win-win situation: business can save money,
additional jobs are created in the society and the impact on the environment is reduced.
Until a legislative proposal will be adopted, other measures can be taken already:
n Products should be designed in a way that they can be entirely or partly recycled and 
re-used; the use of recyclable materials can then be promoted accordingly. In addition,  
increasing the life span of products and services is a measure which is not so often 
mentioned, but which could be very effective in reducing waste – this could be achieved
through a longer minimal period of warranty. 
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n Technology and innovation are key elements in the decoupling of resource use and 
environmental impacts from production, consumption and economic growth. It is up to
business to thrive for innovation and become market leaders and international 
frontrunners in resource efficient products and services.
n Like in all areas where a change of consumer behaviour is required, the necessary 
information must be provided. Creating a waste avoiding, re-using and recycling society
can only be successful with the support of our citizens. Awareness raising campaigns 
can help consumers to take better informed decisions and increase the demand for 
sustainable products. 
In order to achieve the goal of mitigating climate change and energy-self-sufficiency,
Member States need to significantly expand renewable energies, increase energy efficiency
and invest in the grid and storage capacities. In the range of policy options, development and
deployment of renewable energies will be the most sustainable.  
The benefits of an increased use of renewable energy are already known: they foster
sustainable development and access to energy for all; contribute to social and economic
development, a more secure energy supply and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions;
offer side-benefits in terms of less air pollution and health concerns and; reduce the costs of
energy imports; provide economic possibilities for companies due to exports, market
leadership and innovation and last but not least creates jobs. 
In the 2020 package, three targets were adopted to provide energy companies and other
stakeholders with clear market signals and necessary predictability for their investments. This
path must continue with an ambitious framework and three legally binding targets as strategy
for sustainable growth beyond 2020. The combination of energy efficiency, renewable
energy and climate protection is crucial to achieve a sustainable energy mix and become
energy-self-sufficient.
In contrast, last year we were able to witness many regressive measures taken by some
Member States due to the economic crisis. This short-sighted economic interest shall 
not prevail over a clear long-term vision for renewable energy and a low carbon roadmap 
in Europe.
Creating momentum for a sustainability agenda after the European elections 2014
The transition towards a sustainable, resource efficient and low carbon economy 
includes profound changes in thinking, behaviour and consuming as well as economic 
and social structures. A redefinition of the European economy is needed. The figures 
and data on employment, emission reductions, and business opportunities – to name 
just a few – are proof that sustainable development will be beneficial for the environment
and society alike. 
Especially in this time of multiple crises, we are in a situation where we need to reduce costs
spent on energy and resources, we need to increase our competitiveness and we need to
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become less dependent on imports from other countries. Therefore, Europe can't afford 
to delay action. Doing more with less, will become our competitive advantage in 
the 21st Century.







Renewal through international action?
Options for EU foreign policy
Rosa Balfour1
"Actually, this time it is serious. Foreign policy is now compulsory for the EU"
Robert Cooper, Lecture given at the EU Institute for Security Studies 
Annual Conference, Paris, 11-12 September 2014
A time for choices 
The time has come for the EU to become more curious of the world around it, open and
receptive to different ideas, and more articulate and thoughtful about its own. This is a
somewhat anthropomorphic description of what would be needed to 'mature' into a global
actor. The EU has promoted and managed globalisation while pretending that its political
dimension would not require attention. This has led to it punching below its weight globally.
Now it is abundantly clear that the systemic weaknesses of globalisation require
international action and that the management of internal affairs cannot be divorced from the
external context: decision time has come.
Two decades since the end of the Cold War and the beginning of a Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP), the EU has become more active internationally and taken some steps
to improve its capabilities. While it has moved at snail pace on its hard security capabilities,
hiding behind the luxury of external guarantees of the US and NATO, it has endowed itself
with a broad, diverse, and innovative tool box for external action reflecting its 'whole of
government' approach. It has issued plenty of strategies and policy documents, established
relations with governments around the world and, to a much lesser degree, with societies,
and has continued its contribution to multilateral institutions. 
Yet it falls short of widespread hopes and expectations inside the EU and from some of its
international partners to become a fully-fledged global actor. The Union has remained a 
self-referential and internally indulgent power rather than become an actor deeply engaged
with the rest of the world politically as much as it is interconnected economically and
culturally. Now the time for making choices has come. 
Never before have the intimate connections between the 'domestic' and the 'international'
realms been so evident.  Global patterns of insecurity and turmoil, state fragility, the scrabble
for natural resources, climate change are felt in Europe in the price of heating, in the loss of
life in the Mediterranean waters, in the rise of xenophobia and of fear of the unknown.
Europe's eroding welfare system and slow growth has consequences on what should be
thriving multi-lingual school courtyards, on solidarity between multi-cultural and multi-
religious communities, and on Europe's ability to connect, rather than conflict, with citizens
across the world through the exchange of ideas, people, goods and services. 
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European politicians seek international trade agreements to secure sources of economic
growth while citizens become increasingly insulated and allergic to contacts with the outside
world. EU born and bred citizens are moving to fight insurgency wars in the name of religion,
while their elected politicians fail to prevent the break-down of those states and security on
their borders. 
If Europe wants to address its key internal priorities, it needs to do so in an international context
of growing and deepening interdependence which the EU itself has contributed to create. 
The nexus to unravel is conceptual, strategic, policy-related, and organisational: how are the
'domestic' and 'international' inter-related, and what are the implications? How should the EU
position itself globally? What kind of player should it aim to be? What are the implications on
policy and how to identify the priorities? How to organise the institutions and division of
labour to make the EU fit for the challenge? Whatever the choices and ambition, these four
levels need each other for a fuller realisation of the EU's global potential.
Options for Europe's global role
Current and future global trends impose an overarching choice about the EU's global role.
There are two politically possible directions. The first works on the assumption that the
current state of EU politics suggests that to keep the EU hanging together it is necessary to
lower the level of ambition. A more realist reading of Europe's declining position in the world
advises the identification of a smaller and less ambitious set of priorities which could ensure
survival and possibly, in the future, renewal. 
The second sees the urgency of renewal precisely through international activity. The EU has
plenty of assets, experiences and practices which can still be relevant and useful for the 
21st century world. As it was a unique experiment in peace-building after a century of wars
which erupted at the heart of Europe and crumbling empires, it now is a unique example of
cooperative management of the post-modern world, albeit still imperfect and in need of
some fixing.
Both directions have distinctive policy implications, require the next EU leadership to 
adjust their institutions to address the challenges, and call for a leap ahead in political and
strategic cohesion – even if outside the traditional mind-sets through which EU integration 
is usually seen.
Option 1: Do less but better
The meta-narrative about Europe's decline is coupled with the emergence of other powers,
which frequently entertain a general 'anti-Western' agenda. Juxtapose this environment to
the EU's track record in foreign policy, and the case for downscaling is strong. Many of the
EU's foreign policy 'brands' have become redundant in the midst of international turmoil,
from the Strategic Partnerships to the European Neighbourhood Policy. This loss of
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confidence, all the more striking when compared to the post-Cold War ambitions of shaping
a new multilateral, rules-based and cooperative world, has already led to a toning down of
rhetoric and to an appeal for realistically-based objectives. The EU should not think 'big' if
it can only act 'small'. It should focus on what it is good at and avoid raising expectations it
cannot and does not want to meet. 
The consequences of the crisis that Europe has been undergoing since 2008 also advise 
a focus on internal matters to make the EU relevant to its citizens and to refound 
solidarity in Europe before shifting the outlook to the rest of the world. The priorities of the
recently designated Presidents of the Commission and the European Council certainly
suggest an urgency accorded to economic recovery, citizens' confidence and the pressing
need to avoid fragmentation.
Because of interdependence and the politics of scale, however, the EU cannot abandon the
international game altogether. Member States would cooperate on a foreign policy with a
more focused and determined pursuit of priorities which reflect the main collective
challenges and interests. One consequence would be to abandon the already shaken
normative rhetoric built up since the 1990s. The argument is that the EU's insistence on
'values' has not been successful; the world has become more hostile; and Europe has lost its
traction and its friends also as a consequence of its attempts to proselitise about democracy.
The rest of the world, so the argument goes, is not interested in the EU model; on the
contrary, some parts of the world are turning against it. 
Following this interpretation, the EU would abandon any ambition to have a global voice and
just focus on a few, selected interests where the Member States agree, and pursue these
without championing visions of the world. The end of the normative model would in time
lead to a specific set of policy priorities only: energy security, the pursuit of trade deals and
improvement of trade diplomacy, crisis containment and some resolution attempts on the
EU's periphery, migration control, differentiation and selective engagement with third
countries. It could also entail a progressive abandonment of some goals of EU foreign policy:
shaping global governance in favour of common rules and universal principles, human rights
diplomacy, supporting peace world-wide. Or it could continue paying lip service to these
without investing into making them the cornerstone of a renewed approach.
Even such retreat towards more clearly identifiable and delimited goals would require strong
backing of the Member States and EU institutions (which in turn means that the structures for
EU foreign policy need continued attention, as will be argued at the end of this paper); the
politics of EU foreign policy would still be needed even for a lower scale of ambition.
European capitals would still need to go through their differences, especially over relations
with Russia, if they were to focus on a more narrow definition of EU-wide interests, such as
energy diversification and security. It is questionable whether the EU would be able to pursue
such a strategically planned international role with identifiable goals based on clear-cut
interests. This is precisely the EU's weakness, due to its complex structure based on 
28 democracies stretching from the Atlantic to Russia, from the Arctic to the Saharan desert,
working together on the basis of required unanimity. 
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Option 2: International engagement as a means for EU renewal
Beyond the EU's ability to act as a hard-nosed single power, albeit with limited ambitions
and outreach, it is worth speculating whether it is in its interest to do so. The economic 
crisis has had a huge impact on the EU's global role and image precisely because the crisis
has undermined many of the assets for which Europe was seen as a model. Basic human
rights have been under threat within the EU, with the erosion of its welfare systems and
economic growth models. If the EU had been frequently accused of preaching standards it
was not respecting itself, the crisis has brought evidence to this accusation. With growing
signs of intolerance and xenophobia across all European countries and dissatisfaction within
some communities of non-European origin, the solidarity model that the EU proposed
abroad rings hollow. If then the EU withdraws its support for the empowerment of people
and societies elsewhere in the pursuit of its 'interests', its attraction as a model will no doubt
diminish further.
Yet it is precisely those assets that have been under threat which are appreciated externally.
The nexus between getting Europe's house in order and the consequent impact on the EU's
global profile has never been so obvious. The EU has been a live example of multilateralism,
devising complex and (imperfectly) representative structures to manage internal diversity.
These are still observed by outsiders as interesting. What is less understood is the obsession
with them, not their value in themselves. 
The EU has been a unique example of cooperative security and peace-building, through the
creation of complex diplomatic and negotiating processes which have led to de-securitisation
of contentious issues through economic integration and interdependence. These are still seen
as the best means to overcome insecurity, as the continuing requests to join the EU
demonstrate. The EU has fostered normative socialisation more than any other international
organisation, including those created precisely to promote the spread of norms and
international law. To date, no other model has proven better suited to offer some reference
points in governing international turbulence. The EU as regional integration and peace project
is relevant in an Asia, which is seeing rise in military expenditure and worrying patterns of
escalating confrontation, or in Latin America, where populism has not solved the welfare gap
within its populations. In a world which is exchanging more goods, ideas, services and
people, Europe's economic integration model is significant. And the rising middle classes
across the globe may be interested in Europe's history of democratisation, class struggle and
rights' development. 
This does not mean that the EU should reinvent itself by praising its own model. On the
contrary, it needs to be self-critical about its own model and about the historical conditions
in which it came about. The point is that some of the EU's experience can form a basis to
engage in a renewed dialogue with countries and citizens around the world to find new
cooperative ways to address common challenges. This would give the international and
transnational matter a new centrality around which institutions, governments and policies
need to work. It is about addressing challenges through concerted analysis and action, rather
than about creating competences, silos, mandates and boundaries. 
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The EU itself does not need to make a federalist quantum leap to reinvent its international
self. It has the institutions, the tools, the resources, and 28 governments. If these acted
concertedly, together they would not be ignored.  
From a cognitive point of view, what is required is a common strategic analysis of global
developments, a recognition that the sovereign illusion is actually damaging to the state is
supposed to defend, the acknowledgement that there are more common interests that are
vital and threatened by existential risks than particularistic ones, and a new pursuit of
solidarity on international issues. These would be enabling steps towards a diversified,
flexible Europe acting on the global stage through its EU and national institutions in the name
of a shared understanding that it is more convenient to work together than apart.
Whichever path the next EU leadership will embark upon, there are some issues that require
fixing – and these cannot wait much longer.
The prioritisation conundrum: devising a strategy or thinking strategically?
Discussions on EU strategy usually fall in the 'Christmas tree' risk of collecting a wide range
of priorities that all require actions without producing a clear strategy. The trouble with
international politics is that it pushes and pulls actors in different directions. This said, the
broad priorities for the next mandate are already clear: the next mandate will have to address
energetically, in depth, and with foresight relations with the EU's neighbours (including
Russia and Turkey). This will require consolidating the Union's crisis management structures,
dealing with energy matters (internally and externally), and will impose some long overdue
thinking on European defence, both in terms of its industry and its existential purpose.
In turn, this will by necessity have implications for the more global management of natural
resources and climate change, which will lead to rethinking the EU's global network, its
friends and allies, its trade relations, its multilateral preferences. Finally, the broad range of
emerging risks has been amply reported on: population growth and increased resources
consumption pose global risks for societal and environmental security; vectors of connectivity,
from the internet to expanding international travel, all have potential side-effects for cyber-
security, global financial institutions, or the spread of pandemic diseases; the fragility of states
puts populations at risk of poverty, exclusion, forced mobility, to name but a few.
The risks are evident, and they inevitably end up in the Christmas tree. The challenge is not
so much in prioritising their importance but in finding the best ways to address them. The
scale of the challenges and the intangible quality of many of them because of their
interconnectedness, means that they cannot be addressed simply by building institutions or
creating new policies. What is needed is lateral thinking, flexible networks, knowledge
exchange, and cooperative frameworks within the EU and between the Union and the rest
of the world. 
Externally, the EU needs to learn to work better with others. The internal negotiating process
is so tough that when the Union then turns to discuss the challenges with other countries, it
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has little room for taking on board different perspectives. The recognition of the need to switch
to a 'listening mode' does not seem to have produced much by way of results: the global space
occupied by the EU's friends seems to be shrinking and in need of a new diplomatic activism.
The EU need not be a bloc or a power in all areas, but it does and can engage with a very
broad spread of themes of global relevance. Flexibility should be the keyword – flexibility of
representation (it need not be the EU, but a representative of its institutions, Member States
or even societies); flexibility of engagement, reflecting the actual interest, influence,
feasibility and efficiency; flexibility of means, where in some cases economic clout will make
the difference, in others a tailor-made civilian mission. 
While governments have always been the prime actors in world politics, the EU has in recent
years increasingly tried to engage and give roles to people and their organisations in its
international relations. This focus on people rather than on states better reflects the world in
making. States and their governments, of course, are unavoidable, but the dilution of power
and the continuing emergence of new societal actors create new opportunities for
strengthening transnational networks connecting Europeans with citizens around the world. 
The EU has always claimed to be a champion of multilateralism but has made poor efforts at
reforming its institutions, among other things blocked by its own inability to overcome the
post-World War Two representation in the United Nations. But for multilateralism to remain
relevant in the 21st century, and to avoid new global divisions, international institutions need
to renew themselves to become more participatory and democratic. Together with
representation comes responsibility. The relative decline of the West and the emergence of
new actors requires more burden-sharing in addressing global risks, from security to climate
change and resource exploitation. 
For the EU this also entails diplomatic work to deepen ties with its friends and allies, and court
more countries into its network. Instead of institutionalising relations with so-called "strategic
partners", which frequently are neither partners nor are the relations strategic, the EU should
more mundanely better connect with its friends, sharing ideas and exchanging views, while
seeking to expand that network, through multilateral, regional and bilateral channels. 
Fixing the institutions: making the system work for the new leaders
The Lisbon Treaty took a first stab at making the EU institutions fit for the 21st century.
Implicitly, it gave up on the longstanding dichotomy between a supranational, federal foreign
policy (the single voice debate) and the intergovernmental sovereign approach by mixing the
two concepts together and hoping that a more coherent foreign policy would come out of
the shaker. This has not (yet) happened, and the 2009-2014 mandate was wrought with
divisions and new sources of disunity. 
It is unfortunate that the whole summer debate on the next mandate focused exclusively on
leadership and insufficiently at structures and challenges: leaderships and personalities play
an important role in international diplomacy, but without the structures there is not much
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that leaders can do. How to fix the structures is clear. The world cannot wait further for the
EU to oil its nuts and bolts: put simply, the system just has to overcome its current
dysfunctionality – asap. 
The proposal for the organisation of the next Commission addresses many of the shortcomings
of the previous system. First and foremost, it lays the basis for a different relationship between
the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Commission by placing the headquarters
of the High Representative (HR) in the Berlaymont's building, thus strengthening the HR's role
as Vice-President of the Commission. Secondly, it organises the College in 'projects' with
overalapping competences and responsibilities, forcing the next Commissioners and their
officials to work together. While a messy start is to be expected, this organisation will help
cross-fertilisation and horizontal coordination. The creation of an external policy group,
meeting regularly and chaired by the HR/VP who will be primus inter pares in the
Commission, and not just in the Foreign Affairs Council, will give leadership and allow for
burden-sharing in the many tasks that the HR/VP cannot carry out without deputies. It could
even foster more innovative and cross-cutting analysis of challenges and solutions to them, in
a way that few states have been able to do, giving the EU as a whole a competitive edge as
far as policies and tools are concerned. 
The EEAS and its crucial roles, however, must not be forgotten. Fixing the problems in the EU
headquarters will also enable its global network to work better. Some of the EU's 139
Delegations have proven a microcosm of what a global EU could become: ears and eyes on
the ground interpreting complex events and their meaning for Europe, a strong presence
around the world, contacts and outreach with a multiplicity of state and non-governmental
actors, good cooperation and burden-sharing with the Member States' missions abroad,
network-building, bottom-up understanding of local and global developments, the
importance of individuals and people in making a difference. 
This asset needs investment if it is to become exemplary, through sound staffing and training
policies and by boosting resources to make them better operational. If EU foreign policy were
more joined-up with national European foreign policies and with Commission-led external
relations, Europe as a whole would benefit from a most formidable world-wide network of
diplomats and officials.
The Member States will need to be better and more drawn into the system, especially in view
of the shift of power towards the Commission. The temptation to 'go it alone' remains strong
in many European capitals and signs of nationalisation have been frequently evident. But
beyond some national delusions, Member States would struggle globally even more than
alone. Emerging patterns of intra-EU and NATO cooperation are showing a preference for
minilateral alliances and solutions, but there has been a parallel tendency to consult and
discuss with each other more systematically at EU level through the Foreign Affairs Council,
the Political and Security Committee and the European Council. These discussions need to
be encouraged, coordinated, often steered, and sometimes driven by the EU leaders, but
ideas and solutions need to come from all parts of the system, not just the foreign policy
structures. Here, Member States have an important role to play.
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Between a rock and a hard place: the reality check
Disentangling short-term consequences of the crisis from the longer-term structural trends is
no easy task for observers of contemporary politics. It is pedestrian to forecast disaster;
irresponsible to underestimate the depth of discontent and its potential for change. Political
leaders too are part of this subjective process of understanding continuity and change.
Even if one avoids Cassandra-type scenarios, the next leadership will have to steer the EU
between a rock and a hard place. The fragility of national contexts in Europe has made
political life more unpredictable and leaders more vulnerable to accommodating short-term
particular interests. This does not create a context in which longer-term vision plays 
much role in political choice; nor does it support leaders in search of a positive legacy 
to be remembered. 
At the same time, the reality is that EU Member States cannot afford not to cooperate 
more closely on foreign policy, notwithstanding their lack of an appetite to do so. Global
trends will demand more EU not more small states – more incisive and faster responses,
deeper and longer term approaches which are not a mishmash of different priorities and a
long list of initiatives. 
The choice is between levels of ambition. Whichever level will require work, commitment,
ingenuity, inspiration. Feeding into the that ambition a compelling narrative about a new
form of international multilevel engagement with states and citizens in an age of
interdependence, while resting on the solid roots of peace-building, could become a source
of renewal for Europe as a whole.
Rosa Balfour is Director for Europe in the World at the European Policy Centre.
Endnote
1 The author would like to thank Giovanni Grevi, in conversation with whom the option scenarios were gradually shaped, Paul Ivan for
his thoughtful comments, Kristi Raik because our joint work made me focus on the importance of structures rather than leaders, and
Robert Cooper for his quotation.
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EU migration policy – new realities, new opportunities
Cecilia Malmström
European countries, like the United States, Canada, and Australia before them, are becoming
lands of immigrants. While the percentage of foreign-born residents in the EU is still
relatively low, immigration is a significant factor in European societies and their labour
markets. Therefore, the question whether or not we need migrants is moot. Instead, we
should focus on how to make the most of migration and how to make Europe attractive to
the migrants we need.
The pedigree of EU migration policy
The European integration we have achieved to date can trace its roots to developments over
half a century back. The political decision to integrate the economies of Europe and to create
a single market resulted in a strong institutional framework. The European Commission acted
as the emerging Union's executive, while the Court of Justice played an important part in the
establishment of the single market by striking down internal barriers.
European policies in the domain of home affairs do not have the same pedigree. They 
came to the fore in the 1970s and were mainly driven by events such as the 
Munich hostage crisis. Member States then saw the benefits in cooperation and exchange 
of information on specific topics. Gradually, a structure of intergovernmental cooperation
was put in place, with a growing number of working groups in very specific areas of common
interest. In 1985, six EU Member States agreed to set up a borderless zone, allowing their
citizens to travel to each other's territory without being stopped and checked at the border 
crossing (the so-called "Schengen area"). This agreement resulted in true free movement 
of persons across EU internal borders and is considered one of the main achievements 
of the EU.
In spite of their significance, these developments took place outside the institutional
framework of the EU. They were governed by separate structures, and decisions – sometimes
important ones – were taken solely between Member State officials. The European
Parliament, which played an increasingly important role in EU policy making elsewhere, was
not involved in any way. Neither was the European Court of Justice.
The treaties of Maastricht (1993) and, in particular, Amsterdam (1997) were the first steps
towards the integration of justice and home affairs policies into the EU institutional
framework. However, the pillar structure embodied the special status and reflected the
reluctance of Member States to share sovereignty in this field.
When, in 2001, the Commission proposed to put in place EU rules for the admission
concerning migrants for employment purposes, Member States rejected it. Instead, they
chose to advance on specific categories where they shared an interest and saw an added
value. This has led to a "sectorial approach" on legal migration.
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The Treaty of Lisbon, in force since 2009, marked a sea change, making EU legal migration
policy subject to the ordinary decision making process used for other policies. The European
Parliament became an equal partner with the Council in negotiations on new legislation,
playing its role, often forcefully. 
What we have achieved
Migration policy is a very young policy from a European perspective, rooted in an
intergovernmental approach. We have, nevertheless, made significant achievements in this
short history.
Eight Directives covering different categories of migrants have been adopted, each containing
specific rules on admission and residence, as well as on migrants' rights.
The Long-Term Residents Directive is particularly important to the EU's approach, as it awards
migrants who have resided legally for five years or more the same treatment and rights in
certain areas as nationals, and gives them the right to move to another Member State under
certain conditions. 
The Blue Card Directive was the first true labour migration policy agreed at EU level. It was
adopted in 2009, still under the unanimity rules which were in place prior to the Lisbon Treaty.
As a result, it offers significant leeway to Member States in their implementation and the
admission conditions reserve it for the most highly-qualified and well-paid of foreign employees.
The Single Permit Directive was the first to be adopted under the Lisbon rules, resulting in an
important role of the European Parliament. It ensures that non-EU nationals coming to the EU
to work and those already present can do so on the basis of a single residence and work
permit and a single application procedure. They are also ensured a set of equal treatment
rights (e.g. as regards working conditions, access to social security). 
Earlier this year, the EU agreed common rules on seasonal workers, who are the backbone
of several important sectors. The directive will allow for seasonal workers to benefit from the
same rules as EU nationals, notably on working hours, minimum wage, leave and holidays,
as well as health and safety requirements, and access to appropriate accommodation. Thus
the Directive will allow for employers to draw on foreign labour in a responsible manner and
facilitate "circular migration" into the EU.
The recently adopted Directive on intra-corporate transferees harmonises rules for this small
but highly valuable group of foreign employees and their family members, and foresees true
intra-EU mobility.  It will allow the EU to present a common approach in its negotiations with
its trading partners, who may, in turn, facilitate mobility of specialised staff from the EU. 
The Commission's proposal for a Directive on students and researchers aims to attract
talented non-EU students and researchers who can contribute to our growth and
competitiveness with their knowledge and skills. If agreed, the legislation would allow
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students and researchers to take up employment or start a business following their studies or
research. The proposal corresponds to the increasing global mobility and is similar to policies
being implemented in other advanced nations.
Recognising the importance of accurate information, we have set up an EU Immigration
Portal, which serves as a first point of entry to reliable, practical and up-to-date information
on immigration issues, in several world languages. 
After many years of deliberation, Europe has now finally united around a Common European
Asylum System. Once fully in place by 2015, the system will make sure that asylum seekers
are treated fairly and humanely wherever they arrive. Europe will have modern, transparent,
legally safe and predictable rules on who should be considered a refugee, how they should be
treated in the procedure as well as common standards on the rights. It will also mean that all
Member States will have to have the capacity to receive asylum seekers. Today only a handful
of Member States take the responsibility in receiving people coming to Europe for protection.
During the past years, the EU has considerably reinforced the external dimension of migration,
which is an essential component in the development of a comprehensive immigration policy.
The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) is the overarching framework of the
EU's external migration policy. We now work with countries of origin and transit to open legal
channels, prevent unsafe or irregular migration, including through the conclusion of
readmission agreements, stop smuggling and fight trafficking in human beings, and ensure
adequate protection to those in need. 
The EU has made large strides in harmonising return policy and rendering it more humane,
in particular through the implementation of the Return Directive. The Member States will
have to ensure the Directive is correctly applied, including the provisions which aim at
strengthening the rights of the returnees. 
We have taken measures to prevent abuses of migrant labour, by establishing EU-wide
standards for imposing sanctions on employers who take advantage of irregular migrants'
precarious position, thereby also reducing the incentive for migrants to come to the EU
irregularly. The EU has also helped create the means to fight criminals who are exploiting the
willingness to migrate, and who are turning the unwitting migrants' ambitions into a
nightmare by trafficking and exploiting them. 
The EU does not have the competence to legislate in the area of integration, but since
migration and integration are closely related and as many cities in Europe are facing the
same challenges, there is also a dimension of integration policy at the EU level. Member
States share a commitment to integration and the EU's policy framework on integration is
about integrating third country citizens who are legal residents in the EU. It is mainly focused
on assisting national, regional and local organisations and authorities in identifying and
sharing best practices on successful integration strategies with each other. A European
Website on Integration was also set up, in order to facilitate the sharing of best practices and
benchmarking at EU level. 
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These recent achievements constitute the building blocks of a comprehensive EU-level
migration policy. If applied correctly, they provide the tools to allow us to effectively manage
migration to the EU and to pool our resources to that end.
The way forward
It is of the utmost importance to consolidate and effectively implement all agreed legislation,
and to give it wider publicity among migrants, international organisations, Member States
and other stakeholders. The policies have to work in reality, and the EU should foster
cooperation between Member States to ensure the laws are implemented in a coherent
manner. There are political forces which would want to roll back on this and on so many
other accomplishments of the Union. Following the rise of xenophobic parties in elections
and in parliaments, we should be on guard against such backsliding and prevent these forces
from taking over the political agenda. 
At the same time, the EU should continue to develop a strategic and comprehensive
approach to migration. The deep economic crisis and the resulting unemployment have to
some extent revealed shortages and EU enlargement has increased the labour market
significantly. However, the effects of this are temporary and should not detract from the long-
term challenges we are facing. 
The baby boom generation and the generations that followed it, are highly educated, with
many having completed tertiary education. Indeed, a highly-qualified and productive labour
force has always been one of Europe's most important assets. It ensures that high living
standards and global economic competitiveness can coexist in the EU. Moreover, a more
diverse workforce favours innovation. The shrinking of the workforce, which we are
beginning to witness this decade, can therefore have immense consequences for Europe's
social model, the vitality of its cities, its ability to innovate and compete, and for relations
among generations as the old become more reliant on the young.
The needs of the labour market are evolving, with demands for new skills and qualifications
appearing and others disappearing. Most native workers, as well as the economy as a whole
tend to benefit from the growth that is generated by labour migrants because the economy is
not a zero-sum game. Gains by one group do not require losses by another one. Filling a
vacancy which would otherwise have remained open creates additional income and wealth
for our society, increases productivity and contributes to the creation of jobs in related
activities. Well-managed migration is therefore an essential part of the policy response to the
challenges faced by the EU economy.
A key element of well-managed labour migration is respect for the rights of workers, 
be they migrant or native. Flexible labour migration policies which allow our economies 
to address real shortages are essential to sustainable economic growth, but they should 
not be used to instigate unfair wage competition. Any decision to recruit from abroad 
should be driven by real needs, not a desire to simply increase profits at the expense of 
native workers. 
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Providing comprehensive and accurate information to potential migrants prior to their
decision to migrate will remain a cornerstone of any sound migration policy. International
recruitment is challenging for all parties involved and carries significant risks. Here,
authorities can work together with employers to devise credible approaches to prevent
disappointments and abuses.
It is worth recalling that Europe is not the only region in the world which is aiming to address
ageing through managed migration. Other major economies are rolling out ambitious
policies to attract 'the best and the brightest', to various degrees of success. 
We should not forget that the EU is the largest economy in the world. Our single market is
one of its main achievements and a major attraction for ambitious migrants and investors
alike. This has been achieved whilst maintaining, compared to our trading partners,
exceptionally high living standards and relatively low levels of inequality. Europe remains a
good place to live and work, and to raise a family. While individual Member States may
struggle to gain recognition in the global competition for talent, Europe has the potential to
do so very successfully. Nevertheless, voluntary migration to Europe is decreasing as shown
by OECD reports. We must increase our efforts to be attractive in the global competition for
skills and talents. 
EU legislative instruments provide consistency and transparency across the EU while leaving
a certain degree of flexibility and the possibility for more favourable provisions to Member
States. EU-wide instruments leverage the attractiveness of the EU as a whole towards
migrants, in particular when allowing intra-EU mobility. 
Enabling integration and labour market participation of all migrants, in particular of those
already present in the EU or arriving for reasons other than work, will be an essential
component of a successful migration policy. In a study as part of its 2013 Migration Outlook,
the OECD highlighted the enormous potential of increasing employment rates amongst
migrants, in particular of highly-educated migrants and women, in countries with large and
long-standing immigrant populations. Additionally, over-qualification and under-employment
of foreign workers is a widely known issue.
The European Union should also face the fact that as long as there is war, dictatorship,
oppression, and poverty in the world, people will try to seek refuge in Europe. This is a
challenge that will not go away and which cannot be addressed simply by putting in place
legal migration channels. A sustainable migration policy for the future requires a
comprehensive strategy, including search and rescue at sea, enhanced cooperation with third
countries, fight against migrant smuggling networks, and emergency support for the countries
facing greater pressures. A new policy must be based on solidarity where all 28 Member
States take their part of the responsibility. Today only five countries receive 70% of the
asylum seekers. In the future all Members States must be involved in resettlement
programmes. We need to reflect on how we can ensure a more orderly arrival of those who
have strong claims to international protection to reach Europe safely for instance by
exploring possible use of humanitarian visas or other ways of protected entries.
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We should continue to engage with countries of origin and transit, using the channels
already available to us, such as Mobility Partnerships and regional dialogues. We should not
waiver in our struggle to combat trafficking in human beings and to prevent unsafe forms of
migration but then alternatives must be produced 
Conclusion
History suggests that countries that welcome the energy and vibrancy of newcomers,
compete the best internationally. We need Europe to be open to the world, bringing in skills
and talents that we need, to ensure our levels of prosperity. We also need a Europe that offers
protection for those in need of it, true to our founding principles and values. If we succeed,
human mobility can become one of the great assets of the twenty-first century.
Cecilia Malmström is European Commissioner for Home Affairs.
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Freedom of movement of persons – the building-block
of European growth
Radoslaw Sikorski
The European integration project is founded on values and principles which are simple, equal,
and advantageous for all. Freedom of movement of persons is one of the main cornerstones
of EU success. It is a fundamental, cherished right of EU citizens. Thanks to this liberty,
European citizenship is real, concrete and attractive. Moreover, it spurs economic growth and
technological development. But because freedom of movement has become an obvious
feature of our day-to-day lives, some of us tend to underestimate its consequences. Important
recent developments mean that we must renew our commitment to defend this building-block
of a Europe whole and free.
The year 2013 was proclaimed the European Year of Citizens and was dedicated to the rights that
come with EU citizenship. And yet, during this time, several European countries witnessed a
growing backlash against the free movement of persons. At a time of economic crisis, the political
debate has become swollen with stereotypes and prejudices. As a consequence, the image of EU
mobility is becoming increasingly distorted. This in turn has lead policy-makers to take decisions
based on falsities, rather than facts. It is thus high time to dispel the myths of migration. 
When it comes to the public debate, we should underscore another key aspect: that migration
from third countries and intra-EU mobility are two very different phenomena. While the former
is based on secondary law via a process that we manage, control and adapt to our needs, the
latter is a manifestation of the rights bestowed upon all the EU citizens.
First and foremost, free movement of persons within the EU is exercised in a limited scope.
Only 3% of EU citizens live in a different country than that of their origin. So it is false to claim
that Western Europe is facing a Central European invasion. Far from it. The EU enlargements
in 2004 and 2007 contributed only around 4 million people to the current 11.3 million
people exercising freedom of movement, aligning the EU average with the global one. 
Second, free movement of persons, an inherent part of the single market, stimulates economic
growth. Studies carried out by various think tanks in both receiving and sending countries, as
well as by the European Commission, show that migrations from Central and Eastern Europe
have brought huge benefits to the EU economy. The estimated combined effect of migration
on GDP growth in the EU-15 receiving countries amounted to 1% – and that's just between
2004 and 2009! So it should come as no surprise that the boost in economic growth has been
most visible in countries that opened their labour markets back in 2004: Great Britain and
Ireland. Freedom of movement helped revitalise EU economies back then – and is continuing
to do so today.
Third, another widely disseminated myth concerns the misuse of social benefits by EU-10
citizens abroad. Also in this case, reality has nothing to do with the ugly picture painted by
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many politicians. Indeed, social benefits are not the reason why people move to a different
country – it is the possibility of finding gainful employment. Let us take the example of the
United Kingdom, where many of my fellow citizens have settled and found jobs. Since the
year 2000, migrants from the 'new' Member States have paid 25 billion GBP more into the
UK budget than they have received in benefits. Another study shows that the net contribution
of immigrants to the British budget amounted to 37% in 2008-2009. A report published by
the Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration at University College London puts it
bluntly: between 2001 and 2011, immigrants from the European Economic Area to the UK
contributed about 34% more in taxes than they received in benefits. Similar evidence can be
found in other European countries, such as Denmark. Far from breeding benefit seekers, free
movement is bringing benefits to national budgets in receiving countries. 
Nevertheless, the alleged 'abuses' of mobility continue to make the headlines. Slogans like
"Send them all back home" and "They've stolen all our jobs" still adorn the front pages of the
newspapers in some EU countries. Indeed, one of the most common arguments is that
migrants prevent local inhabitants from getting work. But studies show that immigration from
the EU-8 fills gaps in the labour market, which consequently contributes to economic 
growth – which in turn creates jobs. Instead of scapegoating hard-working, legal EU
migrants, Western employers have learned to respect Central European employees. Now it is
time for politicians to follow suit. 
While free movement brings benefits to the EU economy and Europeans on the whole, it can
be challenging for local communities faced with a large influx of migrants. I fully understand
their concern and believe that some domestic measures may be taken to fix this issue, but
under no circumstances should the steps taken threaten the fundamental freedoms that make
up the EU single market. The challenges local governments are facing are not being
neglected. An exhaustive study was carried out by the European Commission, which
presented its results in the communication, "Free movement of EU citizens and their families:
Five actions to make a difference". It presents several proposals of measures and good
practices to better cope with the issue at the local level.
Necessarily, in times of austerity every government is forced to implement measures resulting
in public spending cuts. Any kind of abuse of the social welfare system, if evidenced, should
be eliminated as contradictory to the freedom of movement and conducive to unwelcome
distortions. To some, excluding migrants from the social welfare system comes as the only
reasonable solution. I believe the chosen tools should be different, more proportional to the
scale of the problem and less threatening to the fundamental freedoms of the EU. The stakes
are high, as they concern our common prosperity and future position in the global economy.
We will sympathise with countries undertaking reforms of their social welfare systems. But
freedom of movement must prevail and any changes should be founded on the principle of
equal treatment to all legal residents. To this end we must provide for a balanced response
to the problems at stake.
So we will either manage to cope with these economic challenges – or risk being marginalised
by more dynamic global regions. The only effective way to proceed – and succeed – is to do
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it together. Thus I strongly oppose the approach of some European politicians, mainly from far
right parties, who claim that a singular and national approach to the economy might not only
suffice, but would also enable the restoration of their cherished 19th-century order. Such an
ahistorical vision of modern socio-economic processes has no chance of working in practice. 
Instead, it should be the joint responsibility of European leaders to facilitate endeavors that
make our continent more innovative, more competitive, and more cost-efficient – as well as
more sustainable as regards social structures. Measures that some governments have already
implemented or are planning to adopt in coming months are signs that we are losing the
spirit of European unity.
I believe that one of the most important lessons we have learnt from European history is that
the more troubled and testing the times, the stronger the demand for a coherent and
coordinated response to the problems troubling our continent. Setting aside the rhetoric, we
are faced with a simple truth – no Member State can afford to isolate itself, shut its doors and
go it alone. We need to discuss these issues objectively and act responsibly. To put it simply:
we need to stand as one.
Today the EU is tasked with tackling an unemployment rate of about 10.5%, reaching 22.8%
among young people. This situation, which limits possibilities for growth and innovation, has
important consequences for an entire generation of Europeans. Thus, we need not less but
more mobility. We should be talking about further eliminating restrictions – and not imposing
new ones. 
Mobility has proven its positive impact on the economic and social development of Europe.
It is also of great importance to our citizens, enabling them to build careers and ensure the
well-being of their families. For this reason, it deserves to be strengthened by the abolition of
administrative rules that hinder EU citizens' exercise of this freedom. We need to cut red tape
and make moving within Europe easier. This would also help reduce the risk of abuse and
fraud. Removing barriers will operate in both directions, as well as facilitate the return of
migrants to their home countries.
People who benefit from the freedom of movement are motivated and determined to make
better use of their skills and talents. In their new place of residence they tend to become
more efficient and productive, thus contributing to economic development. What is more,
cross-cultural interaction often leads to innovative solutions. The European economy cannot
afford to let go of this potential. 
However, just for the sake of argument, let us assume that all EU Member States would
decide to take similar steps restricting freedom of movement. Reverting from the EU Treaties
would only please those who dream of benefitting from weak, internally divided and
mutually competing European economies. If our intention is to tackle global challenges, we
will have to make better use of the instruments at our disposal – and not abandon them.
What we need is good use of the EU budget and a new proactive European Commission that
would be more willing to see off the real problems our societies are facing. We need
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institutions that would engage in good reforms. This means that we have to re-assess the
paradigms of EU policies. But we also need to watch the Commission's actions and keep
reminding it about public expenditure, the priorities linked with youth, and – last but not
least – good communication. The outcome of European Parliament elections confirms that
we need to become more adept at explaining our decisions to Europeans. At the same time,
we need to check our priorities and promote those activities which require prompt action. 
Our achievement of the common market, complete with its four freedoms, plays another
crucial role. It determines our position on the economic and political map. Indeed, today
more than ever before, political power stems from solid economic foundations.
As we exit the economic crisis, we must not rest on our laurels. A lot still needs to be 
done – and we need all Member States to act consistently. Though the EU is often rightly
challenged for not taking precautionary anti-crisis steps in advance and focusing too much
on the institutional dimension, moving away from the EU would do us wrong, already in 
the short-term. 
Positive changes not only require time, but also determination and joint effort. If we don't
accept this, we stand to lose a lot, not least economically. 
Europeans make up just 7% of the globe's population. Moreover, the forecasts are gloomy – in
2050, no EU country will be among the top ten global economies. Even those EU Member
States currently considered world powers will lose their privileged position. 
Yet, the EU as a whole is still a global powerhouse – an indispensable element of the
international order. Our market of over 500 million consumers produces almost 25% of the
world's GDP. That's more than the US, and more than Brazil, Russia, India and China combined.
We are the largest exporter of goods in the world. Our experience in terms of conflict resolution,
democracy promotion, institution-building and economic integration is being sought after by
countries all over the world – including on our doorstep, not least in Ukraine.
Let us look back 25 years. According to World Bank data, in 1990 the GDPs per capita
of Poland and Ukraine were on a par. Today Poland's is three times higher. Given this
comparison it is difficult to question the effectiveness of the European model. Still, in 
order to maintain its attractiveness we need to consistently work on its coherence.
Dismantling the very foundations of the single market is precisely the opposite of what we
should be doing.
Over the last quarter-century, Poles have experienced first-hand the benefits stemming 
from European integration. So we believe that the future of our continent lies in advancing
the European project. Returning to economic nationalisms, on the other hand, would
jeopardise our recovery, thereby impeding the creation of highly competitive market
economy for the benefit of Europe as a whole. For this reason, as Europeans we have both
the right and the obligation to develop the European Union into a genuine community of
solidarity and responsibility.
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For the last several years, the European Union has had to face perhaps the most demanding
internal test in its history. To pass it, we all need to accept that this exercise demands
concessions and sacrifices. This applies to every member of our community, without
exception. Our actions should be evaluated not in the context of a simple cost-benefit ratio
within a single labour market, but in light of the combined strength of the Union. Because
what we need right now is a stronger and more competitive Europe.
Radoslaw Sikorski is Marshal of the Sejm (Polish Parliament); former Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the Republic of Poland.
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Building up European leadership – an assessment
of the recent process
Maria João Rodrigues
Europe is in need of a new leadership capacity able to recreate stronger European unity in
the external and internal fronts. Otherwise, anti-European forces will increase their influence
and presence in European governments and EU institutions with large implications for the
direction of European integration. This will be the central concern in making a first short
assessment of the recent process of building European leadership capacity for the next five
years to come.
This assessment will particularly focus on the choice of the President of the European
Commission, of the President of the European Council and, finally of the members of the
European Commission.
Choosing the President of the European Commission
The most important game changer was the new procedure to select the President of the
European Commission.
For the first time the Lisbon Treaty was applied, enabling a choice which took into 
account the outcome of the European elections. The candidate of the European party
winning elections was recognised and proposed by the European Council to the European
Parliament to be submitted to election. This new procedure will be probably and hopefully
taken for granted in the future, which was not the case this time. Several European Council
members had assumed until the final moment that the choice of Commission President
should be mainly made by themselves.
The President of the European Commission was elected by the European Parliament
according to a formal vote in secret ballot requiring the majority of the seats, after presenting
and discussing a formal document with political guidelines. This new procedure has
empowered him with a stronger democratic mandate, but it has also made him more
accountable to the European Parliament.
Finally, it is important to underline that nothing of this would have been possible without the
stronger role played by European political parties, which had become more organised and
active throughout the process: when inviting candidates for President of the European
Commission to emerge; when selecting them to run in European elections; when organising
pan-European campaigns; when making alliances inside the European Parliament to force
the recognition of the electoral outcome; when defining conditions to support the President
candidate; or when organising the political opposition to him. It was in this context that Jean-
Claude Juncker became the first elected President of the European Commission, backed by
his European party EPP, and conditionally supported by S&D and ALDE groups.
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Choosing the President of the European Council
The choice of the President of the European Council also deserves consideration. First of all,
it is important to underline that the European Council had been changing its institutional and
political nature as a consequence not only of the Lisbon Treaty, but also of the systemic
chairmanship conducted by Herman Van Rompuy. It became a more powerful institution, able
to set the political agenda on the internal and external fronts, as well as driving the most
relevant EU processes. Some will argue that this has weakened the community method, others
will argue that this has increased the sense of community interest which should be acquired
by the heads of state and government. Beyond this, it is impossible to ignore that the new
strength of the European Council has also enhanced the European influence of some
particular national leaders, further than the traditional Franco-German couple.
Secondly, the choice of the European Council emerged from a complex game of distribution
of posts, not only the top ones such as the High Representative, or the Eurogroup President,
but also many portfolios in the European Commission.
Finally, the criteria which were formally or informally taken into account have also evolved:
not only bigger or smaller countries, geographical, gender, political parties, but also political
relevance. When the major challenges of the European Union are linked to Russian pressure
and the Ukrainian crisis, or to consolidate enlargement and to heal the wounds of the past,
as well as to design an inclusive future for the euro zone, we should not be surprised that the
final choice was the Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk.
Choosing European Commissioners, as European actors
The choice of the members of the new Commission's members became a controversial issue
across Europe and should also be assessed more in-depth in the future. This can provide a
new opportunity to discuss how future Commissioners should be chosen and organised in
order to build up an EU institution whose purpose is to represent the community interest.
Some lessons of the recent experience should be learnt for the future.
According to some opinions, we should make a disctintion between a European
Commissioner and a national minister, to argue that his/her selection should be conducted
by the Prime Minister alone and under similar full reservation. Should this be the case?
Before speaking about the selection process, we should first ask what a 'good' European
Commissioner is.
A 'good' Commissioner is one who can make an assessment of European challenges and
develop a plan to address them, overcoming or reducing political divergences, and pulling
together the relevant actors, i.e. governments, Council, European and national parliaments,
civil society organisations, and experts across Europe.
Hence, there is a big difference between candidates if, for example, one has negotiated the
structural funds for his/her own country, and another who has negotiated the EU budget as a
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whole; if one has negotiated a national plan and the other has negotiated the European
growth agenda; or if one has conducted an adjustment programme and another has co-
participated in the general reform of the euro zone. This is the difference between knowing
how to operate at national or at European level.
If, in addition, a candidate has been elected in the European elections he/she should have
more legitimacy (which is called input and not just output legitimacy), although this should
not be a sine qua non condition to be selected.
What is fundamentally at stake is the construction of a European Commission as a
supranational entity able to defend the European interest and not just the sum of national
interests, or the influence of private interests.
With this aim, the President of the European Commission should be given sufficient latitude
so that he can build a team that has an adequate number of suitable Commissioners and a
political mix – able to implement the priorities according to which the Commission President
was elected. If this President has been elected by the European Parliament reflecting the
European elections outcomes, as it was, by the first time, the case of Jean-Claude Juncker, 
he will have even more legitimacy to require this latitude, and to select or discourage
national suggestions.
It is important to emphasise that, under the Lisbon Treaty, the Member States present
suggestions, but the final selection depends on the President of European Commission,
because he/she needs to build up a team which is able to implement the priorities endorsed 
by the European Parliament. These suggestions of Commissioners should be made by
governments, not on behalf of themselves but of the Member States they represent. 
This should be understood as the national contribution to build up a strong European
Commission and should imply a process of national consultation which is open enough to
identify suitable candidates.
But, to be appointed, the Commissioner candidate will still have a long way to go, outside
the national sphere. He/she will first have to be evaluated by the President to build up a
consistent team. This year, this process was also revised to increase the weight of women,
which originally was very insufficient. Prior to final approval by the European Council, each
Commissioner candidate will still be submitted to a hearing by the European Parliament,
which may require replacement of some as a condition of its overall vote of consent on the
new Commission.
It follows that the source of political legitimacy of a Commissioner goes beyond one Member
State. It derives from a process involving the European Council and the European Parliament,
and ultimately European citizens as a whole.
A European Commissioner is a European actor or, even better, a central actor of the European
Union as a sui generis political entity. He/she should not be considered neither as a top
official of an international organisation which is selected with the support of his/her national
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government, nor as a national delegate to an international organisation, which is appointed
by the government without previous consultation of their own country.
Hence, when identifying names to suggest to the President of the European Commission,
each Member State should encourage a debate on the key challenges of the European Union
in the coming years; the priorities from the national perspective; the most credible names that
the country may propose to the Commission President to develop responses to these
challenges; and how to get a more relevant portfolio.
It is this debate that was almost absent in several Member States. Many of them were not
open to consider possible personalities, men and women with different political sensitivities,
as Jean-Claude Juncker explicitly called for. Their relative merits should be assessed and
compared to those priorities, on the basis of proven facts of competence and political
successes. It is understandable that the criterion of political and personal trust plays a role,
but not to the point of sacrificing the criteria of European merit to limited objectives of
national politics.
Moreover, the alignment with the top priorities of Jean-Claude Juncker – growth; investment
and employment; and the need to increase the presence and political weight of women in
the Commission should not be downplayed either.
This article was concluded when the final list of chosen commissioners with their portfolios
was about to be announced. We need to wait for the next developments of this story to
identify the kind of political chemistry which would be needed to build up stronger European
leadership capacity.
Maria João Rodrigues is Member of the European Parliament; former Minister, Policy
Advisor to EU institutions, and Professor at the Université Libre de Bruxelles.
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Populism in the EU: new threats to the open society?
Heather Grabbe
In May 2014, around one in four Europeans voted for protest parties and anti-establishment
candidates in the first pan-European poll since the euro crisis began. The rise of populism across
Europe has brought more extremism of various kinds into the European Parliament. It could
change the balance of power between the institutions, and be detrimental to EU policies,
legislation and funding that nurture open societies. This chapter will consider the impact of
xenophobic populist parties,1 who have also become increasingly anti-EU, not considering here
the extreme left Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) who entered the Parliament.2
The populist blame game is having an impact on national politics as well as at EU level.
Already many parties of the centre are leaning much further to the right on migration. During
national election campaigns over the next few years, they may well adopt more extremist
exclusionary rhetoric on the grounds of "defending national identity" and "protecting our
culture." The mainstream right and left are talking more about protecting wages and
restricting labour migration from one EU country to another, as well as from outside Europe.
This raises a major challenge for the new leadership of the EU institutions 
Beyond rhetoric, the more xenophobic populists could attack the infrastructure that protects
the most vulnerable marginalised groups, much of which was put in place at EU level.
Already there is an attack on the whole concept of human rights from many populist groups,
and talk of withdrawal from the European Convention on Human Rights in the UK. Other
Member States are challenging the EU by not complying with fundamental rights principles,
such as limits on freedom of expression and association in Hungary, and discriminatory
collection of personal data from Roma in Italy. 
Why are the populists doing so well?
Populists did well in both creditor and debtor countries, showing that protest parties are
thriving even where economic conditions are not so bad. Many of them straddle the old
left/right political divide. In her criticism of the euro, for example, Front National leader
Marine Le Pen sounds remarkably like French far-left leader Jean-Luc Mélenchon. But her
anti-migrant and anti-Muslim stances are traditional of the far right. 
The angry cry from European voters deserves a deeper hearing. The easy response for
mainstream parties is to hear it as a protest against the EU and migration – and jump on that
bandwagon. But much deeper concerns are driving people away from mainstream parties.
Recent research on first-time voters for radical parties shows that there are much deeper
trends at work here – economic pain, disillusionment with politics in general and concern
about how representative European democracies really are.3 Many European voters are
sceptical that traditional political institutions represent them anymore, including national as
well as EU ones. And there is a great sense of insecurity about cultural identity and traditions
being eroded right across Europe. 
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Voters' economic concerns will not be relieved anytime soon. The euro has stabilised, 
but many southern Europeans are wondering if economic dynamism and jobs 
will ever return. Northerners are not feeling the pain as much and may have jobs, but 
they are left wondering if they can rely on the welfare state to protect them as they age. 
The crisis revealed the dark side of globalisation – that interdependence means permanently
greater vulnerability to turbulence elsewhere in the world. Even in wealthy European
countries, the state has limited powers to protect citizens from insecurity and rising
inequality. The world has changed, undermining the social contracts that Europeans 
hold dear. Taxes stay high but economic security cannot be assured. And citizens in 
many countries have the impression that elites serve their own interests rather than the 
public interest.
Populists have tapped into all these fears and resentments. They do not offer policy solutions
or clear options. But they are adept at channelling frustration and hopelessness into hostility
towards both elites and minorities. It is much easier to pin the blame on politicians and those
on the margins of society – especially Roma, migrants and Muslims – than the faceless forces
of the global economy.
What effect on the EU?
The populist surge has happened just after the European Parliament gained major new
powers under the Lisbon Treaty. The Parliament has the power to block EU legislation,
funding, and resolutions, as well as having the ability to put political pressure on
governments – but who will use it? 
Anti-EU and xenophobic populist parties have nearly a third of the seats, far from a majority.
They are far from unified and have many different views. Some of these MEPs have an openly
racist agenda, many express xenophobic views and some use hate speech. Others disavow
racism but criticise immigration. 
How will they behave? In the past, populist MEPs have mainly used the Parliament as a
source of personal funding and a podium from which to broadcast their messages over
YouTube. They made xenophobic and anti-elite speeches in the Parliament and uploaded
them to the internet, but most did not get involved in the details of parliamentary decision-
making. Partly this was tactical, because anti-system MEPs were seeking to show their
supporters they were not part of the system. But it was also because they disagreed on many
issues, from gay marriage to Israel. Most importantly, they did not have clear policy goals that
would motivate them to organise joint action or to form coalitions with other mainstream
parties on particular issues. 
A big change lies ahead if a better resourced and organised populist front emerges from the
new party groupings that will now get public funding and more speaking opportunities. The
question is which of the new groups in the Parliament will just use it to get funding and
publicity for their national campaigns, and which will invest in learning the Parliament's
procedures and systems. 
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At a minimum, the larger numbers of populists will make bolder attempts to challenge the
EU political system and disrupt parliamentary business. If they use speaking time and tabling
of questions to disrupt debates and voting, the President of the Parliament will find it
increasingly difficult to keep order and maintain momentum behind proceedings. That will
slow down legislation and approval of policies and funding. They could also bring the whole
institution into disrepute if the antics of demagogues and xenophobes dominate media
coverage of the Parliament.
The Parliament will be more fragmented overall, with the populists pulling many centre-right
MEPs further to the right, especially on migration. That will make the European Parliament
more unpredictable as its party groups lack the kind of disciplinary measures used in national
parliaments such as the whip. UKIP's new political group could attract the more right-wing
members of the European People's Party (EPP) to vote with it on some issues.
What are the implications for policies that help keep societies open?
Given the Parliament's position as a co-legislator, populist MEPs could make it more difficult
for the EU to adopt progressive legislation and policies, especially where they share common
ground – for example in opposing migration, asylum, development aid, and EU standards,
and policies that protect marginalised groups. They could attack EU foreign policies too,
including the asylum fund and development aid, as well as human rights promotion.
Five areas to watch for populist influence are:
n The Parliament has hitherto been a stronger supporter of Roma rights and social 
inclusion than reluctant Member States and Commissioners. The Parliament has pressed
the Commission and national governments to maintain momentum on initiatives for 
Roma inclusion, in particular the National Roma Integration Strategies. It has also made
EU funding available for NGOs to monitor implementation of national strategies, and 
for programmes to promote equality. Populist MEPs could try to stop the Parliament 
supporting such initiatives in future by pushing centre-right parties into opposing 
these initiatives.
n Through election observation missions and joint parliamentary committees, MEPs have
an influence in other countries beyond their powers in the EU. Populist MEPs have 
recently used their positions to endorse flawed elections (Azerbaijan) and to promote 
the rights of ethnic Hungarians over those of Roma (Serbia). An increase in these MEPs
is likely to further undermine the EU's credibility and its leverage in promoting human
rights in the rest of the world.
n The European Parliament will have to approve the EU's accession to the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Although the EU would become more accountable to 
citizens if it were under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, anti-
EU MEPs are likely to perceive it as giving greater powers to European institutions and
favouring minorities – and so block it. 
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n The Parliament shares responsibility for approving the EU's budget, so populist MEPs 
could try to steer EU funding away from causes such as equality and social inclusion for
minority groups. 
n Populists could attack key parts of the EU's infrastructure that protects open societies, 
such as the return directive on asylum-seekers, the mandates of the Fundamental Rights
Agency and the FRONTEX border agency, or the proposed mechanism to monitor 
fundamental rights in the Member States.
What can supporters of the open society do?
An open society needs much more public defence from its many quiet supporters in Europe.
Protection of rights, freedoms and diversity can no longer be taken for granted by all
Europeans who have enjoyed a quarter-century of peace and tolerance. Problems are
growing that can no longer be dismissed as a passing phenomenon that results just from the
economic crisis. 
There are four areas where concerned Europeans could focus their efforts to pull energy away
from blame and fear into positive action:
1. Limit racism in the public debate: If many more populists start using the European 
Parliament to broadcast hate speech, the rise in racist rhetoric will also have an impact 
on national politics. How can we make it harder for populist parties to use political 
debate as a medium for hate speech and incitement to violence?
2. Connect national and European politics: In both European and national politics, 
centrist parties are moving towards extremes, and anti-racism norms are being eroded. 
How could anti-racism and pro-tolerance norms be bolstered by bringing other voices 
into political debates?
3. Look deeper into how European societies are changing: Research shows that there are 
many long-term trends behind the latest election results, particularly mistrust of elites, 
and dissatisfaction with public institutions and representative democracy. How can 
Europeans find fresh ideas to revitalise democratic life in their countries and make 
political institutions of all kinds more accountable to citizens?
4. Increase transparency at EU level: Citizen inclusion and participation in policy-making
are required by the Lisbon Treaty but initiatives to bring citizens closer or to ensure more
accountability, are either too infrequent (the European Citizens' Initiative), too shallow
(the voluntary lobbyist register or MEP code of conduct), or too precarious (the 
'Spitzenkandidaten' exercise). The result is a perception of poor inclusion and 
participation which compounds anti-elitism. The EU could improve its accountability by
joining the Open Government Partnership (OGP), which 20 Member States have already
signed up to. 
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Conclusion
In response to the populist threat, the centrist EPP, Social Democrats and Liberals are likely
to form a grand coalition to push through major votes where there is no ideological left/right
divide. This would mean more deals between the parties behind closed doors rather than in
the public debate, which is not good for democracy. 
If the mainstream parties use a grand coalition primarily to maintain the status quo, citizens
will ask why they bothered to vote. Instead, political leaders of the centre should focus on
reforming the EU and delivering the benefits of European integration to citizens by making
progress on issues like fundamental rights and services liberalisation. Instead of hiding behind
a grand coalition, they should open up public debates about the future of European society
beyond Strasbourg and Brussels. And traditional parties need to get their act together to
communicate better through social media, where populist parties are much more effective. 
Political leaders across Europe also need to defend the open society from rising intolerance
and nationalism. The greatest benefit of living in Europe is personal freedoms that allow
citizens to express their opinions, and choose lifestyles according to their values, preferences
and beliefs. The EU has helped to build an infrastructure of rights and rule of law that protect
these benefits and foster tolerance and diversity. European societies are an extraordinary
enabling environment for people to live and let live. To let these gains be eroded by the
politics of fear and hate would be a tragedy. 
Heather Grabbe is Director of the Open Society European Policy Institute.
Endnotes
1 This definition applies Cas Mudde's seminal classification of populist radical right parties to the European Parliament, as used 
M. Morris, Conflicted politicians: the radical right in the European Parliament, Counterpoint, 2013 (pp 11-14). For the original 
classification, see: C. Mudde, Populist radical right parties in Europe, Cambridge University Press, 2007.
2 For an analysis of the impact of the far left see J. Bartlett, P. Krekó, B. Hunyad, New political actors in Europe, Demos, 2013. 
3 C. Fieschi (ed), Populist fantasies: European revolts in context, Counterpoint, 2013.
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Differentiated Europe needs strong institutions
Alexander Stubb
A dear child has many names. Multispeed Europe, Europe à la carte, variable geometry,
avant-garde, flexibility, multi-tier governance and enhanced cooperation – all dealing with
the concept of differentiated Europe. I wrote my doctoral thesis at the London School of
Economics in 1999 on Flexible integration and the Amsterdam Treaty. The subject seemed
academic at that time, but the issue is very concrete for the Union.
A simple definition of differentiated Europe could be that it consists of any institutionalised
cooperation between EU members at smaller configurations than the totality of its
membership in the pursuit of EU objectives.
Differentiated Europe is reality. The most prominent forms of differentiated Europe are the
Economic and Monetary Union – with the euro area having 18 members at present – and the
passport free Schengen area. But other examples are abound – the banking union, the fiscal
compact, enhanced cooperation in community patents, divorce law etc.
Differentiated Europe has become more relevant because of growing EU membership and 
the extension of the Union's policy reach. There was hardly any need for differentiation at six.
Differentiation is not an objective in its own right, but a tool for effective enlarging and
deepening of the Union. In academic terms, differentiation is a form of functionalism. Politicians
talk about pragmatism. 
Prominent examples of differentiation surfaced with the Maastricht Treaty as a reaction to
domestic political pressures and led to Britain abstaining from social policies, Denmark
opting out of justice and home affairs cooperation and the common security and defence
policy, and both gaining a legal opt-out from the euro. 
Later new layers have been added to differentiation as the EU has broadened its scope. With a
larger and more heterogenic membership, the probability for differentiating Europe increases. A
28 member union is a completely different story than a community of six, nine, ten or even 12.
Differentiated Europe can be analysed in terms of the three meta-challenges outlined in this
publication – stagnation, fragmentation and legitimacy. My argument is simple: stagnation or
the prospect of it has been a catalyst for differentiation, fragmentation poses a risk of
differentiation gone too far and legitimacy of differentiation is embedded on institutional
cohesion and good results.
Stagnation is an obvious factor in terms of differentiated Europe. Differentiated Europe can
be a solution to political stagnation – the inability to decide on a policy that would include
all members, but is still seen as a necessity for a broad majority of Member States. This is one
of the reasons why recent treaty amendments have codified rules for reinforced cooperation,
Euro-speak for differentiation.
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This is in essence the philosophy of the avant-garde – a smaller group takes the lead, 
and the rest will follow later. The Treaty puts it well concerning enhanced cooperation,
"Enhanced cooperation shall aim to further the objectives of the Union, protect its interests
and reinforce its integration process. Such cooperation shall be open at any time to all
Member States (…)".
Economic stagnation – or be it any other policy frustration – can be a major motivator for
differentiation. Economic stagnation and the euro crisis definitely presented a clear case for
deepening integration in the euro area. At the same time, major treaty changes were not an
option. The six pack, the two pack and the fiscal compact were born complementing the
European Semester. Economic policy coordination as a result lies somewhere in between
intergovernmental decision making and the community method, the key words being
coordination, consolidation, peer pressure, and guidance. 
The European patent, another example, was a reaction to the fact that a more integrated
patent system was deemed important for competitiveness, but no solution was found
between all Member States because of fundamental differences on the language regime. 
Stagnation is a typical cause for differentiated Europe – a motive, a driver – but fragmentation
can be the main negative consequence of differentiation – a cost, a risk to be avoided. 
In theory, any policy not aimed at all Member States can already be labelled as EU
fragmentation, but for analytical purposes it is useful to define fragmentation in terms of
differentiation gone too far, producing an overall negative impact on the Union – more or less
as the dark side of differentiation. Therefore, the central issue in terms of fragmentation is how
to ensure that functional differentiation does not degenerate into dysfunctional fragmentation. 
This is perhaps the key issue for differentiation. An outline of the political and institutional
elements that can prevent EU fragmentation would act as crucial guidelines for future policy.
So far all the evolutions within differentiated Europe still involve a unity of direction, of
purpose. The idea being that there is a common goal, but a number of Member States will
either join later or even remain behind.
There are different levels of participation, but with the idea that non-participants can, and
many will, join at a later stage – usually when they will have attained the ability to do so.
Same direction, but different speeds. For example, the United Kingdom and Denmark have
a legal derogation from the euro, but they have the right to opt-in if they so decide, and for
the Union at large Economic and Monetary Union constitutes a central element of EU
integration, not some irrelevant side-show.
Until now, differentiation in the EU has never meant that the Union would split in different
directions on any policy. Different levels of participation, but never as groups that would
assume exclusive or competing aims from each other. I would argue that differentiation
within the European Union should never be allowed to develop in this direction, because it
would mean that differentiation would degenerate into fragmentation.  
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The evolution within Economic and Monetary Union is a good example – members of the
euro area have worked on closer economic policy coordination, fiscal rules, banking union,
and there is a good case for further cooperation on issues like taxation. This core remains
open to non-euro members as we have seen with banking union and the fiscal compact. The
fiscal compact is outside the EU framework – because of UK insistence – but is still serves
EU aims.
Existing and foreseeable differentiation within the Union revolves around a central core.  The
euro area is the political and economic core of the European Union, but does not present an
exclusive institutional core. In fact, various forms of differentiation involve different groups
of Member States.
In practice the difference between differentiation and fragmentation is a thin line. And this
thin line is best guarded by strong common institutions. At this stage we have differentiation,
but all within a single institutional structure. The European Commission remains the
executive body for all EU policy – at 28 or less. The European Parliament covers all policies.
Decision making resides in the Council with the Eurogroup firmly embedded to Council
structures. The President of the European Council also serves as the President of the euro area
summit. The European Central Bank is a European institution, well defined by common 
EU Treaties. 
We have unitary institutions, even though policy is differentiated in some areas. We could
call this the singularity principle. European institutional singularity serves differentiated
European policies and at the same time ensures overall coherence. After all, more simplicity,
more continuity and more stability were the guiding principles in the constitutional process
leading to the Lisbon treaty. Duplication, overlapping and complexity would not serve
institutional coherence. 
As this institutional unity is crucial for policy coherence, all attempts to break this singularity
should be resisted. There have been proposals for endowing the euro area with its own
institutions – an own secretariat separate from the Commission, a separate President of the euro
area summit. The break-up of the existing institutional singularity would risk degenerating what
is now pragmatic and functional differentiation into detrimental fragmentation.
Legitimacy – and especially the risk of reduced legitimacy – is an important issue for any
public policy and differentiated Europe is no exception. Legitimacy can either be
approached through process or outputs. With process you need to assess are the procedures
legitimate as such, do they inspire public confidence, and are there enough checks and
balances. In terms of outputs it should be asked whether policies produce outputs that are
beneficial to society, to EU citizens, to the Union's purposes.
Looking at the legitimacy of differentiated Europe in terms of process, the same rules apply
as to any EU policy – democratic accountability, openness, subject to rule of law etc. The fact
that the Union's common institutions are in charge of differentiated Europe provide a fair
degree of accountability. 
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Fortunately differentiated Europe is mainly channelled within EU structures. Despite the euro
crisis leading to several intergovernmental solutions, the role of the Commission has in fact
been strengthened. Working outside the Treaties poses challenges in terms of legitimacy
through process, which is often tackled by de facto involvement by the European Parliament
in the negotiation process. For example, the negotiations on the Single Resolution Fund were
packaged with the Single Resolution Mechanism with European Parliament taking part.
In addition, the role of national parliaments providing the negotiation mandates for their
governments should not be neglected either – despite different levels of their involvement in
the negotiation processes. 
European political parties presenting top candidates in the elections this spring for leading
EU positions has been an attempt to further politicise European politics and this way to
strengthen accountability and legitimacy without the burden of treaty change. 
Unfortunately, the turnout of the elections was similar to previous rounds at just around 43%
and therefore the impact of top candidates in this respect was not as strong as envisaged.
Despite this, the precedent is there and I would expect European political parties to have top
candidates in future elections, too.
Looking at legitimacy in terms of outputs, it is logical to assume that differentiated Europe
tends to perform well.  After all, it is typically a solution to policy problems where progress
by all member states was not an option.
To put it in very simple terms – you either have some progress by means of differentiated
Europe or you have no progress at all. Choosing on more or less differentiation is often
choosing between results or no results.
As a synthesis on differentiated Europe as seen from the perspective of stagnation,
fragmentation and legitimacy, the conclusion is that fragmentation is the most pertinent
dimension, and the risk of fragmentation is best avoided by ensuring that the EU continues
to be endowed by strong institutions that include all aspects of EU policy, including any
items that would belong to the scope of differentiated Europe. At the same time, this
institutional approach tackles questions on legitimacy through process. Similarly,
differentiation at best provides legitimacy by output, by results, by solutions to stagnation.
What does the future hold in terms of differentiated Europe? A safe assumption is that
differentiation will probably increase, because the euro area needs to build a firm economic
core. The fact that treaty change is not an option for the time being will mean that
differentiated Europe can be a useful instrument in deepening integration.
At the same time we need to recognise the limits of differentiation. There are no-go areas for
differentiation, policies that include all members are an absolute must. These are areas where
the essence of European value added lies: in the fact that there are no divisions among
Member States so that all are included.
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An exhaustive list of the no-go areas for differentiation would be long, but the essential
elements are obvious. The internal market needs to work as a coherent entity, competition
policy needs to include all members, trade policy cannot be divided, values are indivisible,
external action is all the more stronger as the whole union participates. 
In general, areas with strong Union competence have very limited scope for differentiation.
When taking that path, this should be coupled with strong institutions.
Alexander Stubb is the Prime Minister of Finland.
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Improving decision-making in the EU
Fabian Zuleeg
The multiple crises the European Union (EU) has experienced in recent years have
fundamentally altered decision-making and, more broadly, governance in the EU. Pre-crisis
systems and processes were not adequate to react to such critical and systemic challenges,
but the speed of the crisis meant that new governance mechanisms have been superimposed
on existing processes and structures rather than seeing a fundamental reform of decision-
making. Consequently, not all changes have been fully successful. Given the institutional
changes this year and the ongoing development of the EMU governance framework, now
presents a good opportunity to reform EU decision-making.
The crisis has shown that decision-making needs to change. In particular, there are five key
challenges, which now need to be addressed:
n dealing with crisis and limiting economic and financial risks – this requires speedy 
decisions that provide flexible but definitive answers from a clearly identified source 
of authority. When dealing with international financial markets, this is especially crucial
as uncertainty will fuel speculation. The difficulty extends to the decision-making 
on strategic direction, where the EU is encumbered with unanimity and a difficult 
and cumbersome procedure for amending EU Treaties, including referenda in some 
Member States; 
n providing systemic, cohesive and comprehensive responses to systemic challenges – the
key policy challenges that the EU and its members face are cross-cutting and complex.
Issues such as dealing with the energy challenge, kick-starting economic growth and 
employment or improving legitimacy cannot be dealt with in policy 'silos';
n increasing politicisation of decision-making – the EU, and in particular the European 
Commission, is increasingly engaged in political decisions rather than legal, 
technocratic or bureaucratic decisions. Making assessments of countries' fiscal policies;
finding the appropriate balance between growth and austerity; or dealing with foreign 
policy crises will be influenced by political preferences;
n fragmentation of decision-making – the new governance arrangements are complex, 
especially given that different mechanisms apply in different instances. There are 
unresolved issues of what should be done by Member States and what needs to be done
by the institutions. The new governance has increased the distance between euro and 
non-euro countries, also raising questions on how differentiated integration will function
in the future; and
n efficiency and effectiveness of policy-making – with increasing concern over the sheer
amount and complexity of European laws and insufficient focus on implementation and
impact of the legislative output.
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These challenges to the EU decision-making process will not be resolved overnight,
especially since a grand reform involving also treaty change seems rather unlikely and any
reform is likely to take time. However, there are reforms which could be carried out, or at
least started, in the coming years.
Structure of the Commission1
A long-standing issue, aggravated by the recent enlargements of the EU, is the number of
Commissioners. While the EU Treaties have provided for a reduction in the number of
Commissioners to enable the Union to cope with successive enlargements, it has proven to be
impossible to get the political agreement for countries to give up the principle of one
Commissioner at least, per country. Equally, having 'junior' and 'senior' Commissioners in line
with similar arrangements in many national governments does not seem to be acceptable to
many Member States, with some of the smaller states worried that they would perpetually end
up with junior posts. 
The number of commissioners had increasingly led to a strong 'silo' mentality, with each
member of the college virtually autonomous in their own portfolio's competences, with inter-
service consultations and infrequent top-down direction from the Commission President
insufficient to break the overall pattern. Eventually this leads to a lack of coherence and focus
and in the worst cases can give rise to uncertainty over the overall direction and even create
outright contradictions. There is, however, a way of potentially overcoming these difficulties.
This would be through building on the existing structure: creating clusters of Commissioners
around Vice-Presidents. 
In previous publications2, we have suggested a possible distribution of priorities of 
Vice-Presidents and clusters of Commissioners to ensure that the structure of the 
Commission mirrors the overarching challenges of the EU, with four new Vice-Presidents
without specific portfolio covering growth, single market, well-being, citizenship & mobility,
and environment & natural resources. Reflecting on their special roles, this structure 
also proposed vice-presidents for the Economic & Financial Affairs and for the Energy
portfolios (without other commissioners to coordinate), as well as the High Representative
who leads a thematic cluster, but also retains their High Representative role. These 
Vice-Presidents would need to have a role which goes beyond merely coordinating the
activities in each thematic cluster. They would need to have an explicit role in conjunction
with the Commission President to make decisions on the strategic direction of policy within
their cluster, working with their portfolio Commissioners. This should also be reflected in 
the administration, for example having a joint strategy unit for each cluster rather than 
each portfolio. 
The new structure of the Juncker Commission does partially reflect these suggestions, with
seven vice-presidents covering broad thematic areas without a specific portfolio.  However,
there is one crucial difference: in an attempt to maintain flexibility (and possibly to assuage
fears of Member States that this would create 'junior' commissioners), the clusters of
Commissioners differ for each broad policy area, with many commissioners contributing to
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more than one area. In other words, there is no clear cluster structure, as well as numerous
overlaps between Vice-Presidents themselves and Vice-Presidents and Commissioners, both
in terms of portfolio content and in terms of the supporting bureaucracy. At the very least,
this will require a clear definition of which Commissioner is ultimately responsible for what
and who reports to whom at the outset of this Commission but the structure might well prove
ineffective without a clear hierarchy.  
This new way of working will also require effective coordination between the President and
the Vice-Presidents, guided by a common purpose and vision. But this will turn the
Commission into a more political instrument, with clear-cut political priorities, and the
ability to better deliver and implement them, which raises fear over the politicisation of the
Commission as discussed later in this article. 
Better regulation
One further innovation of the new Commission is the creation of a First Vice-President for
'better regulation', reflecting the concern in many countries that the EU has a tendency to
over-regulate, which potentially imposes costs, especially on businesses at a time when
corporates are struggling to remain globally competitive. However, beyond the mere signal
of creating such a post, what can this new role achieve, given that an effective better
regulation agenda would have to be implemented horizontally, across all portfolios? 
Better regulation also needs to be built into the earliest stages of decision-making to be
effective, for example to stop an idea turning into a legislative proposal. It is hard to see how
the First Vice-President can manage such a detailed process apart from issuing general
guidance and then checking on its implementation, a role which the Commission President
could also have fulfilled.
The new First Vice-President will also have to show how his activities will make a qualitative
difference to the 'better regulation' activities, which have, after all, been ongoing for years,
including for example the impact assessment system or the activities of the Stoiber Group.
The challenge will be to overcome some of the political barriers, which in the most part, lie
outside the Commission, including the willingness of Member States to change their
priorities to incorporate better regulation principles as well as the willingness of the
European Parliament to be bound by any such principles in its legislative deliberations. It
should also never be forgotten that the EU system is based on compromise, which might not
always be the most effective solution. However, reopening any compromise can lead to
further negotiations with an uncertain outcome, potentially increasing the legislative burden.
As a starting point, the new First Vice-President should set out what he understands under the
term 'better regulation' or, even better, 'better policy-making'. This should include the focus
on ex ante vs. ex post impact assessment and what future for the impact assessment system;
as well as the role of consultation and involvement of stakeholders; what is defined to be an
unnecessary legislative burden as opposed to the cost arising from democratically defined
policy priorities, in how far we need to focus on the existing stock of legislation vs. the
process of making new legislation; what role subsidiarity should play in the decision-making
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processes at the EU, etc. By defining what the focus of activity will be, it will not only provide
a way of assessing at some point in future how successful this new post has been but it will
also provide clear guidance not only to the rest of the Commission but also to the other
decision-makers involved in the process.
Executive powers and the politicisation of the Commission 
A further governance challenge for the new Commission is not new but is becoming
increasingly difficult to handle: the conflict between the political function of the
Commission, taking a role in the overall political direction of the EU, and its role as an
independent monitoring/assessment agency, regulator and arbitrator in the application 
of EU law, for example, in areas such as competition policy or in the assessment of 
Member States' budgetary policies. With an increasingly 'political Commission', potentially
further reinforced by the link to the EP elections made in the Lisbon Treaty and with the
Spitzenkandidaten process, maintaining credibility as an independent and objective
arbitrator might be severely challenged in future. 
One way to address this would be to outsource some of the functions which call 
for impartial, legal arbitration, for example, by establishing independent bodies, for example,
by creating a separate Competition Authority. Undoubtedly, this would be a longer 
term process but thinking about a fundamental reform of the Commission along these lines
should start now. 
Ultimately, the EU level needs to gain more executive powers, especially to be able to 
react swiftly to any emerging crisis. But currently, many Member State governments are
unwilling to relinquish control over executive powers in politically highly sensitive 
areas to the Commission, insisting that the national level or, at the very least, the Council
needs to retain the final decision-making power. There is no effective way in which two
bodies can share this kind of executive power; while co-legislation can work due to its
sequential nature and the absence of acute time pressure, co-executive power shared by
Council and Commission is likely to create uncertainty and delay that can be very 
costly in a crisis. The only way out is to vest powers in a supranational body, whether 
this is the Commission or another construction. Further far-reaching steps seem highly
unlikely at the moment. 
In addition, an effective system also needs to have accountability mechanisms. In national
systems, this is usually performed by the legislative. But with co-legislators, the Council
cannot hold itself to account if it also has an executive role. There is also now a greater role
for national parliaments, which can create additional uncertainty: who, in the end, holds the
executive to account: the Council, the EP, national parliaments or a combination of these?
The limitations of rules-based systems
A further challenge to the absence of effective executive power at EU level comes from the
limitations of the rules-based system, which includes questions about how to pick
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appropriate rules/targets, the perennial question of enforcement mechanisms, whether a
country's failure to meet a target is down to willingness or capacity to deliver and under what
circumstances there needs to be flexibility, and who decides.
The available instruments, both old and new ones, are too complex and therefore difficult to
understand for policy-makers that need to quickly apply and comply with the rules.
Complexity is another factor that leads to low automaticity, obstructing the necessary degree
of ex ante support for the prevention of new economic and financial crises. Rules also suffer
from low anticipatory powers: they often address past crises rather than the coming ones. To
deal with emerging risks, it is necessary to have significant instruments that can be employed
quickly (or even automatically) rather than having a set of inflexible rules. 
Another key challenge is to ensure compliance with the rules by both small and big countries
to safeguard the long-term credibility of the new governance system. In light of the
discussions over sticking to the 3% deficit limit and the reactions in Germany regarding the
investigations of its export surplus (fully in line with the governance instruments that have
just been created), there are at least some doubts whether bigger and more powerful
countries feel that the rules apply to them equally, and in how far the Commission can
enforce such rules in these circumstances. This is further complicated by the need to interpret
rules which always opens up potential disagreement. While the system offers the opportunity
of taking the legal enforcement route, this requires political will to take countries to Court,
as well as patience as rulings take time to be delivered. In addition, it can be questioned
whether a Court with legal rather than economic competence is well placed to rule on
matters of economic governance.
In addition, in times of crisis any rules-based system must have flexibility built-in. This,
however, raises the question of who makes the decision whether rules can be suspended or
eased in such an instance. In the case of fiscal governance, any such decision (or the
decision to enforce the rules) by the Commission is likely to be challenged, especially by the
bigger countries. However, if it is down to the Council, it is difficult to see heads of state and
government holding their peers to account strictly.
The difficulties with a rules-based, legalistic system go further than this. In policy areas 
which are close to the heart of national decision-making systems and that the EU now 
needs to cover, the reliance on a rules-based approach is unlikely to function well. 
While at times adhering to European rules in politically sensitive areas can be politically
useful to shift responsibility for unpopular measures, at other times the political cost of
compliance will outweigh the consequences of breaking the rules, especially for more
powerful countries.
Given the difficulties in changing the EU's strategic direction, it is also very challenging to
change any of the rules that have been written into the EU Treaties. Furthermore, it is 
nearly impossible to take into account country-specific conditions and circumstances, or
changes in the broader macro-environment. This raises a number of crucial questions: 
Is the same inflation target still appropriate, in a situation where deflation might be
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threatening? Is it right to focus strongly on public debt? Is a deficit target of 3% the right one
for all countries, given divergent growth performances and debt financing costs? Again, if for
any of these rules there is a need to consider more flexibility, who is empowered to make
such a decision?
Pooling of sovereignty?
Underlying these discussions on flexibility is a much deeper challenge to how the EU 
works. For some countries, it seems that the main objection is that the European level
attempts to impose rules, rather than the content of the rules itself or how flexibly they are
applied. In essence, under the disguise of flexibility, countries might aim for a repatriation 
of fiscal powers, which would undermine effective fiscal coordination at euro zone level, as
well as undermining the underlying political bargain: debt financing support only with
attached conditionality.  
In addition, there is a widespread feeling at Member State level that we have had enough
'more Europe' due to the crisis and that it is now time for 'less Europe'. In many countries,
there is also a sign of the 'British disease', namely that any further integration is seen as
undesirable and that further integration steps are blocked with the argument that this might
raise strong objections by the electorate.
This will be a significant challenge for the EU. There are already a number of areas where a
process of 'inverse subsidiarity' can be observed, i.e. areas where Member States 
want to retain control but EU solutions are now needed as it is no longer possible to deal
effectively with the issue at national level, for example, related to energy security or
migration. In addition, further integration is also becoming necessary for the euro zone 
due to a process of 'spill-in', i.e. further integration within a policy area with the aim of
avoiding negative consequences, here driven by the necessity to correct the flaws of EMU 
(as opposed to positive reasons for integration such as a wish to move towards a federal
Europe or the pull of positive spill-over effects). Increasingly, we will see that what is
politically possible diverges further and further from what is required to effectively deal with
the challenges the EU faces. Clearly, to have effective decision-making, there first needs to
be agreement on what the EU should be doing and at the moment we are nowhere near such
an agreement.
Moving forward or backward?
In the end, there are two separate directions in which the system could be developed: either
trying to turn the clock back by attempting to set up the Commission as the independent,
bureaucratic, apolitical arbitrator which it (arguably) once was or to accept that the
circumstances have changed with the need for more executive powers at EU level and an
increased politicisation of the system. 
Even if it were desirable, it seems unlikely that we can go back to a 'golden age' where the
Commission does not get involved in politics. The Commission is already highly politicised
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and increasingly the EU needs a Commission which will be able to make executive decisions
that can be implemented across the Union. This implies a move from governance to
government, from a rules-based legalistic system to one driven by political preferences,
underpinned by mechanisms of legitimacy and direct accountability. However, this will
increase concerns that the EU is moving from a supranational arbitrator to a political actor
in its own right. 
Politicisation should not be seen as a negative process. For a long time, many convinced
Europeans have lamented that the EU is remote from its citizens, that democracy is not
functioning as it should at EU level and that there is no engagement with EU policy debates.
While current governance/political developments certainly don't answer all the questions
posed for EU democracy, at least it is a starting point to get citizens more interested in EU
policy decisions.
But to do this, democracy at EU level also needs to be developed further to facilitate
engagement. In addition to the existing mechanisms of representative democracy, 
which are still struggling with low engagement and participation, there is a need 
to develop a more accessible, informed participatory democracy, by utilising new
technologies and building bespoke mechanisms for citizens to input in EU decision-making,
such as developing an EU version of 'liquid democracy', where citizens can be 
involved directly in EU policy. In addition, there needs to be a clear mechanism to 
hold the Commission to account for its executive/political decisions, a role the EP could
increasingly play. 
As a starting point, the new Commission's hearings in the EP should be treated as a political
process. Commission President-elect Juncker has set out his political programme "An Agenda
for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change". All proposed Commissioners should be
tested against what their policies are going to deliver from this Agenda, including three
crucial questions:
n Given its importance for growth and jobs, in what way are actions in this portfolio going
to increase public, private or social investment?
n In how far are actions in this portfolio going to increase protection of citizens from 
internal and external threats, including in terms of the crisis in the East?
n In how far are actions in this portfolio going to facilitate the engagement of EU citizens
with EU policy making?
By-and-large, the EU could start to introduce the kind of changes proposed here in the near
future, without major changes to the institutions or the EU Treaties. However, the elephant in
the room is the question what Member States want the EU to do and in how far they are
willing to make the changes necessary, especially if it requires further pooling of sovereignty
in some areas. This will also require finding a solution to the differences between Member
States, especially the euro ins and outs, with a need to find a way of re-invigorating
differentiated integration. 
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While progress is certainly possible, in the end decision-making at EU level will only be as
effective as Member States allow it to be. 
Fabian Zuleeg is Chief Executive of the European Policy Centre.
Endnotes
1 This section draws from F. Zuleeg 'A more effective structure for the Commission' EPC Commentary, 7 March 2014
http://www.epc.eu/pub_details.php?cat_id=4&pub_id=4230
2 See F. Zuleeg 'A more effective structure for the Commission' EPC Commentary, 7 March 2014 & F. Zuleeg 'Beyond individuals: a 
more effective structure for the Commission' EPC Commentary, 9 September 2014
http://www.epc.eu/pub_details.php?cat_id=4&pub_id=4735
96
The need for a New Pact1
Janis A. Emmanouilidis
During the last political cycle (2009-2014), the European Union (EU) went through the worst
crisis of its history. In the months and years to come, the new EU leadership and 
Member States will have to take major decisions if Europeans want to sustainably overcome
the crisis, prepare themselves for the manifold internal and external tests ahead, and 
provide the grounds for Europe to exploit more of its potential and meet the needs and
expectations of citizens. 
The outcome of this venture is unclear considering the 'state of the Union' and the current
mood in Brussels and national capitals. But one thing seems rather certain: to generate 
active support from citizens and elites, future developments at European and national level
need to be driven by confidence and renewed ambition and not, as in the past years, 
by fear first – fear of a euro implosion; or of an involuntary exit from the common currency
with unforeseeable consequences. In order to take strategic decisions about the Union's
future, there is a need to identify and address the key challenge(s) and provide a coherent
and holistic response on the grounds of an ambitious but at the same time pragmatic
'package deal', taking into account the diverging interests of Member States and their
citizens. But what is the state of affairs, what is the key strategic challenge and how 
can the new EU leadership cope with it in the next political cycle (2014-2019)?
The state of affairs – systemic improvements and 'reactive muddling through'
The Union and its members have gone through and are still facing the aftershocks and
collateral damage caused by the most fundamental crisis in EU history. The experience since
2009/2010 revealed and exacerbated significant structural deficiencies in the Union's
economic and political construction. It cast doubt on the fundamentals of the European
project, as the unthinkable became thinkable, that the 'crisis snowball' might spiral out of
control and trigger an avalanche with the potential to bury the euro and the European project
underneath it.
Today, the situation remains volatile and it is still too early to judge the deep 
economic, political, societal, and institutional consequences of the crisis. Ultimately, it will
be the task of future historians to assess the significance of the current period 
for the overall process of European integration. However, in systemic terms the 
situation has improved significantly compared to the summer of 2012. Much has happened 
since 2010 at both European and national level that would have been considered 
impossible some years earlier and the fears of a 'euro implosion' have receded. 
The European Central Bank's (ECB) promise to do whatever it takes to guarantee the 
stability of the euro and the substantially reduced risk of a country having to exit the 
common currency have boosted confidence and averted the worst-case scenario from
becoming reality.
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However, the EU is not out of the woods. The reality of many Europeans remains 
(extremely) difficult and the crisis is not overcome, given the persistent socio-economic
problems characterised by low growth, high unemployment, increased poverty rates, and
eroded social mobility (see the chapter by László Andor on social Europe in this volume), 
the political uncertainties in many EU countries manifested in the rise of 'anti-forces' 
(anti-establishment, anti-EU, anti-euro, anti-migration), and the fact that collective 
efforts to overcome the remaining structural shortfalls of Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU) have lost momentum since late 2012 (see also the chapter of Daniela Schwarzer on
euro governance).
'Consolidation' or even 'reactive muddling through' and stagnation have become the
predominant mood of the day as the immediate crisis threats and market pressures have
regressed. Recent progress regarding the establishment of a (limited) banking union indicate
that the reform engine is still running. But EU governments are lagging behind and
backtracking from earlier, more ambitious plans aiming towards a "(Deep and) Genuine
Economic and Monetary Union" (see also the chapter by George Pagoulatos in this volume).
National governments want the EU to steer clear of 'overambitious' attempts to deepen
integration, which could backfire given the increased negative attitudes towards the EU.
According to this line of thinking, there is a need to be realistic and accept that Member
States are not willing or able to go much further in pooling sovereignty at European level and
that one should avoid an opening of Pandora's Box as it is not the right time to pursue more
ambitious plans to reform the EU.
The challenge of fragmentation
There are undoubtedly good reasons to support the 'logic of consolidation', but is 
this path sufficient in light of the current situation? The EU and its members face numerous
concrete internal and external challenges. But there is one structural challenge, which 
seems more profound and precarious than others, which has the potential to undermine 
the Union's ability to deliver effective policy solutions: namely fragmentation – in its 
different dimensions:
n Fragmentation between the EU and its citizens: Many people have turned their back on
the EU in recent years because of their dissatisfaction with the Union as it stands. There
is a widespread feeling that the EU has not been 'part of the solution' but rather 'part of
the problem', poisoning national debates and public attitudes. There are growing doubts
among 'ordinary citizens' – and increasingly also among elites – about the future added
value of European integration.
n Economic fragmentation between Member States: There is a growing economic gap 
between EU countries. While some Member States have managed (more or less) to 
weather the storm, many European economies, especially in Europe's periphery, are 
characterised by persistently low growth rates, extreme levels of (youth) unemployment,
a lack of competitiveness, a continuing credit crunch, and persistently high public 
and/or private debt levels (see also the chapter by Daniela Schwarzer in this volume).
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n Fragmentation between states and national societies: Europe has witnessed a resurgence
of national stereotypes, nationalistic chauvinism, historical resentments, increasing 
levels of distrust, and a damaging 'blame game' between national governments and 
even national societies. Even if the worst of this appears to be behind us, its 
consequences are likely to haunt Europeans for years to come, as the crisis experience
is likely to remain in the 'collective memory' of citizens.
n 'Interpretative fragmentation': Citizens in different EU countries live under very 
diverse economic and social circumstances and evaluate the 'state of the Union' and the
root causes, nature and complexity of the crisis in very different ways. At times, it 
seems as if they are 'living on different planets', making it much harder for them to 
understand each other and to find the common ground needed to identify joint 
policy solutions.
n Social and political fragmentation within EU countries: There is not 'only' fragmentation
between Member States, but also within them. Social cleavages are growing between 
the 'haves' and the 'have-less' both in countries hit hardest by the crisis and those less 
affected (see also chapter by László Andor in this volume). Alongside this there is an 
increased loss of trust in traditional political elites and their ability to provide timely and
adequate policy responses to master the complex challenges of today's world. Although
the resulting challenge to traditional models of political representation is a wider 
phenomenon, which goes well beyond Europe, it has particularly drastic consequences
for the EU, which is still perceived as an elitist project.
n Geopolitical fragmentation: Europe is also facing a new form of geopolitical 
fragmentation, between the 'West' and Russia. It is too soon to judge the long-term 
impact of the political standoff with Moscow in the Union's direct neighbourhood. 
Some argue that we are witnessing a 'paradigmatic shift' spelling the biggest challenge
since the end of the Cold War, and that this will require new and deeper strategic 
thinking and a strengthening of the EU's hard power. But it is not yet clear how 
fundamental and lasting the effects of the 'Ukrainian crisis' will be on the EU's ambition
as a foreign policy actor (see the chapter by Rosa Balfour on the Union's role as a global
actor in this volume).
The European project always had to cope with centrifugal forces and some of the dimensions
of fragmentation had in one way or the other already been present before the crisis. But the
developments of recent years have acted as a catalyst aggravating some of the existing
sources of division and adding also some new ones. They have also provided a fertile ground
for populist 'anti-forces' – anti-EU, anti-euro, anti-migration, anti-establishment – on both the
left and right of the political spectrum (see the chapter by Heather Grabbe on populism in
the EU in this volume).
Altogether, the increasing fragmentation and the widespread perception that European
integration is no longer a positive-sum game for all has exposed severe cracks in the 'old
bargain' between Member States and between the EU and its citizens, which makes it
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difficult at both European and national level to convey a convincing future-oriented
'narrative' about the need for and the benefits of European integration.
Now, tackling fragmentation is not an end in itself. Citizens want the EU to provide 
answers to the problems they are facing; they want it to contribute added value in providing
prosperity, peace and democracy; they want it to protect and safeguard the 'European way of
life' in a massively changing global economic environment. A disunited Union will 
struggle to deliver adequately on these objectives. The challenge for the EU now is to find a way
to restore a higher degree of unity, heal the wounds of the crisis, develop effective 
public responses adding to efforts at national level, and articulate a new vision of the future
aiming restore the public's and elites' faith in the European project as part of the solution 
rather than part of the problem.
A New Pact based on three pillars and a new grand project
It will be one of the key tasks of the new EU leadership to identify and implement – together
with national capitals – ways to counter the different sources and dimensions of economic,
social and political fragmentation. In light of the gravity and complexity of the situation, it is
clear that there is no 'silver bullet'; there is no 'magic wand' at the European level to master
the challenge, and much will depend on developments at national level and the readiness in
the Member States to tackle long-overdue reforms.
However, one thing seems rather certain: simply consolidating past achievements will not
suffice. If EU institutions and Member States want to turn the tide, they will have to go
beyond a lowest common denominator approach, while at the same time respecting the fact
that in the current political mood the vast majority of national elites and most European
citizens are very reluctant to increase the powers of supranational institutions by pooling
core elements of national sovereignty at European level.
The EU and its members should avoid the risk of history repeating itself. When the common
currency was conceptualised and introduced, policy-makers and experts knew that the
construction of EMU was by no means perfect, but the political realities of the time did not
'allow' governments to go further. Ten years later when the euro left calm waters and began
being buffered by storms, the EU, its Member States and citizens collectively and individually
were severely hit by the consequences of these imperfections. So, even if the euro area crisis
seems better in systemic terms today than in 2012, there is a risk that Europeans will be left
asking themselves – five, ten, or 20 years down the road – why they stopped halfway when
they should have been aware of the potential dangers of failing to 'finish the job'.
So, what to do in light of the current state of the Union and the challenge of fragmentation?
While being 'pragmatically ambitious' and avoiding 'gesture politics' that capture headlines
but fail to deliver tangible results, the new EU leadership should – together with national
capitals – follow an approach aiming to create a new 'win-win' situation in which the Union
is once again perceived as a positive-sum game for all its members. To achieve this objective,
there is need for a 'New Pact for Europe' between Member States and between the EU and
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its citizens, which can replace the old permissive consensus, which has long been under
strain and has cracked under the pressure of the 'great crisis' whose aftershocks are still
buffeting Europe. 
In order to find broad support, this New Pact could be based on three main pillars as part of
a wider package deal balancing different interests between Member States and their citizens
– an 'Enabling Union', a 'Supportive Union' and 'Participatory Union', as well as a new
'grand project':2
An Enabling Union should foster sustainable growth and job creation by stimulating public
and private investment at both European and national level (see, for example, the chapter by
Malcolm Harbour on the single market), promoting and safeguarding social investment,
focussing on innovation as a key to greater productivity in a highly competitive global
environment (see chapter by Herman Van Rompuy on Europe's economic challenges), and
enhancing Europe's overall competitiveness by supporting structural reform processes,
especially in those Member States lagging behind, to ensure that all countries can do their
'homework' while remaining on the path towards fiscal consolidation. Measures to
strengthen and transform Europe's economies – implemented by Member States but
supported by the EU through, for example, a new fiscal capacity – will help to realise the
Union's combined growth potential, which is in the interest of all EU countries, irrespective
of how well they have weathered the crisis storm. So too is focusing support particularly on
countries and regions suffering from intolerable high levels of unemployment, to avoid the
waste of 'human capital' that undermines Europe's productive capacity. All this would help
address the growing economic and social divisions within the Union by relaunching the
convergence process to narrow the gap between its richest and poorest countries/regions (see
the chapter by Pawel Swieboda on solidarity and cohesion in this volume).
A Supportive Union should enhance the EU's 'caring dimension' to address concerns that
the crisis has hit some countries and citizens particularly hard, fuelling a sense of social
injustice within and between Member States. The potential measures foreseen under this
pillar would send a clear signal to Europeans that efforts to reform national economies and
social systems will always have to respect minimum social standards and will not lead to a
'race to the bottom'. Instead, a social compact including social convergence criteria and
more specific measures to support those suffering most from the crisis, including e.g. a
"complementary European unemployment scheme" (see also chapters by László Andor and
George Pagoulatos in this volume), an 'obligatory minimum support scheme' or a 'European
Mobility Fund', would flank efforts to promote Europe's economic competitiveness. Beyond
a protection of basic social rights, the Union should also enhance its capacity to ensure
respect for, and the protection and promotion of civil rights, fundamental values and
freedoms when they are encroached upon at national level. This can be done by enhancing
the EU's ability to act as a 'democratic watchdog' in response to serious breaches of its
common values.
A Participatory Union should strengthen the ties between the EU and its citizens by
increasing its democratic legitimacy. The focus here should not only be on traditional issues
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such as the powers and role of the European Commission and Parliament (see the chapter of
Fabian Zuleeg on the structure of the Commission in this volume), but also on extending
schemes to enable more people to experience the direct benefits of EU membership and
foster greater understanding of the Union; on expanding the opportunities for a frank
national and transnational dialogue within Member States and between citizens from
different EU countries; on mechanisms for strengthening the direct involvement of citizens
by bringing more voices into EU policy debates; and on ways to enhance the role of national
parliaments in European policy-making at Member State level, especially when it comes to
translating country-specific recommendations made in the framework of the European
Semester into reality.
Besides the three main pillars of a New Pact, the EU should heed the lessons of history 
and seek to identify and implement a new 'grand project' with potential knock-on 
effects in numerous policy areas and clear benefits for all EU countries – just as it 
did with the Europe '92 single market initiative – in order to break the current impasse and
provide new momentum for European integration. Given the current political and 
economic climate, an Energy Union might offer the greatest potential to demonstrate the
EU's added value and deliver genuine benefits for many different groups of Member States.
It would certainly not be an easy endeavour, but it could be the type of 'grand bargain' or
'package deal' that is required with positive spill-over effects in a range of policy 
areas (economic, environmental as well as foreign and security policy). It could be a 
political catalyst addressing the concerns of all Member States, including non-euro countries
that often feel that there is too much focus on issues related to EMU while other important
challenges are being neglected.
The measures necessary to implement a New Pact for Europe would have to be ambitious
but not overly so: almost all could be implemented on the basis of the current EU Treaties or,
if necessary, within the framework of additional intergovernmental treaties/agreements.
However, this cannot be a long-term solution. The content of the many intergovernmental
treaties/agreements of recent years ('fiscal compact treaty'; ESM treaty; agreement on the
creation of the Single Resolution Fund) should, at some point in the not-too-distant future,
be integrated into the EU's treaty framework and to do this, the Union and its members need
to start preparing the grounds for the process of treaty change.
The implementation of a New Pact could lay the foundations for this by helping to 
reverse the tide of public opinion and attitudes towards the EU, which will be essential
before any attempt can realistically be made to launch a process aimed at getting 
agreement on substantial amendments to the EU Treaties and getting those changes 
approved in all EU countries.
The European Union should use the time between now and then to prepare the 
ground for this process. Besides integrating the content of intergovernmental agreements 
into the EU Treaties, there is a need to reflect on and identify (i) the key issues and 
questions which should be addressed; (ii) the potential treaty provisions which 
should be amended, and (iii) the concrete details of the procedure for treaty change,
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including the timing, mandate and organisational set-up of a new Convention. This reflection
process could be launched in 2015, with the aim of reforming the EU Treaties in 
the next decade.
Janis A. Emmanouilidis is Director of Studies at the European Policy Centre.
Endnotes
1 The present article reflects the outcome of the New Pact for Europe (NPE) project, which aims to promote a Europe-wide debate on 
the future of Europe and is supported by a consortium of thirteen European foundations led by the King Baudouin Foundation, the 
Bertelsmann Stiftung and the European Policy Centre. A more extensive and thorough version of the basic arguments presented in this
piece can be found in the second NPE project report. For more information about the project and its reports see here:
www.newpactforeurope.eu
2 For a more thorough description of the three pillars of a 'New Pact for Europe' and potential concrete measures see the second report
of the New Pact for Europe project. 
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